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“We are not born equal; we become equal  
as members of a group on the strength of our  
decision to grant ourselves mutually equal rights.” 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1973:301  
 
 
“groups cannot be assigned rights unless they are 
first assigned members” 
Michael Walzer, Pluralism in Political Perspective, 1982:20 
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Map of Middle East and North Africa (MENA)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The map shows Sudan before partition into Sudan and South Sudan, i.e. prior to July 2011. 
 
 
Source: University of Notre Dame, http://ocw.nd.edu/arabic-and-middle-east-studies/islamic-societies-of-the-
middle-east-and-north-africa-religion-history-and-culture/Images/middle-east-and-north-africa-political-
map/image_view_fullscreen, accessed 26 August 2012. 
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Abstract 
The four articles that constitute the thesis are qualitative case-oriented comparative studies 
of the politics of citizenship in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). The ‘politics 
of citizenship’ refers to the relationship between forms of membership in the state and 
patterns of participation in the polity, as reflected in six Arab states. Two articles are case 
studies on Lebanon and Syria respectively. Two articles are comparative studies. One 
compares the politics of citizenship in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. The other compares 
female citizenship in light of family law reform in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria. 
The thesis looks into the process of state formation and analyzes the political impact 
of the organization and distribution of power along gendered and religious lines in Arab 
states. The emphasis on the state’s demos, the Greek word for ‘population’, seeks to 
highlight how ‘the people’ is constituted upon which kratos, the Greek word for governance, 
is carried out. A theoretical and analytical focus on the constitution of the demos challenges 
democratization theories and analytical approaches that do not account for degrees of 
exclusiveness or inclusiveness of those who constitute members of contemporary Arab 
polities (citizens and denizens), and residents in territorial states (stateless, refugees, 
noncitizen workforce). Hence, the ‘politicization of the demos’ reflects that individuals and 
groups are included or excluded from the citizenry, as well as from full membership in the 
polity, in ways that are continuously addressed, reframed and sought settled within 
contemporary Arab states since the establishment of territoriality as organizing principle in 
MENA after 1920. 
Among the main conclusions of the thesis is that the legal status of women as full 
members of the polity in MENA is a political cursor that reflects the comprehensive 
democratization of society. Female civil rights are not only ‘women’s issues’. The use of state 
power in institutionalizing and distributing civil rights among and between citizens in society 
reflects central issues of consent and dissent pertaining to how, and in which ways, power is 
organized and allocated within the polity. Seen from a state formation perspective, female 
citizens are ‘the masses’ in present-day Arab polities. The thesis provides analytical and 
theoretical tools that enable researchers and observers to understand and explore further 
political development in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
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1 Introduction 
In this thesis I analyze how the politics of citizenship (independent variable) represents a 
central strategy that contributes to the survival of the regime (dependent variable) in 
different states in the Middle East.4 The ‘politics of citizenship’ is seen in terms of forms of 
membership in the state which are separate from, but intimately related to, patterns of 
participation in the polity. The politics of citizenship is furthermore analytically defined as 
encompassing a relationship between structural and procedural elements of citizenship.  
My main argument throughout the thesis is that the politics of citizenship structures 
the relationship between rulers and ruled in Arab states in ways which enable the political 
regime to ensure its control over the state. A central analytical approach is the political 
impact of the organization and distribution of power along gendered lines. I argue that 
variations in the politics of citizenship account for distinctions in the organization of political 
power in different Middle Eastern states, and that these variations reflect central features of 
regime survival. 
The thesis takes as its point of departure the universal recognition of territorial 
sovereignty as the organizing principle of contemporary Arab states as well as international 
politics. This understanding, though sometimes challenged by insurgent groups at the 
domestic level, is well entrenched and accepted by incumbent rulers in contemporary states 
in the Middle East. The establishment of territorial states in the Middle East in the aftermath 
of the First World War involved political and legal decisions which merged the geopolitical 
and economic interests of great powers as well as local nationalist ideologies in creating 
independent and sovereign political entities in MENA.5 
                                                          
4 The ‘Middle East’ refers here to 18 (out of a total of 22) members of The Arab League: Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Palestinian Authorities, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (hereafter UAE), Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The terms ‘Middle East’ and MENA, 
i.e. the Middle East and North Africa region, are here used interchangeably. A regional subdivision in MENA is a 
distinction between a western part, in this thesis including Egypt, usually referred to as Maghreb in Arabic, and 
an eastern part that includes Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, The Palestinian Territories and Iraq, usually referred to as 
Mashreq in Arabic. ‘Gulf states’ includes the six member states of the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GGC): Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Bahrain. 
5 Inga Brandell, ed. State frontiers: borders and boundaries in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 2006), 14. The 
‘territorial state’ is defined along Max Weber’s understanding as stretching over specific geographical space 
within which political authority is exercised through the use of more or less degrees of coercive force that often 
include – among other measures – taxation, conscription and abiding to state laws that power holders form 
and enforce. Roger Owen, State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East  (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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In each of the four chapters that constitute the thesis, I point at how state power is 
both a precondition for establishing membership policies, and a main distributor of 
membership status whether we seek to address questions pertaining to membership in the 
state, membership in a religious group, or as means to analyze the structuring of legal 
capacity of citizens based on gender differences. The thesis illuminates intersections where 
varying degrees and forms of membership in Middle Eastern states are legally and politically 
constitutive. These variances shed light on how the politicization of the demos, i.e. the ways 
in which individuals and groups are included or excluded from the citizenry (non-citizens), as 
well as from full membership in the polity (female citizens) are continuously addressed, 
reframed and sought settled in Middle Eastern states. 
The four articles that constitute the thesis are qualitative case-oriented as well as a 
comparative studies of the politics of citizenship as reflected in six Arab states – Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria. Two articles are case studies: one is on 
Lebanon (chapter 2), the other on Syria (chapter 4). Two articles are comparative studies: In 
chapter 3, the politics of citizenship in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon is compared, while 
chapter 5 is a comparative study of female citizenship in light of family law reform in Egypt, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Syria. 
The case study on Lebanon discussed in chapter 2 addresses the enumeration 
process of the Lebanese citizenry in 1932, the ensuing politicization of demographic figures, 
and its impact on the establishment and perpetuation of sectarianism at the 
representational level.  The Lebanese state is analysed as a membership organization where 
both formal-legal and political objectives control admission. The 1932 census played a 
fundamental role in the state-building process of the Lebanese state: political representation 
was grounded on its findings, it was the basis for personal registration of the population 
residing on Lebanese territories, and it formed one of the cornerstones for obtaining 
citizenship in the Lebanese state. My main finding is the mere presentation of the results of 
the 1932 census itself – a well-preserved and mystified ‘non-topic’, judging from the 
significance the findings have had on the political construction of power-sharing in the 
Lebanese state. In chapter 2 I show how the results of the census and  the way the census 
figures were presented and analysed embody issues of contest regarding the identity of the 
Lebanese state and who its members should be. Restrictive citizenship policies practiced by 
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the Maronite-dominated regime until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 were, I argue, 
means to sustain political domination of a particular group in an ethnically divided society. 
Lebanon provides an example of the political sensitivity of demographic figures in 
polities where fixed proportional representation constitutes the main principle of 
representative political organization. The article presents a critical assessment of the 
consociational democracy thesis, initially presented by the Dutch American political scientist 
Arend Lijphart, which supports power-sharing formulas among political leaders in divided 
societies. I argue that consociationalism can at best be seen as a viable mode of governance 
which ensures stability rather than democracy. My main argument in support of this 
understanding is that the self-evident definition process of ‘the master group’ of people 
which Lijphart implicitly builds his theory on consociational democracy upon, is itself a 
political composition. I emphasize how state power is instrumental in defining, organizing 
and sustaining confessional groups, or more precisely, the political significance of 
institutionalizing citizens as members of confessional groups. As such, membership in a 
‘primordial’ religious group does not only reflect and represent an individual’s ascriptive 
identity. Membership in religious groups is itself a result of membership policies that 
structure citizens’ inclusion in polity and state in ways that establish, sustain and perpetuate 
oligarchic and sectarian rather than democratic forms of political representation. 
The discussion in chapter 3 is a critique of a hypothesis presented by the Lebanese 
political scientist Ghassan Salamé who proposed that the organization and recognition of 
societal difference in Lebanon and Kuwait has promoted democratization and political 
pluralism as observed in the experiences of these states with regards to their democratic 
experiences of power-sharing since independence. I discuss how democratic forms of 
governance in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon are linked to the processes of state-building of 
these states. My main argument is that the relationship between pluralism and 
democratization is more complex and problematic than Salamé accounts for because we can 
identify both inclusive and exclusive forms of political pluralism in Jordan, Kuwait and 
Lebanon at different historical points in the modern history of the three states. I argue that 
political pluralism as found in these divided states is multifaceted and dependent on how we 
define and approach political pluralism theoretically and analytically. The politics of 
citizenship as established and practiced in these divided states reflects variations in forms of 
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membership in the polity, and patterns of political participation since the establishment of 
the state which can be seen in terms of regime survival.  
Along with the other chapters in the thesis, chapter 3 presents a contribution to 
debates regarding multiculturalist formulas of group-based citizenship. The salience of 
political models that prescribe the distribution of rights in a polity in ways that conform to a 
group-based citizenship regime have since 1995 been proposed by Canadian political 
philosopher Will Kymlicka in his seminal book Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of 
minority rights. The merits of power-sharing and the legacy of group-based citizenship are 
likewise emphasized by contemporary proponents of conflict resolution based on 
consociationalist formulas.6 Among the conclusions drawn in chapter 3 is that membership 
policies in the state should be focused upon because the question of defining the state’s 
demos has gone – and is still going – through different consolidation phases. It is, I argue, 
important to be aware of the instrumental role and impact of the politics of citizenship in 
divided states because membership policies and participatory projects in these states 
provide a comprehensive picture of the nature and transitions of different forms of political 
pluralism. 
Chapter 4 explores the impact of legal pluralism7 through family law8. I discuss 
how the proliferation of mutually contradictory legal rules at the state level impacts 
on the structuring of gendered citizenship in Syria where the state’s family law accords 
male and female citizens different legal status. The result is the ordering of the 
distribution of basic rights and duties along sectarian and gendered lines. Syria differs 
from other Muslim majority states in the Arab world in that the shari’a, i.e. the set of 
Islamic laws, tenets and jurisprudence, do not represent the main corpus of religious 
laws that exist as legitimate sources of legislation and promulgation of family law in 
the state. In Syria, there are eight different family laws that regulate the rights and 
duties of citizens in private legal matters (eg. marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody 
and maintenance). Plurality in family laws results in segmented autonomy in the 
                                                          
6 Sid Noel, From power sharing to democracy: post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies  (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). 
7 ‘Legal pluralism’ denotes the existence of a multiplicity of legal sources that prevail parallel with state laws. 
See Maurits Berger, Laila al Zwaini, and Baudouin Dupret, Legal pluralism in the Arab world  (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999). The impact of the phenomenon of legal pluralism in Arab polities is elaborated upon 
particularly in part 4.  
8 ‘Family law’ refers to rules that regulate marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody and maintenance. The terms 
‘family law’ and ‘personal status law’ are used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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regulation of personal affairs of citizens who are thereby seen by the state apparatus 
as members of religious groups rather than as citizens. 
My two main findings are first that, seen in theoretical terms, family law plays 
a crucial role in structuring gendered citizenship in ways that limit the legal authority 
of female citizens as full members of the polity; second, that the partial centralization 
and fragmented secularization of judicial authority related to the accommodation of 
religious groups under the auspices of religious freedom provides powerful venues for 
the secular Baathist regime in maintaining authoritarian rule. The impact of family law 
on citizenship is exacerbated in that membership in religious groups is mandated and 
monitored by the state apparatus. In chapter 4 I point at how pressures to expand 
female citizenship as part of the political regime’s liberalization efforts after 2003 
reflects how the Syrian regime sustains and nurtures a patriarchal bargain with the 
conservative religious establishment in order to ensure its rule at the expense of 
bolstering women’s civil and citizenship rights.  
Most studies on family law in the Middle East focus on the position of women 
within Islam and Islamic shari’a. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical contribution, as well 
as an empirical study, to discussions pertaining to family law in a divided and 
multireligious state in the Middle East where Islamic law constitutes one among 
several other religious laws. The article emphasizes the role in which state power plays 
in sustaining segmented autonomy of different confessional groups in the sphere of 
family law. It emphasizes also the impact of political calculations among majority and 
minority groups in society and how these permeate the organization of political power 
in a multireligious state.  
Chapter 5 is a comparative study of female citizenship in light of pressures for reform 
in family law in Egypt, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon since 1990 until 2010. I present a 
pairwise most similar approach by comparing two Muslim majority states in the Maghreb 
(Egypt and Morocco) and two multireligious states in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon). The 
article explores the relationship between type of court system, pressures for parliamentary 
reform and expanded female citizenship in the four states. My main finding is that female 
citizens have acquired wider civil rights through parliament in relatively homogenous states 
with unitary court systems than in multireligious states with dual court systems. Seen in a 
state-building perspective, reforms during the 1950s in Egypt and Morocco established 
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unitary courts, curbed the clerical judicial authority over family law, and weakened the 
resilience of conservative religious authorities. In Morocco and Egypt, renewed pressures for 
reform after 1990, particularly through the impact of economic globalization, yielded a 
sharper focus on female civil rights. In Syria and Lebanon, by contrast, the sustaining of dual 
courts since the establishment of independent states in the 1940s safeguard the judicial 
autonomy of clerics and enable them to resist pressures for family law reform more 
forcefully. In these states little or no change occurred because the interests of political and 
religious authorities converge and bolster group-based citizenship in ways that perpetuate 
sectarian group membership which constrain the civil rights of female citizens. 
 
1.1 Elaboration of main thematic issues discussed in the thesis 
The four articles that constitute the thesis address two main themes and a subset of 
theoretical problems related to both themes. 
One main theme evolves around what I identify as problems related to the formation 
and establishment of ‘legal citizenship’.  The establishment and formation of legal citizenship 
is related to the state-building process of territorial states and reflects processes whereby 
state power and force is used as means through which individuals are classified as members 
of the state. In the thesis, I argue that the establishment of the citizenry in different states in 
the Middle East has been politicized since the establishment of independent states. 
Particularly in divided states such as Lebanon, Kuwait and Jordan, naturalization and 
denaturalization policies have included and excluded members of the state in ways which is 
in accordance with the survival strategies of the political regimes.  
The subset of theoretical issues related to the formation and establishment of legal 
citizenship are addressed and elaborated on further in parts 3 and 6 of this chapter. Some of 
these questions are related to processes of state formation, conditions related to power-
sharing as governance strategy in divided states, and analytical approaches related to 
defining and understanding the concept of ‘pluralism’ in divided states. 
The other main theme discussed throughout the thesis evolves around what I identify 
as particular challenges and problems related to establishing ‘civil citizenship’ in Arab states. 
Civil citizenship reflects processes related to the distribution of equal civil rights among 
citizens in the polity. I emphasize the importance of analyzing states in the Middle East as 
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predominantly non-liberal polities where state power is central in establishing, sustaining 
and perpetuating the unequal distribution of civil rights among the citizenry. At center here 
is the political regime’s management of religious law as part of state law through the 
organization and institutionalization of clerical authority, the codification and re-codification 
of religious tenets as part of the state’s family law, and the contractual relationship between 
rulers and ruled pertaining to type of citizenship regime that is to permeate the normative 
principles of the allocation of rights within the polity. I focus particularly on the challenges 
related to the inclusion of female citizens as full members of the polity in different Arab 
states. I dwell more on analytical and theoretical aspects related to addressing questions 
pertaining to civil citizenship in part 4 of this chapter. 
My main point of departure with reference to addressing the challenges pertaining to 
civil citizenship in Middle Eastern states is the gendered and unequal distribution of civil 
rights in the polity between male and female citizens. I argue that the unequal distribution of 
civil rights between males and females should also be seen in terms of the use of state 
power in institutionalizing and distributing civil rights in contemporary Arab states. The 
subset of theoretical and analytical issues related to pressures and counterpressures against 
the establishment of civil citizenship include the impact of legal pluralism in the realm of 
family law in Arab societies, the fruitfulness of drawing an analytical distinction between 
‘group-based citizenship’ and ‘individually-based citizenship’ as two ideal models that 
distinguish forms of membership in the polity, the impact of globalization and transnational 
pressures as societal transformation forces, and the points of intersection between human 
rights and citizenship rights as two different but potentially mutually constitutive sets of 
rights. 
 
1.2 The citizenship approach 
In Citizenship and the state in the Middle East: Approaches and applications, Butenschøn 
argued that a theoretical and analytical perspective where citizenship constitutes a level of 
analysis is particularly relevant to the Middle East, “a region where the purpose of state 
power seems to be an unresolved question today as at any time before.”9 A decade and 
                                                          
9 Nils A. Butenschøn, "State power and citizenship in the Middle East: A theoretical introduction," in Citizenship 
and the State in the Middle East, ed. Uri Davis Nils A. Butenschøn, and Manuel Hassassian (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2000), 6. 
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numerous revolts later, this observation still stands true. Radical changes in the stagnant 
political leadership have put the established Arab political order in question. At the time of 
writing, citizens in several Arab states are demanding constitutional reforms, carving out 
new electoral laws, shaping new political parties and parliaments, and reformulating the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. In other words, Arab citizens are redefining the rules 
of the game of citizenship seen as a political participatory project. 
Rather than the inclusionary traits with which citizenship is ideally connoted with in 
liberal democracies, the relationship between rulers and ruled in the Middle East has been 
characterized by predominantly exclusionary traits since the establishment of independent 
Arab states. Constitutional rules have existed in form but not in essence, political 
participation has been severely restricted, and different forms of coercive measures – 
including the use of violence on a systematic basis – have been applied in order to sustain 
rulers’ grip on power through the state apparatus. These measures have paved the way for 
an array of authoritarian and non-democratic political regimes characterized by remarkable 
long-term stability.10 What in this thesis is understood as ‘the politics of citizenship’ has, in 
other words, been primarily based on the use of force by those holding power over the state 
in ways that have yielded continuous resentment and opposition among the ruled. 
In this thesis, the ‘politics of citizenship’ is defined as encompassing a relationship 
between structural and procedural elements of citizenship. Structural elements relate to 
policies that regulate membership in the state such as enumeration processes, censuses, 
citizenship laws, family laws, naturalization and immigration policies and resident permits. 
Political participation is understood broadly as the involvement of citizens and long term 
residents in the formation of rules and laws that are to apply in society.11 Participation 
occurs through pressures and demands presented by social groups (eg. occupational, 
economic, religious, ethnic, tribal, human rights and women’s associations) as well as 
through electoral and parliamentary processes. The politics of citizenship is seen in terms of 
                                                          
10 Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie, Stabilitetens pris: stat og politikk i Midtøsten [The price of stability: state and 
politics in the Middle East]  (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2007). In the Norwegian original edition published in 2007 
the authors placed emphasis on the remarkable stability of political regimes in the Middle East. In the English 
edition published in 2011, ‘change’ was added in the title, reflecting the revolutions and uprisings in the Arab 
world which started that year. See Kjetil Selvik, Stig Stenslie, and John Meyrick, Stability and change in the 
modern Middle East  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
11 To define a particular time limit that denotes what ‘long term’ implies raises many problems related to 
involuntary and voluntary forms of residence. I define here, nevertheless, a decade as an approximate measure 
of ‘long term residency’. 
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forms of membership in the state which are separate from, but intimately related to, 
patterns of participation in the polity. 
The questions dealt with in the four articles that constitute this dissertation can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
i) How does the politics of citizenship reflect the organization and distribution of 
power in the polity in ways that impinge on the survival of the regime? 
 
ii) Where do we find political arenas of contestation through which inclusionary 
and exclusionary forms of citizenship are established, sustained and 
redefined? 
 
iii) In which ways do external and internal pressures for change impact on the 
politics of citizenship in different states in the Middle East? 
 
1.3 Outline of this chapter 
In this chapter I introduce the theoretical and analytical foundation – the qa’ida12 so to 
speak – on which my research on citizenship in the Middle East builds upon. Chapter 1 
allows a presentation of the methodological choices applied in the different articles. 
Although these differ according to the case study at hand and the various themes chosen, 
the methodological tools and analytical perspectives can be viewed as part of an 
encompassing theoretical framework which permits me to situate my research within the 
larger body of research on citizenship. This chapter offers thus an opportunity to reflect on 
some of the arguments presented in the four published articles, and to indicate how these 
relate to broader questions pertaining to political order in the Middle East and the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. 
The concept of citizenship is central in the dissertation and constitutes as such a level 
of analysis through which the abovementioned questions are addressed and discussed. In 
part 1 of this chapter, I elaborate on the use and application of the concept of citizenship as 
a level of analysis. I present a table that illustrates points of entanglement between 
                                                          
12 The Arabic word ‘qa’ida’ means ‘fundament’ or ‘basis’. For more on Arabic as language, see Rania Maktabi, 
"Arabisk i verden," in Fokus på språk, ed. Johanne Ostad og Gunvor Mejdell (Halden: Fremmedspråksenteret, 
2010). The report can be retrieved at 
http://www.fremmedspraksenteret.no/nor/fremmedspraksenteret/forskning-og-utvikling/fokus-pa-
sprak/fullstendig-publikasjonsliste, accessed 8 January 2012. 
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inclusionary and exclusionary forms of membership and participation pertaining to 
citizenship as analytical concept. 
The two first articles, chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, were published more than a 
decade ago. A glimpse back in time where I trace the initial links between the four articles is 
therefore provided in part 2 entitled ‘On membership’. There, I comment on reflections 
evoked in the course of reading Michael Walzer’s inspirational Spheres of Justice, particularly 
chapter 2 in that book entitled ‘membership’. I parry Walzer’s explicit limitations to who and 
how members are included in a particular polity by problematizing the term ‘demos’13 and 
presenting a figure entitled ‘spheres of membership’. This figure may serve as a visual 
guideline that reflects various forms of legal status categories and forms of membership in 
MENA. 
In part 3 I elaborate on themes related to the establishment of legal citizenship as 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The process of constituting the citizenry and establishing the 
state’s legitimate members is viewed as a conundrum of citizenship. Establishing legal 
citizenship involves particular problems in  states that are often referred to as ‘plural’ or 
‘divided’, and I discuss the term ‘pluralism’ with reference to citizenship in these states. In 
this part I present a critique of consociationalism as political agenda and multiculturalist 
approaches that bolster group-based citizenship. 
In part 4 I elaborate on what is perceived as a second conundrum of citizenship 
pertaining to dilemmas and conflicts related to attempts at forming civil citizenship, i.e. the 
establishment of equal civil rights among citizens in the polity. I focus on two main themes 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5: first, the impact of the codification of religious law as state 
law in the judicial and legal institutions of the state; second, the relationship between family 
law and female citizenship in MENA. In a typology over female citizenship I differentiate 
between individually-based and group-based citizenship regimes and point at the analytical 
relevance of viewing political regimes in light of policies that include female citizens in MENA 
as full members of the polity. 
As a concept, citizenship is heavily associated with the historical experiences of 
western democracies. In part 5 I point out that this historical link impels ontological and 
epistemological considerations towards the study of citizenship in states in the Middle East 
                                                          
13 ‘Demos’ is the Greek word for ‘people’ and refers broadly to those who are full and legitimate members of 
the polity. I elaborate more on the term in part 2. 
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which are basically illiberal polities. I discuss the epistemological approach applied by the 
Arabist legal historian Gianluca Parolin in Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and 
nation-state.14 His is, I argue, a ‘culturalist’ study which limits the focus of ‘kinship’ and 
‘religion’ to their cultural features. In contrast to Parolin’s epistemological approach, my 
approach can be seen as ‘structuralist’, in the sense that variables such as individuals’ 
membership in groups (whether ethnic, religious or tribal) is problematized as part of my 
analysis on the politicization of the demos. The exploration on the significance of different 
ontological and epistemological approaches serves as backdrop to the theoretical outline 
and the methodological choices I have made in the course of imploring into the politics of 
citizenship in the Middle East. 
In part 6, I situate my research on citizenship in the Middle East within a wider 
theoretical context on state formation and democratization as outlined by Stein Rokkan and 
Reinhard Bendix. I comment on two of Rokkan’s tables on state-formation and nation-
building by supplementing them with two additional analytical concepts – ‘legal citizenship’ 
which refers to the constitution of the citizenry, and ‘civil citizenship’ which refers to the 
equalization of civil rights among the citizenry, particularly the equalization of civil rights 
between male and female citizens. I point out that a distinction between legal citizenship 
and civil citizenship is significant in two respects: first, it highlights central features 
pertaining to the establishment of political order; second, it reflects points of conflict 
pertaining to the proliferation of legal pluralism in the judicial sphere in contemporary states 
in the Middle East. 
In part 7, I introduce and discuss the methodological approaches applied in the 
different articles that constitute the thesis and discuss some of their strengths and 
weaknesses. I comment on some of the advantages and disadvantages in perceiving political 
processes within a Rokkanian analytical framework, and then point at the sets of 
instruments used to operationalize the politics of citizenship. 
In part 8, I present a set of conclusions over the three broadly outlined questions 
pointed at the beginning of the introduction. In this conclusive part I discuss how the 
politicization of the demos relates to what some researchers have pointed out at as a 
                                                          
14 Gianluca P. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state  (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2009). 
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tension between citizenship and human rights. Finally, I draw conclusions with reference to 
understanding democratization as a political process in the Middle East. 
 
1.4 Citizenship as level of analysis 
How can the concept of citizenship be used in order to examine the relationship between 
rulers and ruled in states of the Middle East? In which ways does citizenship represent a 
fruitful level of analysis that throws light on political structures of power in Arab polities?15  
The application of a ‘level of analysis’ approach is usually related to studies pertaining 
to international relations. A level of analysis approach reflects an analytical framework 
where events are sought described and explained by separating between three particular 
levels of analysis – the individual level, the state level and the international system level.16 In 
this thesis, the use of citizenship as level of analysis differs from the traditional way whereby 
researchers seek to distinguish between these particular three levels.17 Evidently, a focus on 
citizenship understood as membership in the state and as contractual relationship between 
rulers and ruled is state-centered. Nevertheless, approaching citizenship through a level of 
analysis is helpful in orienting my focus on looking for structural and procedural aspects 
pertaining to the politics of citizenship, and in suggesting appropriate and relevant types of 
evidence to explore.  
An application of citizenship as a level of analysis in this thesis is to be understood as 
analytical means to explore into various categories of perspectives and explanations that 
display and reflect the structures and procedures of the politics of citizenship. Among the 
procedures discussed in depth as part of the theoretical and methodological deliberations in 
parts 6 and 7 are processes of state formation, the establishment of judicial institutions, the 
codification of family law within the polity and the use of power by rulers in defining and 
redefining the citizenry of the state. 
Given the nature of the thesis as comprising four separate but interrelated articles, 
the set of independent and dependent variables vary for each article. However, throughout 
the articles, membership and procedural aspects pertaining to citizenship are highlighted in 
                                                          
15 Butenschøn, "State power and citizenship in the Middle East: A theoretical introduction," 12. 
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001).  
17 Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of international relations  (New York: Norton, 2008), 57-59. 
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order to point at the variety in patterns of citizenship policies and citizenship regimes that 
define and redefine the demos of the state. Hence, the politics of citizenship varies in each 
state under study and contributes in diverse ways to strategies for the survival of the regime, 
analytically seen as the dependent variable in the four articles.  
Applying citizenship as level of analysis helps, in other words, developing appropriate 
questions with reference to each article as well as with respect to comparison across cases. 
The level of analysis approach towards the studying of the politics of citizenship is 
furthermore useful in searching for fruitful variables in each case and with reference to 
considering various types of evidence explored in the analysis of the relationship between 
rulers and ruled in states in the Middle East. 
Basically denoting a contractual relationship between a person and a sovereign state, 
citizenship grew historically out of the development of royal sovereignty into popular 
sovereignty following the decline of feudalism in western societies.18 The emancipatory and 
participatory political project introduced by the French revolution through the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen) of 1789 is 
intimately connected with the concept of citizenship whereby new subject / citizen 
constellations were created and where a citizen was distinguished “as an individual and not 
as a member of a community, manor, guild or parish.” 19 As such, citizenship can be seen as 
one of several ‘modes of membership’, so to say, in which an individual can belong to and 
participate in a social group, a community or a polity. Forms of membership characterize 
thus central features of citizenship both in terms of who is included as members, on what 
terms, and the extent of their participation. 
Kymlicka and Norman captured these distinctions when they defined citizenship as 
comprising two compatible but separate aspects. According to them, ‘citizenship-as-legal-
status’ denotes “full membership in a particular political community”, while ‘citizenship-as-
desirable-activity’ reflects a process “where the extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a 
                                                          
18 Reinhard Bendix, Kings or people: power and the mandate to rule  (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California 
Press, 1978), 5-9. 
19 John Tehranian James C. Scott, and Jeremy Mathias, "The Production of Legal Identities Proper to States: The 
Case of the Permanent Family Surname," Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 1 (2002): 16, 
emphasis in original. 
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function of one’s participation in that community.”20 This distinction overlaps partly with the 
inherent structural and procedural elements of citizenship. It corresponds also with the 
Arabic terminological pairs ‘jinsiyya’ and ‘muwatana’, defined by Davis as ‘passport 
citizenship’ and ‘democratic citizenship’ respectively.21 
At the time, Kymlicka and Norman alerted us of two hazards when it came to 
applying citizenship as an analytical concept: first, the scope of a monolithic ‘theory of 
citizenship’ is potentially limitless, they argued, since “almost every problem in political 
philosophy involves relations among citizens or between citizens and the state”22; second, 
they warned against the danger of conflating the two different concepts of citizenship, i.e. 
‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ and ‘citizenship-as desirable-activity’.  
I deal with the first warning, which is both relevant and appropriate as part of my 
discussion on the theoretical framework under part 6. The second warning, however, 
constitutes a cornerstone in my elaboration on citizenship seen through the lens of legal 
status categories in the Middle East. For, Kymlicka and Norman explicitly exhibited quite 
plainly one particular blind spot in their own definition: they assume ‘full membership’ when 
they define citizenship in terms of a ‘legal status’. This premise fails to problematize the 
different shades of membership statuses, and the conflicts embedded in ‘less than full 
membership’ as observed in most states in the Middle East.  
The distinction Kymlicka and Norman made between membership and participation 
is nevertheless analytically constructive, despite – or perhaps precisely because of – their 
assumption of ‘full membership’ as an implicit part of the institution of citizenship. What I 
view as the two authors’ shortcoming constitutes, in other words, my main point of 
intervention into what I address as questions related to the politicization of the demos in 
Middle Eastern political systems. This refers to the ways in which individuals and groups are 
included or excluded from the citizenry (non-citizens), as well as from full membership in the 
                                                          
20 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of 
Europe," in Theorizing citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany, N.Y.: Sate University of New York Press, 1995), 
284, my emphasis.  
21 Uri Davis, Citizenship and the state: a comparative study of citizenship legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, 
Syria and Lebanon  (Reading: Ithaca, 1997), 6. Parolin points that the Arabic term ‘jinsiyya’ is “an abstract term 
built on jins, a borrowing from the Greek term ghènos which in Arabic kept the meaning of ‘genus’, ‘race’, 
‘species’.” Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state: 124. In Norwegian, there exist a 
similar lexical distinction between ‘statsborgerskap’ which reflects membership aspects as in the English term 
‘nationality’, and ‘medborgerskap’ which emphasizes participatory aspects in the state. 
22 Norman, "Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe," 284. 
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polity (such as the majority of female citizens), and how questions related to these inclusions 
and exclusions are addressed, sought settled and reformed in each state. 
The demarcation between ‘legal status’ and ‘desirable activity’ with regards to 
citizenship explains the distinction I make between aspects related to membership in the 
state and aspects related to participation in the polity. Certainly, the two features of 
citizenship – membership and participation – are intimately connected, and I expand on the 
obvious links and their fusion throughout the dissertation. Nevertheless, I make the point 
that not only are the two aspects of citizenship separable, but that their separation is of 
ontological, epistemological and methodological, and – therefore evidently – of political 
significance.23 
The separation is, for instance, fruitful for analytical purposes for typologizing 
political regimes, modes of governance – both democratic and non-democratic –, as well as 
type of citizenship regime sustained through state power.24 At the center here are patterns 
of contractual relationships between rulers and ruled. These reflect the boundaries that are 
invariably set and continuously shaped and reshaped in support of, or in opposition to the 
political regime’s citizenship policies regarding non-citizens and stateless on the one hand, 
and female citizens on the other. As pointed at in table 1 presented further below, different 
patterns of inclusions and exclusions based on the expansion or contraction of those 
included as the demos of the polity give rise to different forms of political regimes 
dependent on the degrees of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of modes of participation. 
A second approach follows from the introduction of the process of democratization 
of a polity as normative political goal. O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead emphasize, for 
instance, that “[d]emocracy’s guiding principle is that of citizenship”, adding:  
Democratization, thus refers to the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are 
either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, 
social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not 
previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic 
minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to 
                                                          
23 I deliberate further on ontological and epistemological considerations in relation to the study of citizenship in 
non-western and non-liberal polities in part 5. 
24 I differentiate between ‘individually-based citizenship’ where civil and political rights are distributed on an 
individual basis, and ‘group-based citizenship’ whereby civil and political rights are contingent on a citizen’s 
membership in a religious, ethnic and / or religious group. I elaborate more on ‘citizenship regimes’ in part 2. 
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citizens participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest 
associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.). 25 
 
At the center in this approach towards citizenship is democratization understood as a 
process based on models of membership configurations where broader segments of 
residents in or inhabitants of, the state are included as full members of the polity on the one 
hand, or the broadening of arenas and issues subject to participation on the other. 
Butenschøn provides a third approach that underpins the distinction between 
membership and participation. In a discussion on ethnic conflict and democracy, he indicates 
the logical ranking between ‘first-order problems’ and ‘second-order problems’ which reflect 
and substantiate aspects related to membership and participation at two different levels. 
While first-order problems relate to the “constitution of the demos, the political entity’s 
demographic identity and extent”, second-order problems refer to the constitution of 
political order based on a particular definition of who constitutes the demos where 
agreement is reached regarding an organizing principle for the political system, i.e. the 
regime that is to rule in the name of the state. At the center here is the establishment and 
sustaining of a particular state idea, that is normatively guiding conceptions regarding the 
identity of the state that express and reflect what the purpose of the state should be and 
who should constitute its members.26  
Whichever approach towards studying citizenship: i) the ‘descriptive analytic’ which 
reflect typologies regarding contractual relationships between rulers and ruled and variances 
in patterns of inclusion and exclusion in polity and state; ii) the democratization perspective 
that looks at particularly inclusionary patterns of expansion of the citizenry and extension of 
issues defined as political; and iii) an approach that seeks to distinguish and analyze 
problems related to first-order issues pertaining to the constitution of the demos, and 
                                                          
25 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, "IV. Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies," in Transtitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects fro Democracy, ed. Philippe C. 
Schmitter Guillermo O'Donnell, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 7-8. 
26 ‘State-idea’ refers to conceptions regarding the identity of the state and to normative foundations expressing 
what the purpose of the state should be and who constitute its members. The state idea of a polity can 
sometimes be read in the state’s Constitution according to Nils A. Butenschøn, "The politics of ethnocracies: 
strategies and dilemmas of ethnic domination," in Working paper 01/93 (Oslo: Department of Political Science, 
University of Oslo, 1993), 15-18. Butenschøn refers to Richard Hartshorne, "The functional approach in political 
geography," 40 Annals: Association of American Geographers (1950). On ‘first-order problems’ and ‘second-
order problems’, see Nils A. Butenschøn, "Etnisk konflikt og demokrati," in Demokrati: vilkår og virkninger, ed. 
Bjørn Erik Rasch and Knut Midgaard (Bergen-Sandviken: Fagbokforl., 1998), 249, emphasis in original, my 
translation. 
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second-order issues related to shaping the political order, it is my belief that whether and 
how we as researchers distinguish between questions related to membership and those 
related to participation, and the relation between them, impacts on our understanding of 
the state in the Middle East as a unique membership organization endowed with sovereign 
powers. 
 
1.5 Citizenship between membership and participation 
Pressures for political change after 2011 herald potential structural reforms and 
transformation in the relationship between and among rulers and ruled in the Middle East. 
However, potential political reforms are dependent on the historical experiences of these 
states with regards to the impact of the politics of citizenship on the survival of the regime. 
The politics of citizenship is seen as a complex interplay between structural and procedural 
aspects whereby citizenship is applied as a level of analysis in order to highlight how rulers 
seek to establish and sustain their rule in different states in the Middle East.  
Common to both the structural and procedural elements of citizenship is the 
inclusionary and exclusionary policies that evolve, and their impact on the survival of the 
regime and the perpetuation of incumbent rulers’ hold on power over the state apparatus. A 
main impact of the politics of citizenship on regime survival is, I argue, the politicization of 
the demos in the Middle East, i.e. the various ways in which long-term resident individuals 
and groups are included and excluded from full membership in the state.  
Ayubi points at the fruitfulness of applying ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ as concepts 
when studying politics in Arab states:  
[t]he concept of inclusion / exclusion is more useful than restricted concepts of representation and 
participation because it implies both socio-economic and political involvement […] We have a whole 
variety of ‘arrangements’ […] for sorting out the relationship between the groups and the state. Some 
of these arrangements are collaborative and inclusionary: tribal confederations, national fronts, 
populist coalitions, ethnic consociations, etc.; while some are more conflictual and exclusionary: 
subordination, encapsulation and segmentary ‘capture’ of the state apparatus.27 
 
In the Middle East, the politics of citizenship can, on the one hand, be inclusive in character 
in the sense that more segments of the population are able to partake in decision-making 
                                                          
27 Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state: politics and society in the Middle East  (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1995), 33-34. 
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pertaining to the formation of rules that are to apply within the boundaries of the territorial 
state.  
I argue that the expansion of the demos occurs either through the inclusion of non-
citizens as members of the state and / or through expanding the membership basis by 
including women as full members of the polity. The politics of citizenship can also be 
inclusive in the sense that participation evolves around wider sets of issues and/or that 
social institutions are subject to political decisions along more democratic lines (extending 
“issues political”). Such issues include the politicization of membership issues that impinge 
on family law, citizenship or immigration policies in ways that expand the demos of the 
state.28 
On the other hand, the politics of citizenship can be exclusionary in the sense that 
particular segments of the resident population are exempted from full membership in the 
state. Contracted demos constellations impacts on the proliferation of segments of the 
population who are citizens with less than full membership in the polity, alien long-term 
residents such as refugees and stateless, as well as severely disproportionate numbers of 
non-national workforce. The politics of citizenship can likewise be exclusionary in the sense 
that less issues and institutions are subject to decision-making processes.  
With reference to the Middle East, we may note the following: the narrower the 
demos basis and the more restricted arenas that are subject to democratic decision-making 
(political representation, parliamentary elections), the more it reflects a high degree of 
exclusionary practice such as different types of control regimes and various degrees of 
coercive measures in terms of membership policies (citizenship laws, naturalization, entry 
procedures). The Gulf states represent the most extreme cases where membership as well 
as participation are characterized by predominantly exclusionary traits, although there are 
significant differences pertaining to internal varieties among the GCC states. 
Conversely, the wider the demos basis is, the more the politics of citizenship may be 
inclusionary. Depending on how the demos is defined, inclusion may pertain to larger 
segments of the citizenry who enjoy civil and political rights (such as post-independence 
Tunisia in 1956, and Morocco after the 2004 family law reform), or inclusion may pertain to 
                                                          
28 The elaboration on inclusionary and exclusionary traits pertaining to membership and participation, as 
illustrated in table 1, builds on what O’Donnell et al. present as processes of ‘democratization’, a point I expand 
on further below. See O'Donnell, "IV. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," 7-8. 
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the naturalization of non-citizens such as Palestinian refugees who became Jordanian 
citizens in 1949, or long-term non-citizens in Lebanon who were naturalized through a 
decree in 1994. 
Table 1 renders a conceptual model which reflects the politics of citizenship in the 
Middle East seen in terms of exclusion and inclusion and in terms of membership and 
participation: 
 
Table 1: The politics of citizenship in the Middle East: a conceptual model 
 
Politics of 
citizenship 
Inclusion Exclusion 
 
Membership 
 
 
expansion of demos 
 
 
 
contraction of demos 
 
Participation 
 
extension of “issues political” 
and institutions subject to 
democratic decision-making 
 
 
restriction of 
“issues political” and institutions 
subject to democratic decision-
making 
 
The table reflects modes of addressing different types of problems related to inclusionary 
and exclusionary citizenship policies pertaining to either membership or participation.  
For instance, how do we deal theoretically with the phenomenon of statelessness 
whereby long-term residents in the region are exempted from membership in a state. It is 
not the legal aspects of statelessness per se that is discussed in the thesis, but rather the 
phenomenon of statelessness that evolves out of the politicization of the demographic 
structure of some states in the Middle East, particularly those labeled as ‘plural’ or 
‘multireligious states’ where nationalistic, ethnic and/ or tribal allegiances intersect with the 
political aspirations of rulers. In which ways do membership and participation aspects 
pertaining to the politics of citizenship reveal variances in the political structure of these 
states that shed light on the survival of the regime? 
Another example of the politicization of the demos in the Middle East is the way 
through which citizenship certificates, naturalization and denaturalization policies that target 
both individuals and collective groups have emerged as significant instruments of control at 
the hands of rulers who shape and reshape the constitution of their citizen and non-citizen 
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populations in ways that sustain their rule. In Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait, citizenship 
certificates, i.e. legal citizenship, have been granted and withdrawn at different points in 
time in ways that conform with the political aspirations of power holders through decrees or 
through amendments to existing citizenship laws. 
A third example of regarding the politicization of the demos is the anomaly of 
enfranchised female citizens who have political rights but who do not share equal civil rights 
with male citizens in the Middle East? One way of approaching this problem, I suggest, is by 
looking at the exclusion of women from full membership in the state as a demos issue 
whereby female citizens are denizens29 of the state: they are enfranchised citizens who are 
excluded from basic civil rights which impinge on their political participation. 
  
                                                          
29 I find ‘denizenship’ to be a fruitful concept that sheds considerable light on the paradoxical legal status of 
female citizens in contemporary states in the Middle East. I was first acquainted with the term ‘denizens’ 
through literature on immigration policies where Tomas Hammar denotes ‘denizens’ as privileged resident 
aliens. See, Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the nation state: aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of 
international migration  (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), 12-14. Lately, the term ‘denizens’ has been used by 
scholars in urban studies to denote marginalized citizens such as the homeless and long-term unemployed who 
are excluded from public space. See Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, "Nodal Governance, Democracy, and 
the New ‘Denizens’," Journal of Law and Society 30, no. 3 (2003); Marc Schuilenburg, "Citizenship Revisited - 
Denizens and Margizens," Peace Review 20, no. 3 (2008). 
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2 On membership 
 
“Citizenship is a neat category […]  
Membership […] is a messy category”.30 
 
States are sovereign in distributing membership, limited only by international conventions 
that they may be legally bound by. In contemporary states, state power is authoritative with 
reference to distributing membership in the state. Indeed, among the most important traits 
of state sovereignty is the state’s capacity in defining its citizens.  
Seen from a legal-ideal perspective, the distribution of membership in the state and 
the acquisition of legal citizenship in the Middle East is based on two main principles: one 
granted through the ‘blood principle’ (jus sanguinis) whereby the offspring of one – often 
the male citizen father – or both parents, and one based on territorial residence (jus soli) 
whereby those born within the state’s territorial boundaries are granted citizenship in the 
state.31 The discussions in the different articles seek to look beyond such a legal-ideal 
perspective with regards to membership in the state. Membership is sought analyzed in 
terms of the complex and conflicting manner in which legal-ideal principles are formed, 
applied, challenged, forcefully abrogated – and in some cases – renegotiated such as the 
case is when citizenship decrees and new nationality laws expand and contract the citizenry 
of the state, or in cases where female citizens are enabled to give their legal citizenship 
(jinsiyya) to their children unconditionally.  
Throughout the thesis I seek to illuminate points of intersection where varying 
degrees and forms of membership in the state are legally and politically constitutive. 
Differential forms of membership shed light on how the politicization of the demos in Middle 
Eastern states both impact on and constitute the politics of citizenship. 
 
2.1 The ‘group’: which group? 
How is a group constituted? When I first read this sentence in a chapter entitled 
‘Membership’ in Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice, I was fascinated by its simplicity. 
Walzer pointed out that by assuming an established group or a fixed population we miss 
                                                          
30 William Rogers Brubaker, "Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America" (Lanham, 
c1989), 15. 
31 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany  (Cambridge, Massachussetts and 
London, England: Harvard Univesity Press, 1992), 81-82. 
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“the first and most important distributive question”. 32 Nearly two decades later, I look back 
and assess that what lies as a thick red thread throughout my research on citizenship in the 
Middle East has been filtered through this one question. Elegant in its simplicity – a Gordian 
knot in the richness of theoretical and analytical approaches embedded in attempts at 
addressing it. Walzer’s question did not only trigger a fascination. His book ignited a 
stubbornness born out of sheer irritation by what he wrote thirty pages later when he 
acknowledged that  
[i]ndeed, the rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over strangers, is probably the most 
common form of tyranny in human history. […] I won’t say much more than this about the special 
problems of non-citizens and strangers: henceforth I am talking about the distribution of security and 
welfare or about hard work or power itself, I shall assume that all the eligible men and women hold a 
single status. This assumption doesn’t exclude other sorts of inequality further down the road, but it 
does exclude the piling up of inequalities that is characteristic of divided societies. The denial of 
membership is always the first of a long train of abuses.33 
 
Walzer built his intriguing insights regarding membership on a building block entitled ‘single 
status’.34 This delimitation, I immediately figured out, was irrelevant to my focus on the 
multifaceted conglomerate of non-citizen, stateless and migrant inhabitants, as well as the 
differential ways in which citizens – eligible and non-eligible – are categorized along 
gendered, religious, tribal or ethnic lines in the Middle East. 
Walzer’s explicitly stated reservations with regards to ‘single status’ made me feel, to 
put it bluntly, as if somebody had flirted wildly with me at a party and then informed me 
that he was actually married. Going through the rest of the book felt like a sort of liaison 
between us: I continued reading, but had the uneasy informed understanding that I had 
been cheated upon. 
Cheated upon, but far from disillusioned, and considerably inspired for four reasons – 
all related to Walzer’s chapter on membership in Spheres.  
First, I understood that the concept of membership was to be central around which 
my focus on citizenship would evolve. What eventually was coined as ‘the politics of 
citizenship’ would thus not only include membership, but premise membership –  or more 
precisely, forms of membership –  as a necessary element for analyzing restricted or 
                                                          
32 Michael Walzer, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality  (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1994), 31. 
33 Ibid., 62, my emphasis. 
34 ‘Status’ implies a particular position of an individual in society that is contingent on the distribution of legal 
rights. See Bryan S. Turner, Status  (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), 5-13. 
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extended patterns of political participation in the polity. ‘Polity’ corresponds here roughly to 
what is inferred to when thinking of the Greek ideal of the polis – a bounded political entity 
characterized by more or less restricted or extended forms of participation through which 
norms, rules and regulations are formed and enforced. In several states in the Middle East 
we find significant numbers of long term residents, refugees and immigrants. Non-citizens 
comprise distinct groups that are not part of the polity although they reside within the 
state’s borders. 
Second, Walzer introduced me to the fascinating status of ‘metics’ who were resident 
aliens in ancient Athens.35 In contrast to slaves who did the everyday necessary hard work of 
economic life, metics were migrants from other Greek city-states drawn to Athens by 
economic opportunity, many from other Greek states. They were required to defend the 
city, but neither they nor their offspring gained political rights. Some metics became wealthy 
merchants, scientists and potters, while others developed into a leisured stratum of 
inhabitants who followed political life without being part of it. Aristotle (384 B.C. - 322 B.C.) 
himself was, Walzer mentions en passant, a metic who observed the unfolding of the polis, 
i.e. the realm whereby decisions were taken regarding Athens as a polity, but was never part 
of its demos, i.e. the eligible segments of Athen’s inhabitants.36 While Walzer likens metics 
with contemporary non-citizen guest workers, I envisaged an array of present day metics in 
the contemporary Middle East.37 I asked myself whether the existence of inhabitants in 
Lebanon and Kuwait – persons holding ‘jinsiyyat qayd ad-dars’ (literarily, ‘citizenship under 
study’) documents and the ‘bidun’ (literarily ‘without’, meaning ‘without citizenship 
documents’) count as metics? What about enfranchised female citizens who nevertheless 
                                                          
35 Walzer, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality: 53-55. For more on metics and the Athenian 
metoikia institution, see David Whitehead, The ideology of the Athenian metic, vol. 4, Proceedings, 
Supplementary volume (Cambridge: The Society, 1977). See also Dahl’s description of metics, Robert A. Dahl, 
Democracy and its critics  (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 22. 
36 A metic himself, Aristotle provides the classic defense of exclusion from participation on the polis in The 
Politics. He responded to critics who argued that co-residence and shared labor were sufficient basis for 
political membership by arguing that “[a] citizen does not become such (…) merely by inhabiting a place.” (as 
quoted in Walzer, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality: 54. 
37 On contemporary examples of present day metics, which in my view encompasses fourth generation 
migrant, refugee and stateless individuals and groups denied a right to stay in territories were they were born 
and raised, see Peter J. Spiro, "Mandated membership, diluted identity: Citizenship, globalization, and 
international law," in People out of place: globalization, human rights, and the citizenship gap, ed. Alison Brysk 
and Gershon Shafir (New York: Routledge, 2004); Brad K. Blitz and Maureen Lynch, Statelessness and 
citizenship: a comparative study on the benefits of nationality  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). See also the 
comprehensive UN report on statelessness in the Middle East by Laura van Waas, "The situation of stateless 
persons in the Middle East and North Africa," (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, October 2010). 
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are under legal guardianship of male relatives, as is the case in most states in MENA? What 
of naturalized citizens who are either exempted of political participation – as the case was 
for naturalized Kuwaiti male citizens until 1996 – , or who are continuously subject to 
arbitrary naturalization and denaturalization policies at the hands of the ruling regime – as is 
the case with former or current Jordanian citizens of Palestinian background since 1949? In 
short, insight into the category of metics led me to contemplate on the conglomerate groups 
of stateless residents, long-term refugees, undocumented inhabitants, along with 
disenfranchised children of marriages between female citizens and male non-citizens 
observed in several states in the Middle East. 
Third, Walzer insisted on the political nature of determining who is included and 
excluded from membership, and how non-members can be admitted to belong to a polity. 
He points that “the distribution of membership […] in any ongoing society, is a matter of 
political decision.”38 Given the political nature of the distribution process itself, I was able to 
formulate questions such as: what constitutes the arenas and institutional frameworks 
through which the political distribution of membership occurs? Who are the key players – 
those we may call the ‘master group’ of members in these arenas and institutions – that 
undertake the political choices regarding membership in the political community? How is 
that master group constituted as members in the first place?  
In the Middle East, the answers to these questions lead to one constitutive principle, 
that of territoriality, i.e. the principle upon which state sovereignty and political authority is 
embedded. The territorial principle was established in the Middle East in the aftermath of 
the downfall of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War 1. This point explains why 
the process of state building and state formation constitute the epicenter around which my 
theoretical discussion regarding the politicized distribution of membership in the state and 
the ensuing forms of participation in the Middle East spur around. 
Fourth, when Walzer emphasized the “piling up of inequalities that is characteristic of 
divided societies” following different or unequal legal status, what sort of divisions and what 
kind of societies and polities did he specifically have in mind?39 When and why are societies 
                                                          
38 Walzer, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality: 40. 
39 Ibid., 31. Walzer is vague on the subject of what constitutes ‘divided societies’ although the term is 
frequently applied in his works. He points, for instance, at ethnic, religious and national features which in some 
states, he argues, form particularist and tribal identities. According to him, these give rise to national divisions 
that challenge the territorially based, in contrast to a culturally based, political unit. Michael  Walzer, "The New 
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and polities, I wondered, sometimes labeled ‘plural’ or ‘multicultural’, often inferring 
agreeable normative connotations of peaceful coexistence, while the same societies and 
polities at other times are labeled ‘divided’ or ‘segmented’, often inferring less agreeable 
connotations of ethnic and religious strife as well as chronic violent social and political 
upheavals?40   
Indeed, the analytical importance of defining a phenomenon on whether and in 
which ways a society is ‘plural’ and / or ‘divided’ came to be of paramount importance for 
analyzing the politics of citizenship. I eventually settled on using ‘divided’ and ‘deeply 
divided’ rather than ‘plural’ as conceptual term in order to emphasize the segmental ways in 
which divisions are organized in states in the Middle East. 
I build on Rabushka and Shepsle’s definition of ‘plural societies’, and define divided 
societies as those identified by societal diversity in which communities are politically 
organized, and where ethnicity is a salient characteristic.41 ‘Ethnicity’ is defined broadly as a 
“collective identity and solidarity based on such ascriptive factors as imputed common 
descent, language, customs, belief systems and practices (religion), and in some cases race 
and color.”42  To this definition I add one significant characteristic to ethnicity in divided 
societies in the Middle East, and that is the systematic use of state power in organizing and 
institutionalizing communal groups.  With the agency of state power as means to organize 
membership in communal groups, we are no longer dealing with communal identities as 
defined by individuals that belong to the group, I argue. In divided states in the Middle East, 
state power impacts on administering, regulating and perpetuating divisions among and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Tribalism," Dissent, no. Spring (1992): 164-66. In other works where Walzer uses the term ‘divided societies’ he 
does not define the term explicitly but takes it rather as a generic description of unequal access to resources 
(money, jobs); differences based on sex or color (men / women; black / white), or ethnic, religious and tribal 
belonging – all which give rise to different forms of inequality within a society which leads to strife and violence 
(civil war and invasion). See Michael Walzer and David Miller, Thinking politically: essays in political theory  
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007). In On Toleration, Walzer presents Israel as a ‘deeply divided 
state’, a point which I comment on further under part 3 of this chapter. See Michael Walzer, On toleration  
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 41-42. 
40 The terms ‘multicultural’, ‘plural’ and ‘divided’ are sometimes used interchangeably, see for instance Majid 
Al-Haj “Multiculturalism in deeply divided societies: the Israeli case” in International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations, 2002, vol. 26, issue 2, pp. 169-183. 
41 Rabushka and Shepsle distinguish between ‘plural’ and ‘pluralistic’ societies. According to their definition, 
both plural and pluralistic societies are characterized by cultural diversity, but plural societies are identified by 
two additional traits: they are “politically organized cultural communities” permeated by “the salience of 
ethnicity”. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in plural societies: a theory of democratic instability  
(Columbus, Ohio1972), 62. 
42 Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., Ethnicity, pluralism, and the state in the Middle East (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; published in cooperation with the Dayan center for Middle Eastern and African studies 
at Tel Aviv university, 1988), 3. 
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between the state’s inhabitants – citizens and non-citizens – in ways that ‘ethnicize’ 
inhabitants as members of groups, along religious, ethnic, tribal and / or gendered lines.43 
At the time – in 1972 – Rabushka and Shepsle presented a critique with reference to 
understanding the salience of communal sentiments and the impact of ethnicity on the 
creation of the modern state. They argued that ethnicity is a variable where ‘politics’ evolves 
as an independent variable; ethnicity institutionalizes and hardens along ethnic dimensions 
in divided states.44 My understanding of ethnicity is likewise one where the politics of 
citizenship evolves as an independent variable which institutionalizes particular demos as 
well as citizen configurations in the state and hardens along religious, ethnic or tribal 
divisions in divided states in the Middle East. This understanding follows from Cynthia 
Enloe’s insight in applying a ‘situational’ and an ‘ascriptive’ theoretical approach to the study 
of ethnicity. Commenting on the state power and the political significance of ethnicity she 
differentiated between an ‘ascriptive’ and a ‘situational’ approach towards the study of 
ethnicity. Through an ascriptive approach a person’s descent and primordial bonds are 
emphasized and taken as defining ethnic belonging. A situational approach, however, “does 
not imagine ethnicity to be a package of fixed attributes and lineage patterns. It presumes 
that ethnicity is open to changing collective definitions and fluctuating emotional intensities. 
[…] Situational theorists also suspect that politics can shape as well as simply mirror ethnic 
pluralism.”45 In other words, the politics of citizenship in the Middle East can be seen as both 
shaping as well as mirroring societal divisions in society and state. 
                                                          
43 Cynthia H. Enloe, Police, military and ethnicity: foundations of state power  (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1980), 167-68; Paul Brass, Ethnic groups and the state  (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 3-10. See also 
especially chapter 7 “Ethnic groups and the state” in Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationalism: theory and 
comparison  (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), 241-99. 
44 Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in plural societies: a theory of democratic instability: 64-66. Judging from their 
insights four decades ago, Rabushka and Shepsle retain a refreshingly accurate assessment regarding the 
problems and challenges pertaining to defining ‘plural societies’: “political scientists, like sociologists and 
anthropologists, neither have a uniform notion of cultural diversity (e.g., what constitutes a plural society?) nor 
concur on its political implications.” Ibid., 19. 
45 Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic soldiers: state security in divided societies  (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1980), 1-2. Esman and Rabinovich draw a similar distinction between ‘primordialism’ and ‘instrumentalism’. 
According to them, ‘primordialists’ emphasize the deep-rootedness of ethnic and religious solidarities and that 
such loyalties should be regarded as continuing realities, while ‘instrumentalists’ “emphasize the adaptive and 
opportunistic quality of communal identities and solidarities”. Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, "The 
study of ethnic politics in the Middle East," in Ethnicity, pluralism, and the state in the Middle East, ed. Milton J. 
Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; published in cooperation with the Dayan center 
for Middle Eastern and African studies at Tel Aviv university, 1988), 12-13. Judging from the views and 
perspectives of these authors as presented in their article, particularly the discussions pertaining to the 
subsections ‘integration vs. conflict models’ and ‘conflict management’, I would argue that the authors 
represent predominantly primordialist analytical approaches and views regarding group membership. 
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2.2 Spheres of membership in the Middle East 
The abovementioned four considerations form points of associations between Walzer’s 
explicit reservation with regards to ‘single status’, and my reflections with regards to the 
distribution of differential legal status categorizations in the Middle East in general and in 
divided societies in particular. In short, Walzer put me on the track of probing more closely 
into the disparate distribution of membership and the grey zones of status categorization 
within contemporary states of the Middle East which I eventually envisaged as ‘spheres of 
membership’ in the Middle East. 
Indeed, lack of membership, or more precisely, the different forms and 
categorization of membership in the state resulting from inclusionary and exclusionary 
practices through state power, is part of a long list of exclusionary rules and practices in 
state and society in the Middle East. 
Two questions arise: First, who is ‘the people’ of the state, i.e. those who constitute 
the state’s citizenry?46  Second, inferring perspectives whereby democratic forms of 
governance are implied with regards to participation: who is the people in which name the 
‘democracy game’ shall be played? Given that the term ‘democracy’ is coined on the Greek 
words demos (‘people’) and kratos (‘governance’ or ‘rule’), any elaboration on the latter part 
of the word needs careful attention to the former. Who, then, constitutes the demos in 
which name kratos shall be carried out?  
In contemporary states in the Middle East, who constitutes ‘the people’ in some 
states represents challenges regarding contested, and therefore conflicting, views regarding 
who shall compose the state’s legitimate members. Hence, the politicization of the demos 
refers to the problematized, contested and conflicting ways in which the population of the 
territorial state is constituted, shaped and potentially reformed.  
In contemporary political philosophy, the term ‘demos’ is used and understood in 
different ways. According to Held, the demos “held sovereign power, that is, supreme 
authority, to engage in legislative and judicial functions” during the period that corresponds 
with the classical ideal of the polis, the Athenian city-state democracy as it evolved around 
                                                          
46 Robert A. Dahl asked “who constitute ‘the people’?” at a lecture held The Nobel Institute in Oslo 8 October 
1992, and added that “[t]his is a basic question for contemporary theories of democracy.” Quoted in 
Butenschøn, "The politics of ethnocracies: strategies and dilemmas of ethnic domination," 1. 
46 
 
500 – 350.47 He points, however, that “[t]he peculiar modern distinctions which began to 
emerge with Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588 -1679) between 
state and society, specialized officials and citizens, ‘the people’ and government, are not part 
of the political philosophy of the Athenian city-state.”48 Held explains some pages later that 
the polis was marked by participation, public deliberation and a highly restricted citizenship 
which embraced a small proportion of the population that made Athenian democracy 
“intimately connected to what might call the ‘tyranny of citizens’.”49 
Habermas views ‘demos’ as a civic association based on equal rights.50 Dahl 
emphasizes that a member of an association has to be taken “a better judge of his or her 
interests than others would be” in order to satisfy a set of conditions that do not involve the 
principle of guardianship in decision-making, and calls “adult members who satisfy this 
presumption citizens; collectively the citizens constitute the demos, populous or citizen 
body.”51  In practice, however, Dahl applies the term ‘demos’ and ‘citizen’ interchangeably in 
his analysis. For instance, he writes that “[w]ell into the last century most advocates of 
democracy assumed that women were rightly excluded from the suffrage, that is, from the 
demos”52, and “[e]very person subject to a government and its laws has an unqualified right 
to be a member of the demos (i.e., a citizen).”53 
Linz and Stepan addressed the terms ‘demos’ and ‘polis’ in their analysis of political 
transitions. They point that “[t]here are many sorts of polis/demos incongruence, and all of 
them create problems for democratic consolidation unless carefully addressed.”54 Their 
observations focus, however, primarily on national aspirations of political leaders which do 
not concur “with the empirical realities of the demoi (populations) in their state” as 
witnessed in post-communist states such as Estonia and Latvia.55 Also, as they explain with 
reference to separatist movements by Basques and Catalons: “the question of demos, of 
who was a citizen in the Spanish state, never became for the Spanish state an issue. The 
                                                          
47 David Held, Models of democracy  (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 14. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 19. 
50 Øyvind Østerud, "Democracy beyond borders? The European Case," in Power and democracy: critical 
interventions, ed. Øyvind Østerud, Fredrik Engelstad, and Robert E. Goodin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 174-75. 
51 Dahl, Democracy and its critics: 108, emphasis in original. 
52 Ibid., 115.  
53 Ibid., 124. 
54 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and post-communist Europe  (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 26. 
55 Ibid., 26, 428-29. 
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legal status of being a Spanish citizen was never denied to any Basque or Catalan armed 
militant or separatist.”56 Linz and Stepan’s example illustrates well how the constitution and 
distribution of membership in the state, what is here seen as ‘legal citizenship’, underpins 
the politicization of membership in newly established territorial states, whether we are 
dealing with post-Soviet states in the aftermath of 1990, or post-Ottoman states in the 
Middle East in the aftermath of 1920. 
The variations and partially unclear ways in which the term demos has been 
understood and defined opens up opportunities to determine what the demos reflects in 
specific settings in a Middle East context. Figure 1 entitled ‘spheres of membership’ is thus 
an attempt to present a conceptual guideline in the form of circles that inform my 
discussions on forms of membership.57 
The envisaged border of the territorial state is at center. The borders of the territorial 
state mark off those who reside in the state and include citizens, i.e. members of the state, 
and non-citizens, i.e. those excluded from membership from the state (stateless and 
immigrants). Each ring includes thus residents, i.e. both citizens and non-citizens. With 
respect to membership, however, residents belong to different legal class categories: those 
included as full members of the state constitute the state’s demos; they enjoy equal rights 
and duties depending on the scope, degree and distribution of material and non-material 
goods in society. Members of the state who enjoy less than full membership status are part 
of the polity, but they do not form part of the polity’s demos.58  
The figure indicates that the demos and the polity configurations are two separate 
entities in contemporary states in the Middle East: they may overlap, but not necessarily. 
The majority of female citizens in MENA are, for instance, members of the polity but they 
are not full members of its demos. This anomaly follows from the situation that most female 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 28. 
57 For an informative discussion on how categories constitute and produce different forms of inequality, see 
chapter 3 in Charles Tilly, Durable inequality  (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998), 74-116. On 
the “larger categorical system to which citizenship belongs”, Tilly remarks that it “includes further distinctions 
such as native-born citizen/ naturalized citizen / legal resident / illegal resident / legal visitor / excluded 
foreigner. Such systems always include formal procedures to transfer persons from one category to another.” 
Ibid., 198. 
58 Heywood defines ‘polity’ as “[a] society organized through the exercise of political authority” while ‘state’ is 
defined as “[a] political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders”. 
Andrew Heywood, Politics  (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 429, 31. Held reserves the term ‘state’ to “the notion 
of an impartial or legally circumscribed system of power, separate from the ruler or ruled, with supreme 
jurisdiction over a delimited territory” and points that this idea of the state is “best thought of as a late 
sixteenth-century invention” Held, Models of democracy: 32. 
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citizens in the Middle East enjoy political rights, but these rights are severely constrained by 
restrictions on women’s civil rights mainly through the state’s institutionalization and 
management of family law as state law. I propose that female citizens be analytically seen as 
denizens; a category of citizens who are neither full members of the polity nor strangers. In 
short, female citizens are not members of the polity’s demos. The exclusion of enfranchised 
citizens from the demos – i.e. female citizens who have equal political rights but not equal 
civil rights with men – is a theoretical anomaly. The distinction is nevertheless fruitful 
because it captures the essence of the boundaries of the membership status in which female 
citizens are mantled with through state power in most states in MENA. 
 
Figure 1: 
Spheres of membership in the Middle East 
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“Stateless” reflect the existence of residents within and at the borders of territorial 
states, such as Lebanon’s qayd ad-dars population, Kuwait’s Bidun population59  and Syria’s 
stateless Kurds60 who – for various reasons – were not enlisted (by the authorities) or did not 
(as a result of individual or collective voluntary avoidance and involuntary negligence) enlist 
themselves in enumeration processes.61 
Some rough numbers may be helpful in providing a demographic assessment of 
persons involved. Female citizens in MENA constitute around half of the population 
estimated to be around 330 million, making the number of women around 165 million.62 The 
number of the non-citizen workforce in GCC states is estimated to be around 11 million 
persons which equals 70 per cent of the total labor force population.63 The non-citizen 
workforce in the six oil-rich Gulf states equals thus roughly the total number of stateless 
persons in the world, estimated to be at around 12 million persons.64 
On the outer flanks of figure 1 we find the sizeable migrant population which in some 
Gulf states, such as Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, constitute a demographic non-citizen 
majority of the resident population.65 They are, as Walzer views it, present day or soon to be 
                                                          
59 ‘Bidun’ means literarily ‘without’ in Arabic, and refers to ‘without citizenship’. The term ‘Bidun’ should be 
distinguished from the term ‘beduin’. Van Waas reports of “several hundred thousand Bidoon in the Gulf 
region”, whereof the Biduns residing in Kuwait are estimated at 92,000, i.e. approximately a third of the total 
number of stateless Bidun population in the region. Waas, "The situation of stateless persons in the Middle 
East and North Africa," 5-7. See also Abbas Shiblak, "Arabia's Bidoon," in Statelessness and citizenship: a 
comparative study on the benefits of nationality, ed. Brad K. Blitz and Maureen Lynch (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2011). On the exclusion of the Bidun population from census-enumerations in 1985 and after the 
liberation of the Kuwait in 1991, see Rania Maktabi, "Liberated Kuwait and the Regime's Quest towards Internal 
Stability," in Golfkrisen 1990-1991 i perspektiv [The Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 in persepctive], ed. Nils A. Butenschøn 
(Oslo: Department of Political Science, 1993), 164-67. 
60 Van Waas reports over 300,000 stateless Kurds in Syria and Lebanon. Waas, "The situation of stateless 
persons in the Middle East and North Africa," 5. For more on statelessness, see the special edition of Refugees 
Magazine “The excluded: the strange hidden world of the stateless”, n. 147, issue 3, 2007; and Forced 
Migration Review, issue 32, April 2009. 
61 The different categories of refugees, denizens and stateless in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon are presented 
further in chapters 2 and 3. 
62 "Ara Human Development Report 2009: Challenges for human security in the Arab region,"  (New York: 
United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab states), 271. 
63 Nasra M. Shah, "Recent labour immigration policies in the oil-rich Gulf: How effective are they likely to be?," 
in ILO Asia Regional Programme on Governance of Labour Migration, Working paper no. 3 (Bangkok: 
International Labour Organization and European Union, January 2008), 20. 
64 Stateless persons are estimated to count around 12 million persons worldwide. Blitz and Lynch, Statelessness 
and citizenship: a comparative study on the benefits of nationality: 1. 
65 Shah estimates that expatriates constitute approximately 65 per cent of the total population and 82 per cent 
of the labor force in Kuwait; 78 per cent of the total population and 82 per cent of the expatriate labor force in 
Qatar; and 71 per cent of the total population and 90 per cent of the labor force population in UAE. Shah, 
"Recent labour immigration policies in the oil-rich Gulf: How effective are they likely to be?," 20. 
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metics: long-term residents and migrant workers who constitute inseparable parts of the 
socio-economic structure of Gulf states.66 
2.2.1 A note on the non-citizen workforce in the Middle East 
Demographic figures pertaining to the non-citizen workforce shed light on the magnitude of 
the sheer number of individuals concerned with reference to demos / polity perspectives. 
Undertheorization pertaining to this anomaly is, according to Kapiszewski, related to the 
contractual nature of work permits, and the fact that the majority of migrants have 
membership in home states.67 
The rights of migrant workers are, in principle, the prerogative of three bodies: i) the 
contracting agency with whom the worker has signed a labor contract with; ii) the state (or 
states in case of dual citizenship) which a worker belongs to through a citizenship document; 
and iii) the international community through the United Nations’ International Labour 
Organization (ILO).68  
The kafala system is, with reference to the citizen / non-citizen divide in the Gulf 
states, particularly significant to the sustaining of the institution of citizenship in states 
where citizens constitute demographic minorities (such as in Kuwait, Qatar and UAE). The 
kafala system is a sponsorship system which permeates the working conditions of non-
Kuwaitis and where citizenship and resident documents play central parts in establishing and 
maintaining social orders where citizens and non-citizens are stratified along economic lines 
which emphasize and bolster tribo-ethnic citizen identities. Only persons holding a Kuwaiti 
citizenship can operate as ‘kafil’, i.e. a sponsor or guarantor of the residency of non-citizens 
                                                          
66 For an excellent case study on citizen / non-citizen dynamics, see Anh Nga Longva, Walls built on sand: 
migration, exclusion and society in Kuwait  (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). For a rare analysis of the 
economic and demographic structures that underpin the relationship between nationals and non-nationals in 
the GCC states, see Andrzej Kapiszewski, Nationals and expatriates: population and labour dilemmas for the 
Gulf Cooperation Council states  (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001). For two updated studies on non-national labor 
force in GCC-states, see Shah, "Recent labour immigration policies in the oil-rich Gulf: How effective are they 
likely to be?."; Nasra M. Shah, "The management of irregular migration and its consequence for development: 
Gulf Cooperation Council," in Asian Regional Programme on Governance of Labour Migration, ILO Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific, working paper no. 19 (Bangkok: International Labour Organization and European 
Union, March 2009). 
67 See Kapiszewski, Nationals and expatriates: population and labour dilemmas for the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states. 
68 See Gay W. Seidman, "Deflated citizenship: Labor rights in a global era," in People out of place: globalization, 
human rights, and the citizenship gap, ed. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (New York: Routledge, 2004); Kristen 
Hill Maher, "Globalized social reproduction: Women migrants and the citizenship gap," in People out of place: 
globalization, human rights, and the citizenship gap, ed. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (New York: Routledge, 
2004).  
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in the state. Among the impacts of the kafala system is that it creates a financially rewarding 
market of visa trading for local national sponsors which is resilient to official GCC-policies 
that aim at restricting labor force immigration: there exist a potentially unsatiable market of 
workers who are willing to pay in order to become part of the kafala system and thus be 
able to get jobs in GCC states.69 Seen from the perspective of citizenship, the kafala-system 
provides a powerful basis for establishing the institution of citizenship as based on a political 
clientelistic contract between rulers and ruled. Through this contract rulers provide for 
welfare services and material goods that are not based on taxation and acquire the political 
support of citizens in ways that secure the basis of the princely dynastic rulership. Among 
the material goods enjoyed by nationals is rent income that accrues nationals and which 
enables them to operate as sponsors based on their capitalization of their very legal status 
as citizens of the state.70 
The economic significance and political salience of the presence of a disfranchised 
majority of non-citizen workforce is, indeed, relevant to understanding and analyzing the 
politics of citizenship in MENA in general and the Gulf states in particular. However, given 
the main focus in this thesis, I concentrate here on discussing questions pertaining to 
citizenship and human rights with reference to two main groups, primarily female citizens 
and stateless.71 
2.2.2 A note on Palestinians and Kurds 
Kurds and Palestinians provide ample empirical cases for research agendas with reference to 
the politics of citizenship in their own right. Indeed, from an analytical perspective, they 
                                                          
69 Shah points out that through the kafala system of visa trading, a work visa for an Indian is sold for 2042 USD 
while a work visa for an Iranian is sold for 4084 USD. She concludes that “a fundamental difficulty in the 
implementation of any policies aimed at curbing visa trading is therefore the ease with which an ordinary local 
sponsor can have a continuous source of income coupled with a market in sending countries where many are 
eager to buy such visas at any cost.” Shah, "Recent labour immigration policies in the oil-rich Gulf: How 
effective are they likely to be?," 9. 
70 On the kafala system as structure of dominance, see Longva, Walls built on sand: migration, exclusion and 
society in Kuwait: 78-111. On an analysis of political clientelism, citizenship and the kafala system, see Maktabi, 
"The Gulf crisis (1990-1991) and the Kuwaiti regime: Legitimacy and stability in a rentier state," 6-8, 45-47. 
71 In a forthcoming paper I address questions related to the citizens / non-citizen divide with reference to 
pressures for reform in family law in Kuwait and Qatar. My hypothesis is that Gulf states have more in common 
with Levantine states in the Mashreq than with Maghreb states with regards to contained and contracted 
forms of female citizenship, partly because of the non-taxed based welfare and the abundance of low-paid and 
unskilled non-citizen workforce which nurture what I would call ‘Victorian Islamist ideals’. The current working 
title of the paper is “Family Law and female citizenship in Kuwait and Qatar: A comparative perspective in light 
of globalization in the MENA region”, to be presented at the 2012 Gulf Research Meeting, “Women and 
Globalization in the GCC: Negotiating States, Agency and Social Change”, Gulf Research Centre, Cambridge 
University, 11 – 14 July 2012. 
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represent ‘litmus cases’ with reference to the politicization of the demos in the region. This 
endeavor lies, however, outside the realm of this thesis. In as far the legal status of 
Palestinians and Kurds is addressed, they exemplify how and in which ways they are included 
or excluded in different territorial states. The political situation of Palestinians and Kurds 
differs significantly on one point: Kurds72 obtained, with the exception of segments in 
Lebanon and Syria73, legal citizenship in the territorial states of their abode. The majority of 
Palestinians are de jure and de facto stateless. 
Palestinians represent a conglomerate and multi-faceted body of inhabitants with an 
array of legal –  at times incongruent, at other times overlapping – statuses (stateless, 
citizen, non-citizen, long-term migrant workers, naturalized, denaturalized) contingent on 
shifting political interests of power-holders in each of the states where Palestinians reside.74 
Significant segments of the Palestinian population share similar legal and socio-economic 
traits with both stateless residents and migrant workforce in the MENA region. The situation 
of Palestinian refugees and Palestinians defined as ‘displaced persons’75, differs 
nevertheless, from the majority of migrant non-Arab workforce for two main reasons: First, 
while the latter reside in the MENA region, they are not of the region. The majority of non-
Arab workers have homelands that are recognized as territorial states by the international 
                                                          
72 On Kurds, see Nicole F. Watts, "Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational networks and ethnic 
contention in international affairs," in Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape 
identities and local practices, ed. Joel S. Migdal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Denise Natali, 
The Kurds and the state: evolving national identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran  (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. 
Press, 2005); Khalid Khayati, "From victim diaspora to transborder citizenship?: diaspora formation and 
transnational relations among Kurds in France and Sweden" (Institutionen för Tema, Linköpings universitet, 
2007). 
73 Kurds number approximately 10 per cent of the Syrian population. An estimated 300,000 Kurds born in Syria 
remain, According to Human Rights Watch, subject to arbitrary denial of citizenship following a census carried 
out in 1962. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011: Syria, URL: http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2011/syria, accessed 12 December 2011. Following the uprisings in Syria in 2011, Syrian authorities issues 
Legislative Decree nr. 49 on 7 April 2011 granting Syrian citizenship to persons registered in the registers of 
(predominantly Kurdish populated town of) Hasaka as ‘foreigners’. See “Syria to grant citizenship to some of its 
stateless Kurds”, URL: http://kurdishrights.org/2011/04/07/syria-to-grant-citizenship-to-some-of-its-stateless-
kurds, accessed 12 December 2011. 
74 See my “The formal relations to the states: Givens and strategies”, chapter 3 in Signe Gilen et al., "Finding 
Ways: Palestinian Coping Strategies in Changing Environments," (Oslo: Fafo Institue for Applied Social Science, 
1994), 23-41. On Palestinians, see Ingvild Hauge, "The political dynamics of citizenship: an analysis of 
demographic structure, state-idea, and regime as determinants of citizenship policies regarding the 
palestinians in Israel, Jordan and Lebanon" (Universitetet, 1997). See also Roula El-Rifai and Rex Brynen, 
Palestinian refugees: challenges of repatriation and development  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Rex Brynen and 
Roula al Rifai, Compensating Palestinian refugees: legal economic and political perspectives  (I. B. Tauris, 2011). 
75 The term ‘displaced’ refers to Palestinians who became refugees following the 1967 war and who do not 
have a 1948 refugee status as defined by The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA). 
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community represented by the United Nations (hereafter UN). Second, stateless 
Palestinians, who also constitute a sizeable body of migrant Arab speaking workers in MENA, 
have legal rights to a homeland in international law through UN Resolutions 194 and 242, 
but no sovereign territorial state to be members of yet. The political plight of Palestinians 
with refugee and/or stateless legal status remains therefore enshrined in international law, 
and as such, the legal responsibility of the international community, and not only the legal 
prerogative of single states.76 
 
2.3 Citizenship regimes and the distribution of rights within the polity 
A central rule of inquiry that informs my analysis on the politics of citizenship is an 
assessment of overall type of ‘citizenship regime’ that exists within the state. Citizenship 
regimes refer to an analytical distinction between individually-based and group-based 
citizenship which permeate the normative principles of the allocation of rights within a 
polity: In an individually-based citizenship regime, civil and political rights are conferred to 
members of the state on an individual basis. Individual citizenship rights imply thus a direct 
membership in the state where rights are granted and guaranteed on the basis of a citizen’s 
autonomy and full legal capacity. Group-based citizenship implies indirect membership in 
the state through an ‘identity group’. Group-based citizenship reflects notions of nationhood 
and belonging to the state in ways where female and male members are normatively 
regarded as part of larger kinship structures ideologically bound by descent or membership 
in a religious and / or ethnic group. In states characterized by a group-based citizenship 
regime, civil and political rights are conferred to citizens as members of a group (e.g. 
religious, ethnic, tribal). 
The distinction between group-based and individually-based citizenship regimes 
builds further on Butenschøn’s delineation pertaining to the distribution of rights along 
‘discriminatory’ or ‘non-discriminatory’ lines. According to him, this delineation distinguishes 
between “whether the organizational principle of state institutions is based on collective or 
individual membership”, and “whether or not the state applies a systematic principle of 
                                                          
76 See especially chapter 3 “The International Law Framework” in Donna E. Arzt, Refugees into citizens: 
Palestinians and the end of the Arab Israeli conflict  (Washington, D.C.: The Council, 1997), 63-79. For scholarly  
insights into the Palestinian national struggle, see Blaming the victims: spurious scholarship and the Palestinian 
question, ed. Christopher Hitchens and Edward Wadie Said (London: Verso, 2001).  
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differentiation between individuals or groups in its allocation of rights and duties.”77 
Butenschøn focuses particularly on the political organization of state territories with 
reference to the distribution of rights: ‘hegemonic systems’ are categorized as having more 
or less ‘discriminatory features’ which reflect neither equality between groups, nor the 
neutrality of the state, whereas ‘consociational democracies’ (where governance is based on 
power-sharing among elite groups) and ‘majoritarian systems’ are categorized as ‘non-
discriminatory’.78 
In parts 3 and 4 of this chapter, I point at problems related to viewing consociational 
democracies as ‘non-discriminatory’, and emphasize the theoretical challenges inherent in 
the existence and sustaining of legal pluralism as a characteristic feature in polities of the 
Middle East.  
Questions regarding differential civil rights between female and male citizens as 
enforced through family law, and group-based citizenship as reflected and interpreted by 
state authorities, are intimately linked: without establishing and controlling through state 
power – and thereby enforcing – the distribution of disparate civil status between male and 
female citizens through family law, the political importance of group-based citizenship along 
religious lines weakens considerably.79 
Below, I concentrate primarily on the role which state power plays in structuring the 
allocation of differential civil rights among female and male citizens through the state’s 
management of religious law. By extension, the institutionalization and organization of 
family law at the hands of the state sustain and bolster differential civil rights among the 
citizens of different religious groups. 
 
                                                          
77 Butenschøn, "State power and citizenship in the Middle East: A theoretical introduction," 17-18, emphasis in 
original. 
78 Ibid., 17, 26. 
79 Ayalet Shachar, "Should church and state be joined at the altar? Women's rights and the multicultural 
dilemma," in Citizenship in diverse societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Susan Moller Okin et al., Is multiculturalism bad for women?  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1999); Suad Joseph, "Civic myths, citizenship and gender in Lebanon," in Gender and citizenship in the 
Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000). 
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2.4 State power and the structuring of group-based citizenship along 
religious lines 
The uniqueness of state power stems from the state being an entity that is ‘more than an 
umpire’. Day refers to S.I. Benn and R. S. Peters who emphasize that while the government is 
in the position of an umpire, “the state is more than an umpire, because it not only enforces 
the rules, but also – and to an even greater extent – makes them.”80 
With reference to the Middle East, Migdal argues that forms of inclusions and 
exclusions produce boundaries that create identity and status which do not precede, but 
often result, from state power.81 He points at categorizing and monitoring devices which are 
used by the state to create and sustain particular forms of collective group identities. Migdal 
emphasizes that control over marriage and divorce has over time proved to be important 
arenas of contest. “Being a part of society, right into the bedroom, is fraught with problems 
for the state”, he argues.82 
What I refer to as a conundrum of citizenship in MENA region reflects the set of 
problems related to the embedment, literarily speaking, of the state with religious law 
through family law.83 Enacted through the state as codified canonical law, or through 
autonomous clerics, the organization and institutionalization of family law – either as state 
law or as part of the state’s legal structure – represent central arenas of conflict related to 
the organization and distribution of state power. 
Seen from the perspective of citizenship as a relationship between citizen and state, 
these problems are reflected at the state, group and individual levels in a variety of ways 
that highlight how individuals’ group-based membership in religious groups is structured and 
sustained through state power. The following presentation adopts a top-down perspective 
with regards to the structuring of membership in religious groups in the Middle East. As 
                                                          
80 ‘Umpire’ in the sense of arbitrator, principle adjudicator or judge. John P. Day, Liberty and justice  (Aldershot: 
Gregg Revivals, 1987), 187.  
81 See Joel S. Migdal, "Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints," in Boundaries and belonging: states and societies 
in the struggle to shape identities and local practices, ed. Joel S. Migdal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 14-15, 20-23. See also Brandell, State frontiers: borders and boundaries in the Middle East, 12-14. 
82 Migdal, "Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints," 19. See particularly the article which Migdal refers to by P. J. 
Woods, "Gender and the reproduction of group boundaries: Why the “secular” state matters to religious 
authorities in Israel?," in Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape identities and 
local practices, ed. Joel S. Migdal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
83 Throughout the thesis I refer to ‘religious law’ in a generic sense, implying and including forms and 
interpretations of sacred text and jurisprudence pertaining to different confessional religious groups that are 
subgroups of the three monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. 
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such, it highlights state-mandated forms of group formation on the basis of what Clifford 
Geertz termed as ‘primordial attachments’.84 
 
2.4.1 The state level: Codifying and institutionalizing religious law as state law 
The codification of law implies a process whereby rules and norms are explicitly recorded as 
state laws.85 The centralization of judicial authority in the Middle East began with the 
reformation of the Ottoman legal system in the 19th century, i.e. in the period before the 
establishment of territorial states following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. 
While most legal and judicial fields were modernized in ways that incorporated Western 
legal standards (such as constitutional, commercial and criminal laws), the Ottoman Law of 
Family Rights of 1917 maintained the authoritative legitimacy of religious jurists and laws by 
perpetuating the autonomy of religious groups in defining rules of personal status.86 
The institutionalization of religious law as state law persisted after independence 
under the influence and control of national rulers.87 In most states the codification of family 
law occurred through decrees at different points in time.88 In general, governmental 
                                                          
84 Geertz explains: “By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” – or more precisely, 
as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” – of social existence: immediate 
contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givens that stems from being born into a particular 
religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular 
social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at 
times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.” Clifford Geertz, "The integrative revolution: 
Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states," in Old societies and new states: the quest for 
modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963), 109. 
85 Customary law and traditional law are examples of uncodified laws. So is the case with Islamic shari’a which 
should be understood as a complex body of a set of legal norms that reflect changing jurisprudence 
(rettspraksis in Norwegian), rather than a unified body reflecting ‘a religious law’ often referred to in the 
singular. Codified laws are explicitly formulated state laws formed under the auspices of a political regime. A 
codified family law as state law is subject to change and is thus secular and temporal in nature, although its 
articles may be based and derived from religious laws or customary norms. 
86 George N. Sfeir, "The place of Islamic law in modern Arab legal systems: A brief for researchers and reference 
librarians," 28 Int'l J. Legal Info. 117(2000). 
87 A presentation of the ways in which religious law and the judicial system was institutionalized and organized 
under colonial rule is outside the frameworks of this thesis. For an informative insight into the variety of 
policies applied with reference to the institutionalization of the judicial system and the impact of religious law 
on the legal system under the British and French colonial period, see Pierre-Jean Luizard, Le Choc colonial et 
l'islam: les politiques religieuses des puissances coloniales en terre d'islam  (Paris: La Découverte, 2006). On the 
importance of European colonial influence on the millet system and how early nineteenth century economic 
and cultural developments undermined traditional patterns of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims  in 
ways where different communities “drifted into sharper competition and mutual suspicion”, see Jonathan P. 
Berkey, The formation of Islam: religion and society in the Near East, 600-1800  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 266. 
88 See table 2 in part 4 where years of codification of family law is rendered in the typology on female 
citizenship according to political regime and type of citizenship regime. 
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committees included political representatives of the state, legal advisors in civil law and 
religious clerics who epitomized the expertise on religious law.  
In chaper 3 I point, for instance, at how the Syrian family law was codified. As in other 
Arab states where Islam dominates, Syria shaped its family law out of nationally and 
politically defined mixtures of shari’a principles and profane civil laws. The current Syrian 
family law of 1953 was prepared by a government commission which included both Muslim 
religious scholars, civil lawyers and political representatives who codified the Syrian family 
law on the basis of five sources: 1) the 1917 Ottoman family law, 2) the unofficial code 
prepared by the Egyptian jurist Qudri Pasha, 3) various Egyptian laws enacted between 1920 
and 1946, 4) a treatise on personal status law drafted by the Damascene judge Ali al-
Tantawi, based on his choices among different law schools according to principles most 
suitable to changing conditions, and 5) the choice of the committee members of various 
Islamic jurisprudence regulations in accordance with the Hanafi school.89 Similar legal textual 
mixtures can be traced in the codified family laws of each state. Such processes illustrate 
that the codification process and the end product, the state’s family code, had a distinct 
national flavour.90  
With regards to the institutionalization of the judicial system, i.e. the state’s court 
system, religious law became primarily institutionalized in two modes: a unitary court 
system – as found in Egypt and Morocco – where verdicts on family law are made by civil 
judges, and a dual court system with parallel civil and religious courts – as found in Syria and 
Lebanon – where religious courts have various degrees of autonomy.91 The 
institutionalization of the court system informs the pairwise most similar systems design 
applied in chapter 4 when Egypt and Morocco are seen as ‘Muslim majority states’ and 
compared to Lebanon and Syria categorized as ‘multi-religious states’. One of the main 
findings in this article is that female citizens have acquired wider civil rights through 
parliament in relatively homogenous states with unitary court systems than in multireligious 
states with dual court systems. In Egypt and Morocco, unitary courts curbed clerical judicial 
                                                          
89 See M. F. Shafaqa, sharh al-ahkam ash-shakhsiyya [Explaining personal status laws]  (Damascus: al-Nuri, 
1998), 15. 
90 See Aharon Layish, "The Transformation of the Shari'a from Jurists' Law to Statutory Law in the 
Contemporary Muslim World," Die Welt des Islams 44, no. 1 (2004); Lynn Welchman, Women and Muslim 
family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development and advocacy  (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2007). 
91 I use the terms ‘dual court system’ and ‘multiple court systems’ interchangeably; both indicate the lack of 
centralized judicial system in the state. 
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authority over family law and weakened the resilience of conservative religious authorities. 
In these states renewed pressures for reform after 1990 yielded strengthened female civil 
rights. In Syria and Lebanon, dual courts safeguard the judicial autonomy of clerics and 
enable them to resist pressures for family law reform more forcefully. Reforms in Syria and 
Lebanon were limited because the interests of political and religious authorities converge in 
ways that bolster group-based citizenship and constrain the civil rights of female citizens. 
 
2.4.2 The group level: Autonomy of religious groups 
Family law remains the main legal arena where non-state actors, such as religious groups 
and scholars, have partial autonomy in interpreting and applying religious tenets and rules as 
state law.  
Particularly religious groups in multi-religious states have maintained autonomy in 
regulating family law. In Lebanon and Syria, for instance, the ‘legal link’ between the 
Constitution and religious law occurs through assertions that the state shall respect the 
‘religious rites’ of religious communities.92 In both states, more than 15 religious groups are 
recognized.93 The powers of clerical authority in Syria and Lebanon have distinctive historical 
backgrounds intimately linked to the historical legacy of the Ottoman millet-system whereby 
                                                          
92 Article 35 of the Syrian constitution states that “[t]he state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious 
rites, provided they do not disturb the public order.” Article 9 of the 1926 Lebanese constitution asserts that 
“[t]he State […] shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of 
all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and 
religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.” Art. 19 reads: “The 
officially recognized heads of religious communities have the right to consult [the Constitutional Council] only 
on laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and religious practice, and the freedom of religious 
education.” 
(http://www.nowlebanon.com/Library/Files/EnglishDocumentation/Official%20Documents/Lebanese%20Cons
titution.pdf). Art. 9 and 19 of the Lebanese Constitution are read as safeguarding the authority in personal 
status laws to heads of the officially recognized religious communities. 
93 There are five Muslim denominations in both states (Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Ismaelite and Alawite), a small 
Jewish community and a plethora smaller and bigger Christian denominations (12 in Lebanon and 10 in Syria): 
Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Oriental Nestorian (known previously as ‘Assyrian 
Chaldean Nestorian’), Greek Catholics (also called ‘Melchites’), Armenian Catholics, Syriac Catholic, Maronite 
and Latins. In Lebanon, Protestants and Copts are two officially recognized Christian denominations. Akram 
Yaghi, qawanin al-ahwal ash-shakhsiyya lada al-tawa'if al-islamiyya wal-masihiyya.  (Beirut: manshurat zein al-
huquqiyya, 2008), 59-60. The size of the different religious groups in both states is not officially known. 
Lebanon has not had an official census since 1932 and Syria stopped releasing statistics on the distribution of 
the population according to ethnic and religious identity in 1956. Rough estimates indicate that Christians in 
Lebanon comprise 40 % and Muslims 60 % of the population, while the Syrian population comprises of 74% 
Sunni Muslims, 16% Alawite, Druze and other Muslim sects, and 10% various Christian denominations (CIA 
Factbook 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html), accessed 15 
March 2011. 
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religious groups maintained autonomy with regards to regulating internal affairs. Today, this 
historical legacy is safeguarded through state measures that seek to preserve the communal 
rights of groups by ensuring autonomy in the domains of family law and education.94 
Control over family law is thus only partly under state authorities who thereby 
accommodate religious groups in maintaining certain social arenas under the jurisdiction of 
the religious groups. By ‘accommodation’ I refer to the delegation of certain social spheres, 
such as education and family law, which religious groups perceive as vital for their 
constitution and perpetuation as an identity group that share a distinct culture, history or 
world view. Shachar terms identity groups as ‘nomoi communities’ referring to “religiously 
defined groups of people that ‘share a comprehensive world view that extends to creating a 
law for the community’”.95 The autonomy of these identity groups is usually facilitated by a 
state or a political regime through accommodating multireligious or multicultural policies 
that enable the identity group to be governed by its own institutions and according to its 
own traditions. 
The maintenance of group-based membership in religious groups is less visible, but 
no less significant in states where Islam is dominant religion with regards to its impact on the 
distribution of rights in the polity through state power. An implicit membership in religious 
groups is related to the influence of religious law on the state’s family law which impacts on 
the civil legal status of all citizens in the MENA region. This condition is not unique to Arab 
states. Family laws are based on religious law in about 1/3 of contemporary states (the 
majority member states of the Islamic conference, India and Israel).96 These states are 
characterized by the clerical imprint on the state’s family law, dual court systems, state-
mandated registration of religious identity, and - in Arab states - the ‘shar’i postulate’97 in 
                                                          
94 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural jurisdictions: cultural differences and women's rights  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 17. 
95 Ibid., 2. 
96 On Israel, see page 280 in A. & Shmueli Blecher-Prigat, B., "The interplay between tort law and religious 
family law: The Israeli Case," Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 26, no. 2 (2009), 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Journals/AJICL/AJICL2009/BlecherPrigatShmueli.pdf; Shachar, "Should church and 
state be joined at the altar? Women's rights and the multicultural dilemma," 215-26. On Muslim dominated 
states in Africa and South Asia, see B. Krawietz, Reifelt, H. (ed.), "Islam and the rule of law: between shari’a and 
secularization." (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008), 
http://www.kas.de//db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_13008_2.pdf?080214130352., accessed 18 
June 2008. See also Sindre Bangstad, Sekularismens ansikter. [The faces of secularism].  (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2009).  
97 Welchman, Women and Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development 
and advocacy: 16. 
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the Constitution which asserts that Islamic jurisprudence shall inform the application of state 
laws. In many of these states, non-voluntary registration of every citizen’s religious identity 
is significant for three reasons: First, without registration, state authorities are unable to 
ordain the rules necessary to regulate a citizen’s legal affairs with regards to family law. 
Second, mandated registration structures group-based citizenship rights, bolstering the 
understanding that a citizen’s membership in an identity group is a primal identity not 
subject to negotiation.98 Third, a citizen’s choice of membership in a religious group, 
including conversion, is constrained and susceptible to allegations of apostasy by fellow 
citizens or by the state apparatus.99 
One of the politically significant consequences of the non-secularization of the legal 
and judicial systems is that citizens are categorized qua members of a religious group. 
American anthropologist Suad Joseph argues rightly that an implication of the inclusion of 
religious law as part of state law is the “elevation of religious identity to civil status” which 
certifies religious law as the state’s public law.100  
 
                                                          
98 Compulsory membership in religious groups is state policy in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan. Among the 
salient state-mandated policies are Regulation 2851 of 2 December 1924, issued during the French Mandate 
rule, which made the registration of the confessional personal status of each citizen compulsive. In 1951, the 
authority of Christian clerics was significantly strengthened through Law of 2 April 1951 which widened the 
autonomy of churches in matters related to marriage and divorce. Aref Zeid Az-Zein, ed. qawanin wa qararat 
al-ahwal as-shakhsiyya lil-tawa'if al-masihiyya fi lubnan [Laws and regulations on personal status for Christian 
confessional groups in Lebanon] (Beirut: manshurat al-halabi al-huquqiyya, 2003), 45, 53. While Muslim and 
Christian clerics strongly supported the introduction of the 1951 law, members of the Order of Lawyers reacted 
by organizing an 84-day strike arguing that the delegation of judicial powers from civil courts to religious courts 
weakened the state’s authority. Sherifa Zuhur, "Empowering women or dislodging sectarianism? Civil marriage 
in Lebanon," Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 14, no. 1 (2002): 178; Yaghi, qawanin al-ahwal ash-shakhsiyya 
lada al-tawa'if al-islamiyya wal-masihiyya.: 55. 
99 As witnessed, for instance, through the Egyptian state ruling in 1995 and legal proceedings against Professor 
in Islamic thought Nasr Hamid Abou Zeid (1943 – 2010) who was forced to divorce his wife. The divorce ruling 
came about when an Egyptian citizen with fundamentalist political leanings filed a suit against Abou Zeid by 
raising a hisba-case, i.e. allegations of insulting God as deity, activating thereby articles 89 and 110 of the 
Egyptian regulations that govern courts. These laws were amended in Egypt in 1998. However, allegations of 
apostasy arise recurrently in different Arab states, and can be seen as powerful instruments of social and 
political control over individuals’ religious belief systems. In Syria, attempts at reforming the 1953 Syrian family 
law by inferring clauses that open up for cases of apostasy leaked through the press in May 2009 and caused an 
uproar among intellectuals as well as religious clerics. See Rania Maktabi, "Female Citizenship in Syria: Framing 
the 2009 controversy over the draft laws on personal status," in paper presented in the conference "Bashar Al-
Asad’s first decade: A Period of Transition", 7 - 9 October 2010 (The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), 
Lund University: forthcoming in a book edited by Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl). 
100 Joseph, "Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East," 11, 19. 
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2.4.3 The individual level: Distinguishing between hala shakhsiyya and hala madaniyya 
Contemporary Western legal systems do not distinguish between the legal status of a person 
in the public and private spheres, i.e. an individual’s legal and social position within or 
outside the realm of the family as a kinship system. In most Arab legal systems, however, 
this distinction is central; an individual’s rights and obligations in the public sphere are 
regulated by civil law, while a person’s relationship within the family is regulated by personal 
status law – more commonly known as ‘family law’.101 
In legal matters related to a person’s private sphere where family law regulates 
‘private legal affairs’, a citizen is ordained a legal status termed hala shakhsiyya in Arabic, i.e. 
a ‘personal status’.102 A citizen’s status in the public sphere is, in distinction, termed hala 
madaniyya, referring to a primarily civil status.103 In practice, civil status excludes matters of 
personal status and addresses only matters pertaining to civil law in the public sphere such 
as constitutional, political and social rights of citizens regarding waged labour, education, 
political representation, freedom of speech and organization in civil societies, political 
parties and labour unions. The distinction between ‘civil status’ (hala madaniyya) and a 
‘personal status’ (hala shakhsiyya) substantiates that a secular civil legal status is a non-
option for citizens in Arab states. 
  
                                                          
101 Mustafa al-Siba'i, sharh qanun al-ahwal as-shakhsiyya. [Explaining the law of personal status]  (Damascus: 
Dar al-Warraq, 2001), 11. 
102 ‘shakhs’ in Arabic means ‘person’ or ‘individual’ and is, as the case is in English, a gender neutral noun. 
103 The Arabic root to the term ‘madaniyya’ is ‘madana’ which refers to the noun ‘town’, called ‘madina’ in 
Arabic. By extension ‘town’ represents literarily the epicenter of the polis, the arena whereby political 
community is exercised. 
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3 Legal citizenship: Constituting membership in divided societies 
 
“Pluralism is a great comfort, at least, the doctrine of pluralism is a great comfort.”104 
 
In Democracy and its critics, Robert Dahl turns our attention to the historical constitutive 
legacy of a particular demos. He argues that “who should be included in the demos” 
represents an intractable domain in democratic theory and practice.105 The inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of the demos of a particular political system has, according to him, 
implications on forms and procedures of decision-making in a polity. Dahl introduces the 
distinction between citizenship as a categorical principle, and citizenship as a contingent 
principle. Citizenship as a categorical principle implies that “[every person subject to a 
government and its laws has an unqualified right to be a member of the demos (i.e. a 
citizen)”, while citizenship as a contingent principle implies that “[o]nly persons who are 
qualified to govern, but all such persons, should be members of the demos (i.e. citizens).”106  
Dahl differentiates between a political system that is democratic in relation to its own 
demos, and a political system that is democratic in relation to everyone subject to its rules. 
The first category is procedurally democratic in a narrow sense, he argues. The second 
category is democratic in a wider sense because it meets the criterion of an inclusive demos 
which has the opportunity to have final control over the political agenda in the 
decisionmaking process. According to Dahl, only if the demos is inclusive enough to meet 
this latter criterion could the process of decision-making be described as fully democratic.107  
Despite the distinction Dahl provides with reference to restrictive and expansive 
democratic political systems, he is – as noted earlier –not clear on the differentiation 
between the terms ‘demos’ and ‘citizens’. Dahl uses the terms interchangeably when he 
juxtaposes exclusion from suffrage as being equal to exclusion from the demos, and equates 
thus membership in the demos with being a citizen.108 The gendered dimension of those 
who constitute full members of the demos in a Middle East context, i.e. male citizens, is thus 
implicitly included in Dahl’s elaboration. Dahl’s distinction between expansive and restrictive 
political systems is in other words helpful to a certain degree, but it is not sharp enough with 
                                                          
104 Michael Walzer, Obligations: essays on disobedience, war, and citizenship  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), 218. 
105 Dahl, Democracy and its critics: 116. 
106 Ibid., 124. 
107 Ibid., 108-14, 30. 
108 Ibid., 115, 24. 
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reference to who is regarded as member of the state, i.e. a citizen who has legal citizenship, 
in distinction to citizens who are members of the demos, i.e. full members of the polity. For 
instance, Dahl summarizes the relationship between aspects of membership and aspects of 
participation as follows:  
[t]he demos being given, the scope of its agenda can be determined. The scope of an agenda being 
given, the composition of an appropriate demos to make decisions on those matters can be 
determined. But in principle, it seems, the one cannot be finally determined independently of the 
other.109 
 
Dahl presents here clearly the problem of the demos as what I view as a veritable 
conundrum of citizenship with tautological features. 
Butenschøn’s presentation of a logical distinction between ‘first-order problems’ and 
‘second-order problems’ with reference to ethnic conflict provides a clearer elaboration on 
legal citizenship and how a demos is identified and constituted. He perceives first-order 
problems as related to the constitution of the demos which delineates the polity’s 
demographic identity. Second-order problems, on the other hand, relate to the constitution 
of political order that is based on an already agreed upon definition and delineation of the 
demos. It is, according to the distinction made between the two sets of problems, this 
agreement that is reached which constitutes an organizing principle for the political system, 
i.e. the regime that is to rule in the name of the state.110 
Walzer presents yet other perspectives with reference to who the demos is or should 
be. He poses the same questions as Dahl, and offers an exclusionary perception as to who 
may be included in a polity. According to Walzer, it is those already included that have 
supreme authority in determining inclusion in the demos: “What kind of community do the 
citizens want to create? With what other men and women do they want to share and 
exchange social goods? […] The members decide freely on their future associates, and the 
decisions they make are authoritative and final.”111  
But, then again, the question arises, who are those ‘members’, and – more 
importantly – how are they constituted as such? 
                                                          
109 Ibid., 119.  
110 Confer with my elaboration on first-order and second-order problems with reference to membership and 
participation under part 1 of this chapter, see Butenschøn, "Etnisk konflikt og demokrati." 
111 Walzer, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality: 40. 
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Although Walzer does not provide examples of what he defines as ‘deeply divided 
societies’ in Spheres of Justice, he identifies Israel as a ‘deeply divided state’112 in one of his 
later works. In On Toleration Walzer alludes clearly to ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ 
problems as distinguished by Butenschøn whereby the former addresses questions 
pertaining to the constitution of the demos, while the latter addresses questions pertaining 
to the constitution of the political order. According to Walzer “the central issue in dispute 
between Jews and Arabs was immigration policy. It was not a question of how to organize a 
regime of toleration (Within what structures might Jews and Arabs most readily tolerate 
each other?) but of who should be the participants in the regime (How many Jews and Arabs 
were there going to be?).”113 Among the main instruments used in order to the latter 
question were the enactment of Law of Return (1950) and Law of Nationality (1952) which 
constituted the demos of the state by guaranteeing every individual of Jewish background 
the opportunity to become a citizens, while simultaneously denying the same right to 
Palestinian refugees who had fled their homes following the war in 1948. 
Dahl’s, Butenschøn’s and Walzer’s theoretical observations regarding the 
interrelatedness between membership and participation constitutes the point of departure 
to the discussions pertaining to the politics of citizenship as elaborated upon in chapter 2 
where membership in the Lebanese state is discussed, and chapter 3 which is a comparative 
study of the politics of citizenship in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. 
In the following, I elaborate on some problems related to the politics of citizenship in 
Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy in particular, and problems related to the 
concept ‘pluralism’ as understood and applied in shedding light on political processes in 
divided societies in general. 
 
                                                          
112 According to Walzer, Israel is ‘deeply divided’ in three ways: i) it contains a Palestinian Arab citizen minority 
who “do not find their history or culture mirrored in its public life”; ii) it has retained autonomous religious 
courts for family law; iii) it is an immigrant society with different histories and cultures where Zionism, although 
“a strong nationalizing force […] has not had the assimilative powers of French republicanism.” Walzer, On 
toleration: 41-42. 
113 Ibid., 41. 
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3.1 The politics of citizenship in Lebanon 
Benedict Anderson points out that the census – along with the map and the museum –
represents “institutions of power […] which changed their form and function as the 
colonized zones entered the age of mechanical reproduction.”114 
In Lebanon the enumeration process carried out in 1932 under French Mandate rule 
remains until date the only official census that exists. In a state where political 
representation is based on the proportional representation of religious groups in parliament, 
the government and the state apparatus – the bureaucratic administrative as well as judicial 
bodies – the census constitutes a significant political document.  
The genesis of the 1932 census reflects political questions pertaining to the idea of 
the Lebanese state and who its legitimate members should be. These questions were 
discussed and only partially resolved under Mandate rule. They continue to entangle and 
therefore aggravate conflicts related to political representation and decision-making over a 
wide range of second-order issues. The sensitivity accorded to the demographic structure of 
the country is illustrated in the politics of citizenship that reflects the authorization process 
where legal regulations as well as political considerations determined membership upon the 
establishment of the territorial state. 
During the process of statebuilding, citizenship policies in the newly established state 
were applied to reinforce the size of the Christian citizen population through the 
naturalization of Christian emigrants and refugees such as Armenian refugees (and later, 
during the 1950s, Christian Palestinians). At the same time, the regime undermined the size 
of the Muslim citizen population by excluding stateless persons from membership in the 
state, such as beduin populations living in border-areas, and by denying citizenship to long-
term immigrants of Muslim background such as Kurds. With the pass of time, the number of 
stateless and long-term non-citizen residents increased rapidly. The increase was paralleled 
by the number of legal requests and growth in the number of disputes where non-citizen 
residents and stateless persons demanded Lebanese citizenship.  
Disputes regarding naturalization did not end before Law 67/68 in December 1967 
was issued requiring the presence of the state in cases pertaining to naturalization. Seen in 
                                                          
114 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism  (London: 
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judicial terms, Law 67/68 changed the character of lawsuits regarding citizenship from being 
handled as appeals of request to being considered as appeals of dispute which necessitated 
the presence of the state. Seen in political terms, the introduction of Law 67/68 froze the 
legal procedures pertaining to citizenship applications and empowered the President, the 
state’s supreme representative, to issue citizenship certificates. From then on, the 
application of citizenship laws and judicial procedures pertaining to naturalization and the 
acquiring of citizenship were shelved into bureaucratic oblivion: a tradition was instituted 
whereby Lebanese citizenship was bestowed by decree on selected applications at the end 
of each president’s term.115 
The premises pertaining to who are the state’s legitimate members and to what 
political end the territorial entity shall serve were already in place when the Lebanese 
unwritten National Pact was formed in 1943 convened between political elite figures at the 
time. The National Pact’s until date enduring political significance is that it sealed the 
principle of basing political representation and the distribution of power according to the 
proportional size of each confessional sect as rendered in the 1932 census. The census, i.e. 
the document whereby the Lebanese citizenry was categorized and granted membership in 
the state, provided thus the demographic as well as the political cement that molded the 
principle of power-sharing under Christian dominance, based on the representation of six 
Christians to five Muslims in the government, parliament and the civil services.116 
The empirical findings I point at related to the politicization of the demos and the 
politics of citizenship in Lebanon as reflected in the way the Lebanese citizenry was 
established and maintained, suggest that the importance of the 1943 National Pact and 
power-sharing as elements that ensure democratic governance in Lebanon as reflected in 
theories on consociational democracy need to be reconsidered. My main argument is that 
power-sharing pacts serve well as means to ensure stability, but that the kind of stability 
consociational arrangements ensure are not necessarily democratic – neither in terms of 
inclusionary membership aspects, nor in terms of non-elite participatory aspects. 
                                                          
115 I deal more with the presence of the state in court appeals, the role of the President and the importance of 
administrative personal registries as control instruments in Rania Maktabi, "State formation and citizenship in 
Lebanon: The politics of membership and exclusion in a sectarian state," in Citizenship and the state in the 
Middle East: approaches and applications, ed. Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis, and Manuel S. Hassassian 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 171-75.  
116 The 1989 Taif Accords which ended the Lebanese civil war changed the ratio to an equitable fifty-fifty 
representation between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. 
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3.2 On consociationalism: Lebanon in perspective 
In political science literature, the importance of national pacts as unifying building blocks in 
divided societies, and the merits of power-sharing among elites is especially prominent 
within the ‘consociational school’ established by the Dutch American political scientist Arend 
Lijphart.117 The theory on consociational democracy has, since it was presented and 
developed, attracted considerable academic attention. Many researchers perceive 
‘consociational democracies’ as an undergroup of democratic governance.118 Since the mid- 
1990s theories on consociationalism have furthermore attracted new academic interest 
which is reflected in literature on multicultural citizenship.119 The logic on which 
cosociationalism and multiculturalism rests is by some researchers seen as a prescription for 
governance strategies in divided polities in Europe and the Middle East, such as Kosovo and 
Northern Ireland as well as Iraq, Israel / Palestine and Afghanistan.120 
Coined over time by Lijphart, ‘consociationalism’ came to describe divisions in 
society, termed ‘segmental cleavages’, as divisions that run along religious, ideological, 
linguistic, regional, cultural, or ethnic lines.121  In societies characterized by such cleavages, 
political parties, interest groups, the media, schools and voluntary associations “tend to be 
                                                          
117 See Arend Lijphart, "Consociational democracy," World politics 21(January 1969); Arend Lijphart, Democracy 
in plural societies: a comparative exploration  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
118 Linz and Stepan consider ‘consociational democracy’ as an “important category” of variation within 
democracy. Linz and Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and post-communist Europe: 40. See also Arend Lijphart, Patterns of democracy: government forms 
and performance in thirty-six countries  (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999). Brendan O’Leary 
argues of the enduring importance of consociational politics as a realistic necessity in divided societies.  
119 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
34 -35, 174-75. See also  Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, The Politics of reconciliation in multicultural societies  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12. 
120 See for instance, the list over ‘classic’, ‘past’ and ‘contemporary’ cases of ‘strong consociational cases’ 
discussed by Rupert Taylor in Rupert Taylor, Consociational theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern 
Ireland conflict  (London: Routledge, 2009), 6. The works by proponents of the consociational democracy school 
include Noel, From power sharing to democracy: post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies. See 
especially Brendan O'Leary, "Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments," in From 
power sharing to democracy: post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies, ed. Sid Noel (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 8. Michael Kerr, Imposing power-sharing: conflict and coexistence in 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon  (Dublin: Irish Academic Press., 2006). See also Sammy Smooha and Theodor 
Hanf, "The diverse modes of conflict-regulation in deeply divided societies," International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 33, no. 1-2 (1992). On US administration politics in Afghanistan and Iraq, and towards 
The Israeli Occupied Palestinian Territories and a critique of what is termed as ‘post-conflict’ international 
relations, see Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Christine Pratt, Women and war in the Middle East: transnational 
perspectives  (London: Zed Books, 2009), 17, 21, 225. 
121 Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration: 3-4. Lijphart clarifies that he borrows the 
term ‘segmental cleavage’ from Harry Eckstein, Division and cohesion in democracy: a study of Norway  
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34. 
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organized along the lines of segmental cleavages”, Lijphart pointed.122  His theory on 
consociational democracy focuses on power-sharing between elites who are able to 
transcend and solve conflicts that arise between and among different sects despite the 
existence of social, economic, and political cleavages in deeply divided societies. Through 
‘consociational accommodation’, elites are able to reach agreements that stabilize the 
political system and ensure democratic governance.123 
In the late 1960s and late 1970s, consociationalism was discussed in light of political 
instability and violent upheavals witnessed in the Third World where ethnic, religious and 
tribal divisions gained political salience after independence and threatened the likelihood of 
the development of representative forms of democracy.124 Consociationalism offered an 
alternative democratic model which, proponents argued by referring to Beligium, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands as comparable cases, took heed of existing divisions in 
divided societies and the likelihood that the cooperation between elites could bring about 
political stability. Consociational democracies enjoyed political stability, it was argued, 
because they premised the existence of cleavages in society rather than ignoring societal 
divisions.125 
The Middle East enters our discussion with the case of Lebanon which Lijphart 
presented as a “plural society with a large number of rigidly self-contained religious 
segments.” 126 Lebanon was, moreover, seen as a reasonably successful consociationalist 
model “against which other countries can be compared”.127 Despite the outbreak of the 
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), Lijphart, along with proponents of consociational models of 
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democracy, continued to argue that consociationalist political arrangements represent 
viable political paths to democratic forms of representation and participation in Lebanon 
and other polities in the Middle East. Lijphart attributed, for instance, the collapse of the 
consociational formula following the outbreak of the civil war to “the intrusion of external 
forces: substantial Palestinian involvement in Lebanese politics followed by Syrian and Israeli 
interventions. In addition, a number of internal weaknesses in Lebanon’s consociational 
government must share the blame for the 1975 breakdown.”128 
Seen in terms of the logical ordering of first- and second-order problems, Lijphart 
views problems related to political participation as a ‘first-order’ issue rather than a second-
order issue. This is explicitly portrayed in his definition of what constitutes the four basic 
components of consociational democracy: i) a government by grand coalition which includes 
the political leaders of “all significant segments of the plural society”; ii) mutual veto in order 
to guard vital minority interests; iii) proportionality as principle of political representation; 
and iv) a “high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs”.129 
What constitutes ‘significant segments of the plural society’, and how these segments are 
established or formed are not problematized and remain unclear in Lijphart’s definition.  
There are two ways of making sense of the diffuse way in which Lijphart addresses 
first-order questions – i.e. the constitution of membership in a particular group: these are 
either taken as obvious and self-evident facts, reflecting ‘primordial attachments’, or – more 
probably the case, as I see it – a conscious and deliberate resolved understanding on the 
part of Lijphart that questions pertaining to the constitution of the demos are second order 
issues because the ‘master group’ of people is already self-evidently defined, and therefore, 
not a subject to be problematized. The question pertaining to ‘who constitutes the group’ 
arises thus out of different perceptions and qualified understandings pertaining to what 
constitutes first-order issues and second order issues. 
In chapter 2 I argue that the self-evident definition process of ‘the master group’ of 
people which Lijphart implicitly builds his theory on consociational democracy upon, is itself 
a political composition because state power has been instrumental in defining, organizing 
and sustaining confessional groups. More precisely, state power was instrumental in 
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emphasis. 
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establishing and bolstering the political significance of institutionalizing and categorizing the 
citizenry as members of confessional groups according to the nationalist aspirations of the 
powerful Maronite community. In Lebanon, state power is still instrumental in establishing 
and creating population segments grouped along religious lines as witnessed by the 
opposition against efforts at forming an alternative optional civil family law in 1997 
(discussed in chapter 5). Among the salient state-mandated policies are Regulation 2851 of 2 
December 1924 issued during the French Mandate rule which made the registration of the 
confessional personal status of each citizen compulsive.130 As such, membership in a 
‘primordial’ religious group does not only reflect and represent an individual’s ascriptive 
identity, but acquires a potency which renders membership in a particular confessional 
group similar to membership in an ethnic group. 
As a model for conflict resolution and power-sharing in Lebanon, consociationalism is 
still viewed as representing a viable model of governance for Lebanon and a ‘unique’ 
experience of democracy.131 Among its benefits, Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner point at: 
the opportunity to share power; ensuring the inclusion of smaller communities; negotiation 
as decision-making strategy; promotion of moderate politics; freedom of expression; and 
“finally, one can say that the consociational model helped to maintain the pluralism of 
Lebanese society”.132 As a reader one wonders whether the “myth of pluralism” is here 
presented as an asset, rather than its manifestation as part of the structural fabrics of state 
power itself which by extension is at center when the authors point at the weaknesses of 
consociationalism in Lebanon. For, according to these authors, the drawbacks of 
consociationalist political arrangements include: growing allegiance to socio-religious 
divisions; the facilitation of external intervention; incapability of accommodating political 
differences; the abolishment of equal opportunity among citizens in the public sphere; and 
finally that “familialism, nepotism, clientelism and favouritism [are] entrenched features of 
political practice.”133 Evidently, these researchers still view consociationalism as a guarantee 
                                                          
130 al-jinsiyya wal-ihsa’ wa watha’iq al-ahwal ash-shakhsiyya [Citizenship, the census and the documents on 
personal status], al-majalla al-qada’iyya [The legal Magazine], n.d. 51. See also Davis, Citizenship and the state: 
a comparative study of citizenship legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon: 146. 
131 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi, Democracy in the Arab world: explaining the deficit  (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 1-6. See also Fadia Kiwan and Marcus Marktanner Samir Makdisi, "Lebanon: the constrained 
democracy and its national impact," in Democracy in the Arab world: explaining the deficit, ed. Ibrahim 
Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi (London: Routledge, 2011).  
132 Samir Makdisi, "Lebanon: the constrained democracy and its national impact," 132.  
133 Ibid., 133. 
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to Lebanon’s ‘pluralism’, but fail to sufficiently problematize the tenets on which 
consociational pluralism is based upon. 
Depending on which approach a researcher adopts, one may view state mandated 
registration of religious membership as reflecting a person’s religious identity and belonging, 
or – in contrast – as a factor that shapes, reproduces and sustains the significance of 
religious membership in a polity. My argument with reference to the politics of citizenship in 
Lebanon is that the significance of group-based citizenship supports and underpins ruling 
strategies that concur with the political interests of the ruling regime pertaining to its 
survival. The discussion in chapter 2 on the politics of citizenship surrounding the 
establishment and constitution of the citizenry in Lebanon lends support to the latter 
understanding – that politics shapes and mirrors citizens’ membership in religious groups in 
ways that maintain the salience of collective definitions of group membership. 
Seen from the perspective of the enduring salience of group-based citizenship as a 
necessary condition for consociationalism, power-sharing among groups remain at best a 
remedy or an instrument for stability. As a model for organizing political power it serves its 
purpose in preventing the politicization of issues political, such as gendered citizenship or 
policies that establish and maintain group-based citizenship. As such, consociationalism 
depoliticizes issues that cut across group boundaries such as class, gender and economic 
issues.  
Pressures at forming an optional civil law on personal status in 1997-1998 can well be 
understood as demands that address first-order issues pertaining to sustaining structures 
that define and regulate membership in the polity. When the incumbent power-holder, 
former PM Hariri resorted to mobilize an alliance with internal and external conservative 
clerical authorities, he acted in ways that immediately politicized the question pertaining to 
an optional personal status code. What was then supported was a vested interest among 
powerful groups in society (financial, clerical, political) in defining fundamental issues of 
dispute pertaining to first-order problems as if they were second-order problems. The Taif 
Accords define explicitly that questions related to the citizenship law and the personal status 
laws are two out of thirteen ‘major issues’. At the time, PM Hariri exercised the supreme 
authority granted to him through article C.5. of the Taif Accords. Article C.5. nullifies article 
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D.6. which enables a majority of the Cabinet by vote to adopt a resolution on whether or not 
to send proposals regarding family law issues to parliament.134 
Kerr argues that “Lebanon has always had external political referees, which its 
communities defer to for arbitration over internal and external disputes”. While this is a 
valid argument in explaining disputes over security issues, the point remains that, in order to 
solve internal domestic issues, authorities do not hesitate to use debatable and 
unconstitutional means to secure their main vested interest, and that is to ensure the 
survival of the political regime they head, as well as the Lebanese political order on which 
the political regime – whatever its members may be through parliamentary elections – rests 
upon. In chapter 5 I point at the dire deadlock the legacy of power-sharing reached at an 
important historical juncture pertaining to addressing sectarianism by suggesting an optional 
and unified civil law for the Lebanese. The verdict of a clear majority in the government in 
1998 – 21 against 6 ministers – was ignored by the late PM’s show of force who pressed the 
‘clerical button’ and called for support from conservatively orthodox Sunni clerics in Syria 
and Saudi Arabia. 
In their study of power-sharing and electoral quotas in Nepal, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Lebanon, Butenschøn and Vollan point at the risk involved in sustaining 
democratic politics based on consociational power-sharing formulas. They warn of the 
danger of power-sharing arrangements that “tend to empty the formal political institutions 
of decision-making power, leaving it in the hands of informal power structures that are 
controlled by the most important groups.” 135 What can be read out of PM Hariri’s veto in 
the governmental voting procedure represents an example of such politically undermining 
                                                          
134 Article C.5. regarding the prerogatives of the Prime Minister reads that he shall exercise the power to “[s]ign 
the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.” 
Article D.6. pertaining to the Cabinet reads: “When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet 
sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 
2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The 
resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the 
approval of  2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency 
and it abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general 
budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their 
equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, 
the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.” Retrieved at 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/taif.htm, accessed 26 February 2011. 
135 Nils A. Butenschøn et al., Electoral quotas and the challenges of democratic transition in conflict-ridden 
societies  (Oslo: Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, 2011), 7, emphasis in original. 
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measures that empty political institutions of their capability to reform political systems built 
on consociationalist formulas of power-sharing.  
Such a governance strategy allows the perpetuation of a political structure that 
resembles more an autocratic oligarchy of leaders whose main objective is to perpetuate 
oligarchy rather than democracy. In as far as external groups are involved, these both lend 
support and are supported by representatives of the Lebanese oligarchic leadership with 
respect to whether an alliance formation supports or runs contrary to their political interest 
at a given historical moment. In Lebanon, political leaders who participate in power-sharing 
are unable (at best) and/or unwilling (at worst) to engage in a process that redefines a 
fundamental key that determines membership in the state along religious lines: state 
mandated membership in religious groups and clerical sovereign autonomy in matters 
pertaining to family law. 
What is argued to represent a ‘consociational democracy’ in Lebanon does not offer 
sufficient fruitful interpretations of the impact of political interests that not only seek to 
‘accommodate difference’ between societal groups but also support efforts that  block out 
putting on the political agenda questions pertaining to a political order based on group 
membership. Rupert Taylor questions therefore rightly whether  
consociationalism’s reading of ethnicity as a key independent explanatory factor, which is 
unquestionably taken to set the parameters for social engineering, is sociologically correct? What of 
the body of social-scientific scholarship that sees ethnicity as in interdependent socially-constructed, 
fluid factor – mediated by class, status, and education (amongst other influences)? 136 
 
Lustick suggests that consociationalist regimes act as ‘umpires’ which F.G. Bailey 
distinguished from ‘leaders’. While a leader acts on behalf of his group, an umpire does not 
have a group. What an umpire preserves is, according to Bailey 
the structure of rules which regulate political competition. His concern is not a team, but an arena. […] 
most of an umpire’s time is spent seeing that existing rules are obeyed and that deviant competitors 
are brought back into line. But the role also includes modifying the existing rules and even making new 
rules to cope with unanticipated disorders which may break out in the arena. But his goal is always the 
preservation of that arena 137 
 
This description fits well with a judicial move that was perceived as a ‘systems shock’ in 2009 
                                                          
136 Rupert Taylor, "Introduction: The promise of consociational democracy," in Consociational theory: McGarry 
and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland conflict, ed. Rupert Taylor (London: Routledge, 2009), 10. 
137 As cited in Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," World 
Politics 31, no. 3 (April 1979): 331. Lustick cites F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and spoils: A social anthropology of 
politics  (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 135. 
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following Judge John Azzi’s unanticipated court ruling on 16 June 2009. Azzi ruled in favor of 
allowing the registration of four children under the name of their Lebanese mother, Samira 
Sweidan, in the state’s personal registries. This step would allow the children to obtain 
Lebanese citizenship. Widowed after her Egyptian husband died, Sweidan raised a case 
against the state, objecting the fees demanded for the yearly residence permits required of 
her children who were born and raised in Lebanon.138 Minister of Interior Ziad Barud 
declared that he will not oppose the ruling, while Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar objected 
on the grounds that “[p]oliticians should make laws, not judges”.139 A year later, on 18 May 
2010, the nationality ruling was reversed through a debatable appeal on behalf of the 
Ministry of Justice and judge Azzi lost his position as judge through internal displacements.  
In a series of articles before and after the 2009 nationality ruling, journalist Ali al-
Musawi who has reported on legal issues in Lebanese courts since 1997, followed the 
citizenship rulings in Lebanese courts. Al-Musawi argues that the Ministry of Justice’s 
internal Court of Appeal, hay’at al-qadaya wan-niyaba al-‘amma, can only raise an appeal on 
behalf of the concerned ministry. Since cases of citizenship are under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Interior who had publicly declared that he will not oppose the ruling, the Ministry 
of Justice had no judicial authority to raise a case. Knowing that the state’s appeal against 
Azzi’s nationality ruling cannot be signed by him as Minister of Justice, Minister of Justice 
Ibrahim Najjar appointed junior female judge Arlette Thabit, who had no previous 
experience in issuing a ruling, to proceed with the appeal. She was eventually promoted to 
the position of – among lawyers much desired – judge in the Mount Lebanon Court of 
Appeal. The withdrawal of the citizenship ruling was appealed by Sweidan who is supported 
by the main civil society group, the CRTD-A “My nationality campaign”. It is still being 
handled by the High Court [mahkamat at-tamyiz], but – according to al-Musawi – should be 
understood as de facto shelved.140 
In other words, the Lebanese state reacted to Judge Azzi’s ruling as an umpire: the 
most important objective was to preserve the structure of rules in a vital legal arena, that 
which regulates membership in the state. Deviant actors, i.e. the judge who ruled in favor of 
                                                          
138 See “mahkamat al-bidaya tataqallabu ‘ala al-ijtihadat al-qada’iyya” in as-safir, 17 June 2009. 
139 http://www.al-shorfa.com/en/article/090722_political_nws/, and 
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/08/2009826105950433205.html, accessed 2 September 2009. See also 
interview with al-Najjar in al-akhbar, 21 March 2011 where he reiterates on the citizenship ruling. 
140 Interview with author 15 March 2011. See also as-safir 19 May 2010 and 2 January 2011.  
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a Lebanese female citizen’s legal capacity to pass over her citizenship to her children, and 
unacceptable acts, i.e. the 2009 nationality ruling which might have established precedence, 
were brought into line by arguably making new rules to cope with the disorder created in 
the political arena of citizenship rulings. 
 
3.3 Pluralism and the politics of citizenship in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon 
The discussion in chapter 3 takes as it point of departure a hypothesis which Ghassan 
Salamé, a noted Lebanese political scientist, presents that it is in the small and plural states 
in the Middle East we find the most noteworthy emergence of democratic practices. His 
conviction spurs around an understanding that “democratization is to a great extent brought 
about through a recognition of […] ethno-cultural pluralism, rather than by is rejection”.141 
Writing in 1994, he pointed that “Lebanon and Kuwait have been practically the only Arab 
countries to hold legislative elections […] in which genuine competition between candidates 
could be discerned, despite some tough limitations and more or less justified accusations of 
malpractice.”142 Salamé argues that the experiences of these two countries are exceptional 
and that they may be regarded as in “a category of their own in the authoritarian nebula 
which has been typical of most Arab countries” since independence.143  
He then presents the hypothesis that Kuwait and Lebanon’s ‘exceptionalism’ is 
related to their democratic experiments characterized by power-sharing among groups 
where none is dominant and to a free press where political interests and dissent have been 
articulated openly. Salamé deduces his conviction on the merits of recognizing difference in 
Lebanon and Kuwait rather than suppressing it after presenting what he sees as two logics 
that are in opposition:  
one that takes into account the basic social pluralism and tries to organize its political expression into 
consociative institutions, and another – more common – logic that ignores this basic pluralism in the 
name of national unity. It seems that the first logic has more easily prevailed in those small countries 
where […] the management of liberal/confessional pluralism (rather than its negation) is viewed as an 
asset […]. 144 
                                                          
141 Ghassan Salamé, ed. Democracy without democrats?: the renewal of politics in the Muslim world (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1994), 87. 
142 Ghassan Salamé, "Small is pluralistic: democracy as an instrument of civil peace," in Democracy without 
democrats?: the renewal of politics in the Muslim world, ed. Ghassān Salamāh (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 84. 
143 Ibid., 85. 
144 Ibid., 87, my emphasis. I comment on Salamé’s terminological coinage later.  
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Although presented in the mid-1990s, Salamé’s hypothesis is still salient and 
academically potent. His argumentations run parallel with Lijphart’s in viewing 
consociationalism as a valid model for democratic governance in divided societies. They are 
likewise echoed in analytical approaches that have different labels such as the ‘politics of 
difference’, ‘multicultural politics’, ‘identity politics’ or ‘politics of difference’ advocated by 
Canadian professor of philosophy Will Kymlicka. These theoretical approaches have 
attracted considerable academic interest the past fifteen years, and have in some states 
legitimized governance strategies that support and bolster group-based citizenship.145 
 Kymlicka maintains that societies and polities can (and should) recognize group-
differentiated rights that substantiate the essence of citizenship as more than individually-
based rights. He suggests that the group-differentiated rights by ethnic and national 
minorities be seen as viable political paths to democratic forms of representation, 
participation in western democratic states as well as measures to achieve reconciliation in 
divided societies. 
Seen from the perspective of first-order and second-order problems in divided states 
in the Middle East, the line of reasoning presented by Salamé, Kymlicka and other 
proponents of group-based citizenship, evolves around second-order issues concerning 
aspects related to political participation. Aspects related to membership – be it in a religious 
or ethnic group, an indigenous minority group, in the demos, in the polity, or in the 
territorial state – are not addressed. As is the case with Lijphart’s analysis, the ascriptive and 
given nature of “who constitutes the group” is taken as an implicit part of the analysis, and 
therefore disregarded. 
My main argument discussed and elaborated upon in chapter 3 is that  
the ‘exceptional’ experiences of political participation in Kuwait and Lebanon cannot be 
understood fully without including a focus on fairly high degrees of exclusionary 
membership policies as practiced by the ruling regime in these states. One particular 
characteristic shared by Kuwait, Lebanon and Jordan is the central role in which membership 
policies play in constituting, shaping, reshaping and sustaining distinct citizenry 
constellations at different historical moments since the establishment of the territorial state 
in ways that are in accordance with the interests and aspirations of powerholders. 
                                                          
145 Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights: 34 -35, 174-75. See also  Kymlicka and 
Bashir, The Politics of reconciliation in multicultural societies: 12. 
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In chapter 3 I argue that the manner in which the citizen and non-citizenship 
populations of these states was established, and how these states have managed the high 
exogenous population influx, through enumeration processes, the settlement of refugees, as 
well as the incorporation of overwhelmingly large numbers of non-national workforce 
compared to citizens (in the case of Kuwait), sheds light on the variances between these 
states’ inclusionary and exclusionary participatory experiences. The politics of citizenship in 
Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon highlights variances in the political participatory experiences 
which are inseparably related to the way in which rulers have organized, categorized and 
molded their populations through membership policies. 
In table 1 rendered in chapter 3 I show how different modes of membership policies 
impinge, at different historical stages in time, on the character of political participation in 
the form of pact formation between rulers and ruled in each state. The table shows that in 
Kuwait and Lebanon, we find that political pluralism has been, for a substantial period of 
time, exclusive in terms of the demos subject to the polity's rules, while Jordan has been 
particularly inclusive in terms of expanding the body of its citizenry. In the three states we 
find that the inclusive and exclusive character of the demos has been maintained or 
attempted changed in each state in different ways over time: Each demos configuration 
resulting out of the membership policies applied affects the nature of the patterns of 
participation in the polity. The political pluralism we find in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon has 
therefore to take heed of the expansion and contraction of the citizenry at different points in 
time. 
In part, my discussion addresses problems related to viewing pluralism as an 
explanatory factor that sheds light on the participatory formulas which render Lebanon and 
Kuwait as more democratic than other polities in the region. My argument is that pluralism 
in these states is embedded in fairly exclusionary traits for two reasons: first, pluralism, as 
portrayed by Salamé, builds on group-based membership in the polity which hardly sorts 
under the label democratic as Salamé’s innovative term ‘liberal/confessional’ suggests146; 
second, pluralism at the societal and political levels are not necessarily compatible, as 
pointed in the following discussion on political regime typologies. 
 
                                                          
146 I elaborate more on the significance of viewing Arab polities as illiberal polities in part 5 of this chapter. 
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3.3.1 On pluralism: a descriptive or analytical concept? 
What counts as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ pluralism? When does pluralism, understood as embodying 
or reflecting modes and forms of societal differences in kind or degree, develop into a 
liability rather than an asset with reference to society and state in MENA? 
In Getting to pluralism: Political actors in the Arab World, Hamzawy and Ottaway 
point that the imbalance of power between ruling establishments, secular parties and non-
violent Islamist movements limits the degree of pluralism, and argue that “pluralist politics in 
the Arab world is not yet democratic politics.”147 Though not clearly defined, ‘pluralist 
politics’ encompasses mainly the proliferation of political parties, and the report presents an 
understanding that political pluralism is good.  
The implicit positive connotations related to the concept ‘pluralism’ is affirmed by 
Linz and Stepan who, in their study on problems of democratic transition highlight 
‘pluralism’ as one of four central variables along with ‘ideology’, ‘mobilization’ and 
‘leadership’ that define variances in the five regime ideal types they outline.148 The authors 
do not, however, clarify what they imply by ‘pluralism’. They differentiate, for instance, 
between forms and degrees of ‘political pluralism’ as opposed to ‘social pluralism’. 
Nevertheless, there is an implicit understanding as to the characteristics of what ‘pluralism’ 
which is not immediately clear: Democracy is, for instance, typologized as including   
[r]esponsible political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy in economy, 
society, and internal life of organizations. Legally protected pluralism [that is] consistent with ‘societal 
corporatism’, but not with ‘state corporatism’149 
If pluralism in a democracy is to be a yardstick against which types of pluralism in other 
political regimes is to be compared, then Linz’s and Stepan’s definition is not clear on what 
‘societal corporatism’ and ‘state corporatism’ encompass. Nor are the authors keen on 
defining ‘pluralism’, although the term is central in their typology. However, they apply the 
term in their discussions on different states illuminating the distinctions they seek to 
                                                          
147 Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, Getting to pluralism: political actors in the Arab world  (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 12. 
148 See table 3.1. entitled “Major modern regime ideal types and their defining characters” where Linz and 
Stepan differentiate between five ideal types of political regimes: democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, 
post-totalitarianism and sultanism. Linz and Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe: 44. 
149 Ibid., 40. The authors state moreover that “we believe that such important categories as “consociational 
democracy” and “majoritarian democracy” are subtypes of democracy and not different regime types. 
Democracy as a regime type seems to us to be of sufficient value to be retained and not to need further 
elaboration”. 
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establish between ‘democratic’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘sultanistic’ regimes with reference to 
‘pluralism’.  
An authoritarian regime is, for instance, according to Linz and Stepan, a “[p]olitical 
system with limited, not responsible political pluralism … [o]ften quite extensive social and 
economic pluralism [where] most pluralism had roots in society before the establishment of 
the regime.” With reference to sultanistic regimes, the authors point that pluralism is 
characterized by no rule of law, low institutionalization, high fusion of private and public in 
which “[e]conomic and social pluralism does not disappear but is subject to unpredictable 
and despotic intervention. No group or individual in civil society, political society, or the 
state is free from sultan’s exercise of despotic power.”150 
Based on the distinction the authors make between pluralism in these three types of 
political regimes, states in the Middle East fall somewhere between ‘authoritarian’ and 
‘sultanistic’, depending on how the authors define ‘societal’ and ‘state’ corporatism. To the 
degree that pluralism in terms of ‘societal corporatism’ includes religious group autonomy in 
personal law, I would argue that this type of pluralism should be classified as an aspect of 
authoritarian political regimes. Pluralism in the Middle East is, furthermore, authoritarian 
rather than ‘sultanistic’ for two main reasons:  first, ‘social pluralism’ in terms of more or less 
institutionalized forms of religious differentiation is extensive and was, as Linz and Stepan 
point, in place before the establishment of the political regime; second, there exists ‘rule of 
law’, even in states where rulers act as sultans such as in the Gulf states. But, in as far as 
family law permeates the fabrics of societal pluralism in most states in the Middle East, it is a 
legal arena which, in some states, can be seen as battleground between different 
contenders regarding who has or shall have the authority to interpret and regulate family 
law. 
The institutionalization of religious pluralism in multireligious states such as Lebanon, 
Jordan and Syria, and the codification of family law as state law in most states in MENA 
impel a theoretical and analytical distinction between different types of pluralism, including 
a differentiation between the boundaries and point of intersection between ‘political 
pluralism’, ‘societal pluralism’ and ‘religious pluralism’ in society. Societal divisions that arise 
as a result of the prevalence of religious pluralism and the embedment of legal pluralism as 
part of state law in illiberal polities in the Middle East are, in other words, of a categorically 
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different sort than societal divisions based on religious, geographical or linguistic lines in 
liberal societies such as contemporary western democracies.  
Indeed, “[p]lural regimes may not always be as plural as the definition would 
indicate.”151 It is therefore worthwhile to dwell on the term ‘pluralism’ and emphasize the 
importance pertaining to how ‘pluralism’ is defined, and the impact of the clarification of 
nuances that follow from its definition in liberal and illiberal polities.  
 
3.3.2 Consociationalist and multiculturalist group-based citizenship: a critique 
The salience of models that prescribe the distribution of rights within a polity in ways that 
conform to a group-based citizenship regime have made their impact on deliberations 
pertaining to statebuilding and prescriptions to conflict resolution in divided societies. 
It follows from discussions that permeate this thesis that consociationalist as well as 
multiculturalist approaches address societal divisions as apriori givens.152 Critique against 
such approaches has, since the turn of the millennia been presented both within the liberal 
school of thought153, and by feminist researchers who have emphasized intra-group 
oppression with reference to female members of minority groups as well as inter-group 
differences between religious groups.154 Criticism towards the application of ‘pluralism’ as 
analytical concept has also gained wider support among social anthropologists such as 
Richard Jenkins who argues that: 
By the end of the day, the notion of pluralism is theoretically vapid. The best that can be said is that it 
is merely profoundly descriptive, going no further than the extensive cataloguing of concrete 
situations by reference to a classificatory scheme of ideal-typical plural societies […] This is all the 
more reason for treating the concept with caution in academic discussions of inter-ethnic relations.155 
                                                          
151 Butenschøn, "State power and citizenship in the Middle East: A theoretical introduction," 25. 
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Women's rights and the multicultural dilemma."; Shachar, Multicultural jurisdictions: cultural differences and 
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It is with reference to such criticism against understandings of pluralism that my discussions 
on consociationalism and legal pluralism in family law fall. I find the salience of 
consociationalist approaches towards understanding and conceptualizing societal divisions in 
‘multireligious’ and / or ‘plural’ societies – depending on how these are defined and 
operationalized –  intriguing. To a certain extent, ‘multicultural citizenship’ appears to be the 
Trojan horse with which illiberal practices take their form in presumably democratic settings, 
and which go hand in glove with views that underpin theories of ‘consociational democracy’. 
There are a number of significant, and politically devastating, deficiencies related to 
multiculturalism as a relevant school of thought or political compass as this is theorized and 
applied in the Middle East.  
Ian Lustick presented a prudent discussion of consociationalism in 1979.156 Two 
decades later, he produced a full-fledged critique of Lijphart’s project from a history of 
philosophy perspective where he points that “Lijphart’s struggle over time […] emerges as 
mainly political, to affirm consociationalism as valid (almost) regardless of its scientific 
status, because it serves the ends he values.”157 
Within consociationalist approaches, arguments pertaining to conflict resolution and 
the political accommodation of difference builds on a point of view where the ‘group’ 
(linguistic, religious, ethnic or tribal) is seen as an established variable emanating mainly as a 
result of voluntary association by individual members. My discussions in the four articles 
that constitute the thesis point at the importance of emphasizing the role in which state 
power plays at the hands of ruling elites and governing regimes through the politics of 
citizenship in creating and sustaining legal and institutional social boundaries along 
gendered, religious and tribal lines in ways that support regime survival. 
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4 Civil citizenship: The ‘woman question’ reinterpreted 
 
“Women were protected because they were not citizens.  
If they wished to enjoy full and responsible citizenship,  
they must forego protection.”158 
 
What I term as challenges pertaining to the establishment of ‘civil citizenship’ is, as I 
elaborate on in part 6, related theoretically with processes of state formation. These 
challenges are connected to the equalization of civil rights among citizens, as well as the 
equalization of civil rights between female and male citizens in the polity. In the thesis, my 
main emphasis is on the latter set of problems, i.e. questions that involve the gendered and 
unequal distribution of civil rights in the polity. I discuss the political significance of the 
interrelatedness between clerical and judicial autonomy, particularly in multireligious states, 
which impacts on the unequal distribution of civil rights among all citizens as well as 
between male and female citizens. In chapters 4 and 5, I discuss how the relationship 
between clerical and judicial autonomy gives rise to variances pertaining to alliance 
formation between societal groups that underpin particular citizenship regimes and support 
regime survival. 
The discussion in this part spins mainly around questions pertaining to the expansion 
of female citizenship in MENA. ‘Female citizenship’ is here defined as the set of civil rights 
that regulate the legal capacity of a female citizen in the polity. I reflect and comment on the 
use of the term ‘the woman question’ which is widely used as a descriptive concept to 
denote the marginalization of women in Arab polities. I then address the intersection of 
questions related to family law and the autonomy of religious groups on the one hand, and 
the impact of state power on the distribution of civil rights among the citizenry and on the 
other hand. For, as I discuss in chapters 4 and 5,  what is often defined and portrayed as 
‘women’s issues’ in the Middle East reflect variances in the distribution of power in society 
and state in ways that highlight political alliance formation and power constellations at the 
state level. Finally, I propose a typology on female citizenship in MENA which categorizes 
political regimes with regards to whether the distribution of civil rights occurs along 
individually-based or group-based lines.  
 
                                                          
158 T. H. Marshall, Class, citizenship, and social development: essays  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977), 89. 
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4.1 The ‘woman question’ in MENA: equalizing civil rights within the polity 
Moghadam points that ‘the woman question’ is a term used by leftist parties and nationalist 
movements since the nineteenth century to describe the oppression of women and to 
prescribe alternative visions offered in order to include women in social development.159 The 
term is still in vogue.  
The fourth Arab Human Development Report Towards the rise of women in the Arab 
World aimed, for instance, “to dislodge traditional views still clinging to the women’s 
question”.160 The term is also used to express reformist efforts within Islamist movements in 
the contemporary Middle East. “Certainly, the “women’s question” will remain a central 
object of reformist concern”161 point Vogt et al., while Utvik discusses whether elements in 
the ideological agenda of Islamists may pressure for reform, including reforms concerning 
the woman question.162 With reference to different approaches towards Islamic feminism in 
Sudan and Iran, Bøe and Tønnessen point likewise that “[s]ecular approaches to the woman 
question have been […] systematically suspended the past 22 years” and that “[t]he 
ideological framework for the woman question was established in 1989 up to 2000.”163 
What unites these diverse perceptions is a common understanding that women 
represent a ‘problem of a sort’ – female citizens are reduced to ‘a question’. I suggest that 
the socio-economic and political marginalization of women in Arab polities be theoretically 
addressed as a classical demos issue which is inseparably related to the state formation 
process of modern Arab polities and the partial inclusion of female citizens in the polity.164 I 
                                                          
159 Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalization and social movements: islamism, feminism, and the global justice 
movement  (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 72. 
160 Arab Human Development Report 2005, "Towards the rise of women in the Arab World," ed. United Nations 
Development Program (Amman: National Press, 2006), 11. 
161 Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen, and Christian Moe, eds., New directions in Islamic thought: exploring reform and 
Muslim tradition (London: Tauris, 2009), 5. See also Nazife Sisman, "Historical and political dynamics of the 
“women and Islam” issue – The Turkish case," in New directions in Islamic thought: exploring reform and 
Muslim tradition, ed. Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen, and Christian Moe (London: Tauris, 2009), 113.  
162 Bjørn Olav Utvik, Islamismen  (Oslo: Unipub, 2011), 345. The original sentence is: «[E]r det elementer i 
islamistenes ideologiske kjernepakke som i samspill med samfunnsmessige endringer driver fram endringer 
også i kvinnespørsmålet?». 
163  Marianne Bøe and Liv Tønnessen, "Nye utfordringer til islamsk feminisme: Kvinneaktivismens mange 
ansikter i Sudan og Iran [New challenges to Islamic feminism: The multiple faces of women's activism in Sudan 
and Iran]," Tidsskrift for kjønnsforskning, no. 4 (2011): 332, my translation. 
164 Evidence on the socio-economic and political marginalization of women in the MENA-region compared to 
other regions in the world is ample. See for instance Leigh Tomppert and Sameena Nazir, Women's rights in the 
Middle East and North Africa: citizenship and justice  (Lanham, Md.: Freedom House, 2005); Laura D. Tyson 
Ricardo Hausmann, Saadia Zahidi, "Global Gender Gap Report 2011," (Cologny/ Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2011). The report is available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/, accessed 29 
November 2011. For informative and updated case studies for each country, see Women’s Rights in the Middle 
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argue that limited and conditional inclusion in the demos restrains the legal capacity of 
female citizens and impinges on their political participation in Arab states. Moreover, I 
emphasize the significance of perceiving contracted female citizenship in relation to the 
organization and distribution of power within the polity. These questions pertain to the field 
of politics in as much as they involve questions related to ‘women’ or ‘religion’. Rather than 
concentrating on women’s position within ‘Islam’ as majority religion in MENA, I maintain 
that there is need for social scientists to make use of the rich studies provided by social 
anthropologists and scholars within history of religion in order uncover the alliance patterns 
and power play at hand between and among religious or confessional groups. Indeed, there 
is dire need to probe into the points of intersection whereby ‘religion’ becomes ‘politics’ in 
ways that surpass what may be primarily seen as matters pertaining to religious faith.165 
There are several arenas in which the marginalization of women in MENA is 
continuously reproduced in the Middle East: the kinship structure, the educational system, 
the waged labor market, and representative political channels such as local municipalities as 
well as parliaments. Nevertheless, family law is an arena of particular relevance to the 
marginalization of women in the Middle East for two main reasons: first, family law 
conditions a range of other civil, economic and political rights that are embedded in the 
kinship system; second, state power plays a central role in constituting and sanctioning the 
institutionalization and organization of family law. In other words, the principle of 
guardianship which permeates family law is bolstered, maintained and reproduced with 
state power as legitimizing force. 
 
4.2 Religious law as the state’s family law 
With reference to Islamic laws and jurisprudence, Vikør points that “[i]n spite of the 
attention it has received, criminal law is not, […], the most widely used part of Islamic law 
[…]. The area of the Shari’a that has the widest application, directly or through codifications 
based on the Shari’a rules, is clearly family and personal law. It is also the most controversial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
East and North Africa 2010, available at http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=86, 
accessed 15 September 2011. 
165 An excellent compilation of articles is provided by professor at London School of Economics and Social 
Sciences John T. S. Madeley, Religion and politics  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 
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area in relation to ‘modern’, Western norms, in particular on issues of the position of 
women and gender.”166 
In general, religious law reflects conservative interpretations with regards to gender 
in ways that underpin patriarchal family models.167 What evolves around the inclusion of 
religious law as part of state law is, furthermore, the institutionalizing and sustaining of the 
principle of guardianship168 of male citizens over female citizens in various ways in the legal 
and judicial systems in most polities in the Middle East. The inclusion of the principle of 
guardianship in various parts of the state’s legal codes is a common problem exhibited in 
states where Islam dominates, as well as in multireligious states where different 
confessional groups have various degrees of autonomy. While Islam predominates in studies 
on family law in the Arab world169, the scope of analysis is here widened and includes the 
impact of non-Muslim communities, as well as different Muslim and Christian confessional 
subgroups on the state’s management of religious law. 
 
4.2.1 Impact of institutionalization of religious law as state law 
The inclusion and institutionalization of religious law as part of state law serves as a central 
element in the constitution of the legal status of all citizens in MENA. In chapter 5 I 
emphasize the political significance of unitary and dual court systems on the manoeuvring 
                                                          
166 Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan: a history of Islamic law  (London: Hurst, 2005), 299. 
167 Buskens defines ‘a patriarchal family model’ as a “model of family life in which senior men are entitled to a 
dominant position over subordinate women and children. This male dominance, grounded in their position as 
husbands and fathers, is expressed in norms about gender, descent, obedience, sexuality, the use of space and 
freedom of movement, as well as about the economy of the household.” Léon Buskens, "Recent debates on 
family law reform in Morocco: Islamic law as politics in an emerging public sphere," Islamic Law & Society 10, 
no. 1 (2003): 75. 
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well as ‘possession’, ‘supervision’ and ‘control’. The term is also connected with ‘imprisonment’ as in “he has 
been in custody for 12 moths” referring thus to ‘detention’, ‘confinement’, and ‘captivity’ (accessed 19 
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see Deniz Kandiyoti, "Islam and Patriarchy: A Comparative Perspective," in Feminist Approaches to Theory and 
Methodology, ed. Christina Gilmartin Sharlene Hesse-Biber, Robin Lydenberg (New York / Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 228-31. 
169  Lynn Welchman, ed. Women's rights and Islamic family law: perspectives on reform (London: Zed Books, 
2004); Welchman, Women and Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual 
development and advocacy; Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on trial: Islamic family law in Iran and Morocco  
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Annelies Moors, "Debating Islamic family Law: Legal texts and social practice," in 
Social history of women and gender in the modern Middle East, ed. Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. 
Tucker (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999). 
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room of societal pressure groups that push for reforms which expand the civil rights of 
women. States with unitary court systems are predominantly homogenous states where 
Islam dominates. There, the codification of family law on the basis of religious law is 
perceived as safeguarding the cultural, historical and religious identity of the state. In 
multireligious states with dual court systems, the delegation of judicial autonomy to 
religious groups is perceived as a measure of accommodation which facilitates and 
safeguards the interests of communal groups, enabling them to be governed by their own 
institutions. By ‘accommodation’ I refer to the entrusting of certain social spheres, such as 
education and family law, which religious groups perceive as vital for their constitution and 
perpetuation as an identity group with a distinct culture, history and world view.170 
In both homogenous and multireligious states in the Middle East, statutory and 
communal family laws grant differential civil rights to citizens qua members of religious 
groups. Family law differentiates not only between the legal status of citizens who belong to 
different confessional groups. It accords also male and female citizens with differential rights 
within each confessional group. Moreover, membership in religious groups – while not 
involuntary due to the comparably high degree of voluntary association – nevertheless is 
encumbered by the non-existence of exit opportunities in illiberal states: a citizen in MENA 
can be a believer / non-believer, or a faithful / unfaithful member of a confessional group to 
different degrees.171 He or she does not, however, have the opportunity of exit from 
confessional group membership because the state accords every citizen with a religious 
membership status in order to ordain an appurtenant family law in matters pertaining to 
personal status. As such, ‘exit’ and ‘entry’ costs into an association based on confessional 
belief are less relevant measures pertaining to voluntary or involuntary association: without 
exit opportunities offered by the state in the form of a civil personal status code, a citizen is 
de jure member of a religious group.172  
The proliferation of legal pluralism resulting from the political accommodation of 
religious pluralism is a structural facet of polities in the Middle East. In most Arab states 
                                                          
170 Shachar, Multicultural jurisdictions: cultural differences and women's rights: 2. 
171 Confer with the study on religiosity in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Jordan, 
Kuwait and Yemen by Mark Tessler, "Religion, religiosity and the placeof Islam in political life: Insights from the 
Arab Barometer Surveys," Middle East Law and Governance 2, no. 221-252 (2010). 
172 Confer with the discussion on individual and collective participation in western liberal societies and the exit / 
entry choice opportunities depending on high cost / low cost versus voluntary / involuntary modes of 
association as sketched out by Reinhard Bendix John Bendix, Norman Furniss, "Reflections on modern western 
states and civil societies," Research in Political Sociology 3(1983): 18-23.   
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citizens may be equal before the law, but not in the law, complicating the ideal of ‘rule of 
law’ principles.173 
The institutionalization of religious pluralism and the sustaining of group-based 
citizenship regimes in contemporary states in the Middle East represent a double-edged 
sword with reference to democratization: Religious pluralism safeguards in principle 
freedom of belief and minority group rights.174 However, the price paid is intra-group 
infringement of individual citizen rights. This point has been emphasized in discussions on 
multicultural citizenship within liberal polities.175 To a lesser degree is intra-group 
infringement of individual citizenship rights been analyzed with reference to Middle Eastern 
states as illiberal polities. Focus has, moreover, remained on a unitary representation of 
Islam as dominant religion, rather than the plurality in confessional faiths within Islam as 
well as the multitude of Christian confessional denominations. The academic discourse on 
gender justice within Islam, and feminist readings and interpretations of religious canonical 
text, approach the question of unequal distribution of civil rights.176 However, as long as the 
main emphasis is on at the confessional group level (‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’), a more 
comprehensive analysis of intra-group relationships (minority – majority constellations such 
as in Syria and in Egypt, or intra-minority relations such as in Lebanon and in Syria) is either 
lost or remains critically undertheorized. We need more research on state-church177 
relationships and constellations in order to unravel the political dimensions pertaining to the 
state’s management and organization of religious belief systems. 
                                                          
173 This distinction is made by professor Rabéa Naciri, president of the Association Démocratique du femmes du 
Maroc (ADFM/Rabat) in her article on Morocco. See Rabéa Naciri, "Country report on Morocco," in Women's 
rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and justice (Freedom House, April 2006). She points that 
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http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=178, accessed 6 November 2011. 
174 Religious minorities in the Middle East: domination, self-empowerment, accomodation, ed. Anh Nga Longva 
and Anne Sofie Roald (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
175 Okin et al., Is multiculturalism bad for women; Shachar, "Should church and state be joined at the altar? 
Women's rights and the multicultural dilemma."; Ayelet Shachar, "What we owe women: The view from 
multicultral feminism," in Toward a humanist justice: the political philosophy of Susan Moller Okin, ed. Debra 
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Press, 2010). 
177 I use the term ‘state-church’ as a generic term which denotes institutional and organizational constellations 
between temporal state power and authority on the one hand and organized religiously sanctioned power and 
authority on the other. 
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My main objective in analyzing the politicization of family law debates in 
multireligious Syria and to compare family law debates and pressures for reform in four Arab 
states is to emphasize the intimate relationship between inter-group and intra-group 
dynamics related to the politics of citizenship and the ensuing variation in the politicization 
of the demos. What at first glance appear as ‘gender issues’ or disputes regarding ‘the 
woman question’ in the Middle East is profoundly related to political calculations and 
patterns of alliance formation pertaining to regime survival in non-democratic and 
authoritarian polities. Moreover, I argue that particularly in multi-religious states, the 
institutionalization of group-based citizenship defines and structures the distribution of 
power at both the group as well as the state level in ways that bolster the survival of the 
regime.178 
Bryan S. Turner discusses questions related to the management of religions in liberal 
and illiberal states in contemporary societies. He concentrates his analysis on what he terms 
as “various authoritarian responses to religious pluralism and the rise of religious radicalism” 
because, as he explains, “[p]essimistically, authoritarian solutions are likely to become the 
dominant mode of the modern management of religions.”179 With reference to the Middle 
East, I would argue that religious pluralism is not only managed. Religious pluralism 
permeates the political order as this was formed upon the establishment of the territorial 
state system after 1920. Neither nationalism as driving force for change, nor secular political 
programs projected by different movements supported demands made by for strengthened 
civil rights among and between citizens within family law.180 Indeed, as Moghadam notes, 
nationalist and revolutionary movements, including those who came to power, perpetuated 
and sustained traditional gender roles and bolstered group-based citizenship along gendered 
lines.181  
Writing persuasively already in the late 1980s, P.J. Vatikiotis argued with reference to 
Egypt that  
                                                          
178 I reflect on the post-2011 uprisings in the Arab world in part 8 where I discuss variances pertaining to the 
politics of citizenship and regime survival. 
179 Bryan S. Turner, Religion and modern society: citizenship, secularisation and the state  (Cambridge: 
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the conflict is between a basically secular state authority and those who deny its legitimacy because it 
refuses to establish a purely Islamic order. Yet the conflict is characterized by the hesitation of state 
authority to impose a functioning, institutionalized secular system. This hesitation accentuated the 
problem of ethnicity and pluralism. Moreover, the state itself has tended to impose a political 
uniformity of its own that is in effect a practical denial of pluralism.182 
 
Vatikiotis’ insights hits head on the crux of contemporary challenges related to religious 
pluralism in Egypt and other Arab states where post 2011-revolting citizens are pressuring 
for the establishment of new contractual forms of citizenship between rulers and ruled. 
Vatikiotis prescribes, in my view, a fruitful approach to understanding problems related to 
establishing a secular order in the Middle East. Nevertheless, his argumentation falters on 
the grounds that, he too, is not sensitive enough with regards to uncovering the inherent 
problems related to enhancing ‘political pluralism’. Not unlike other researchers, Vatikiotis 
defines pluralism in terms of a political order which does not separate, but tolerates 
dhimmis, i.e. non-Muslims, as part of the same political community.183 Vatikiotis points out 
explicitly that he is mostly occupied by highlighting the “doctrinal basis and confusion of 
religious pluralism and its political negation – that is, the failure to accommodate it 
politically.”184 My understanding of his critique of pluralism is therefore that Vatikiotis 
defines, understands and seeks to address pluralism along the same group-based lines as 
Ghassan Salamé (discussed in chapter 3) and – to a certain degree – Arend Lijphart; 
pluralism should be accommodated politically by ‘secular state authority’ on a more 
equitable basis between Muslims and non-Muslims in Egypt. Vatikiotis does not question, 
nor does he problematize, the very essence or the impact of organizing or institutionalizing 
citizens’ membership in the state along religious lines. 
A closer look at inter-group and intra-group relationships is, I argue, needed because 
of the politicization that arises out of the inherent conflicts related to sustaining and 
bolstering group-based citizenship at the expense of individually-based citizenship. Such a 
focus helps explain why pressures for reform in family law, emanating partly at the 
                                                          
182 P. J. Vatikiotis, "Non-Muslims in Muslim society: A preliminary consideration of the problem on the basis of 
recent published works by Muslim authors," in Ethnicity, pluralism, and the state in the Middle East, ed. Milton 
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international level in the 1990s, have transcended in the form of transnational pressures for 
reform at the domestic level in different Arab polities. These pressures reflect the 
importance of turning attention to the dilemmas pertaining to individual rights and group 
rights which are not only observable at the domestic level, but which are equally inherent at 
the international level within conflicting and mutually contrasting norms of human rights. 
 
4.3 Family law as political battlefield in contemporary Arab states 
Incongruence between international law and state laws within Arab states are reflected on 
three levels: First, pressures for change has generated spheres of consent and dissent 
between fundamentalist, conservative and liberal forces that compete in expanding 
individually-based citizenship or bolstering existing group-based citizenship. Second, the 
state’s domestic autonomy has come under increasing pressure. To the extent that state 
authorities respond to international or domestic pressures for change, their sovereignty as 
autonomous producers and implementers of laws is constrained. Third, family law has 
become a battlefield where political authorities approached opposing groups in a variety of 
ways: aligning with some groups and distancing support from others, spearheading changes 
in the law, and, at times, changing support towards different factions. This polarization is 
reflected in pressures for change in family law after 1990 which in some cases proceeded to 
parliament and ended in reform. 
Contemporary debates over family law in the Middle East are multifaceted. On the 
one hand, they should be understood as fundamental individual and group struggles for 
welfare, since in the absence of expansive welfare states, family remains the essential 
guarantor of individual welfare in Arab states. The primacy of kinship-based social and 
political systems thus accentuates the importance of family laws due to the profound social 
and economic impact of these laws on the quality of life of all family members, including 
females who are predominantly outside the waged labour market. On the other hand, it is 
important to note that the struggle over gendered citizenship is related to the authority of 
communal leaders. Their influence on interpreting family law is crucial in maintaining the 
boundaries of communal groups which ultimately lay the basis for gendered citizenship. 
Finally, these debates should also be understood as struggles over the fundamental nature 
of citizenship: whether it should be primarily entrenched in an individually-based 
92 
 
relationship between citizen and state, or based on kinship and gender roles as expressed 
through group-based citizenship rights. 
 
4.3.1 Family law between individually-based and group-based citizenship 
The tension between women’s rights and religious rights has been a recurrent and widely 
addressed problem with reference to the Middle East as well as in other regional parts of the 
world. Tensions sharpened after several Arab states signed CEDAW, the UN’s Women 
Convention, with reservations to article 16 which excludes matters related to marriage and 
divorce. The reservations ensure the autonomy of religious groups in regulating internal 
affairs and maintain orthodox clerical interpretations of family law.185  
Political regimes in Arad states are not the only powers that reduce the potency of 
efforts at equalizing civil rights between male and female citizens. Part of the international 
human rights corpus of international law safeguard state policies that accommodate gender 
inequality based on the principle of preserving religious autonomy in regulating internal 
affairs. Lundberg and Eide point at the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which became an integral part of the international human rights framework in 1966. 
Article 27 of the Covenant reads that in states where minorities exist, members of these 
minorities “shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language”.186 
 International law gives thus a normative legitimation basis to both individually-based 
citizenship rights as reflected in CEDAW, and to group-based citizenship rights, as reflected 
in ICCPR. Both proponents and opponents towards reform in gendered family laws in the 
Middle East find support for their views. In other words, demands for the equalization of civil 
rights between males and females, as well as demands for maintaining gendered citizenship 
                                                          
185 For a comparative case study on Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, see Michele Brandt and Jeffrey A. Kaplan, 
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93 
 
through the doctrine of religious freedom find support in international human rights norms 
and conventions. 
This dilemma is dealt with by Anat Scolnicov who discusses whether the doctrine of 
religious freedom should be understood as an individual right or a group right from a 
normative legal perspective.187 She argues that the doctrine of religious freedom is powerful 
and that without a sensitive eye to legal prerogatives that safeguard individually-based civil 
rights independent of group-based rights, women’s rights are abrogated. Scolnicov 
addresses particularly the role of the state in the delicate political balance where state 
authorities have relegated autonomy for religious groups in family law. She argues that 
“[t]here exists a strong case for concluding that the prohibition of gender discrimination 
must be regarded as a norm of customary international law, at least if the discrimination is 
systematic and state endorsed.”188 Scalnicov points further: 
States give legal status to religious law by relegation of state authority to religious communities, 
usually in the arena of family law. This legal structure directly pits the rights of religious communities 
against the rights of individuals, with specific implications for the rights of women in those instances in 
which the religious laws is discriminatory to women. […] It seems easier for states to assuage political 
group aspirations by conceding to religious groups’ jurisdiction over the family, often compromising 
the rights of women, rather than risking a political confrontation and power struggle between 
subgroups in the state.189 
 
What I analyze as the politics of citizenship with reference to family law and demands to 
reform family law in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon highlight the circumstances and 
conditions under which rulers in each state address or respond to demands for expanded 
female citizenship. Evidently, rulers in predominantly homogenous states in North Africa 
have, at critical moments (Egypt in 2000 and Morocco in 2004) conceded to pressures that 
strengthen female civil rights despite the anticipated resistance and opposition towards 
reform; they took the risk at confronting power struggles between and among subgroups in 
the state. These power struggles include groups that support conservative interpretations of 
family law against groups that endorse widened civil rights for female citizens. At the time, 
the political steps at supporting women-friendly policies were, I argue, taken by the 
Mubarak regime and King Mohammad in Morocco, as means to strengthen their 
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authoritarian rule.190 In multi-religious states, by contrast, rulers did not run the risk to 
support pressures that would strengthen female civil rights. They avoided the potential risk 
to confront powerful clerical groups and chose to perpetuate their alliance with them. 
Clerical autonomous groups of all confessional subgroups not only nurture predominantly 
conservative political groups; the former groups guarantee the degree of strength with 
which the latter groups can ensure their power basis and perpetuate their survival upon.191 
The result is powerful conservative constellations which are able to resist pressures for 
reforms that widen individually-based civil rights more forcefully. 
 The case of Egypt is particularly interesting. I categorize Egypt as a predominantly 
homogenous state where Islam dominates as religion. Nevertheless, Egypt features similar 
multireligious traits as the cases of Lebanon and Syria because of the sizeable Coptic 
minority.192 The Egyptian state’s management of religious law with reference to its Coptic 
minority reflects a mode of alliance which resembles a governance strategy identified in 
Syria and Lebanon. The Egyptian regime’s management of religion at the turn of the 
millennia is particularly interesting when contrasted to how the Syrian regime responded 
selectively towards demands for reform presented by the Syrian Catholic Christian minority 
after 2003. 
 
4.3.2 Comparing the case of Catholics in Syria and Copts in Egypt 
Minority status in a multi-religious state compared to a homogeneous state impacts on 
reform in family law. Syria and Egypt represent two examples whereby Christian 
confessional groups are minorities in a state where Islam dominates. Syria and Egypt reflect 
                                                          
190 Witness the Egyptian regime’s controversial constitutional amendments pertaining to 34 articles approved 
by parliament in March 1996. The term ‘muwatana’ inferred in the Constitution through the amendment to 
article 1 which read that “Egypt is a state with a democratic system that is based on citizenship.” Michele 
Dunne Nathan Brown, and Amr Hamzawy, "Egypt's Controversial Constitutional Amendments,"(2007), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf. 
191 For interesting accounts of church-state relations in terms of electoral turnouts in Latin American polities 
where the Catholic Church nurtures and sustain comparable conservative political alliance patters see  Anthony 
J. Gill, "Rendering unto Caesar? Religious competition and Catholic political strategy in Latin America, 1962-79," 
in Religion and politics, ed. John T. S. Madeley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994 / 2003). See also Juan J. Linz, "Church 
and state in Spain from the civil war to the return of democracy," in Religion and politics, ed. John T. S. Madeley 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1991 / 2003). 
192 The size of the Coptic minority in Egypt is not precisely known, but is widely estimated at comprising 
approximately ten per cent of the Egyptian population which counts around 80 million. At any rate, Copts in 
Egypt constitute the largest Christian minority in any Arab state in the Middle East. 
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different examples whereby the intersection between individual and group rights have led to 
expanded female citizenship.193 
In Syria, the Catholic Church strengthened the civil rights of Catholic women in 2006, 
while the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt has repeatedly resisted reform. In these two 
cases, reform concurs less with type of court system and more with the governance 
strategies of political rulers and their choice of ally. In chapter 4 I point out that reform in 
the Catholic family law in Syria fit well with the political liberalization agenda professed by 
the new president Bashar al-Asad at the turn of the millennia. Proposals for change started 
in 2003 when the Catholic Council of Churches endowed Bishop Mousleh and two lawyers 
with the task of drafting a new law. The drafters took into consideration the Law of Oriental 
Churches dated 18 October 1990, international conventions on the rights of women and 
children, and social cases within a Syrian context that required adjustments in the law. The 
small size of the Christian groups in Syria – around 10 per cent of the population – proved to 
be an asset in negotiating with the ruling majority. The centralist Syrian regime, eager to 
accommodate religious pluralism – and more importantly – present itself as a proponent of 
religious freedom internationally, supported internal changes within the family law of a 
minority group. 
By contrast, internal resilience towards change within the Coptic Church is partly 
related to the support of conservative governance strategies of the Egyptian political 
rulership. In the 1950s, the unification of the court system was accompanied by a 
transformation of political power from the Coptic majlis al-milli194, an elected consultative 
council that represented the lay orders of the Coptic community, to the clerical leadership of 
the Coptic Church. As a result, the Coptic patriarch became the representative of the Coptic 
community and the church assumed the position of mediator between Copts and the 
                                                          
193 I leave it to historians of religion and students of theology to probe into the historical background and forces 
of internally generated theological reform and the human rights’ discourse within Catholic and Orthodox 
churches in contemporary western and non-western states. I focus here on the social and political contexts 
within which contemporary pressures for and resilience against reform occur. 
194 The majlis was established in 1874 as a parallel institution to the Coptic Church. It had a mandate to oversee 
Coptic endowments (awqaf), Coptic schools and institutions, and Copts’ personal status courts, resulting in a 
fierce competition between the clergy and the majlis leadership around which body shall represent the Coptic 
community vis-à-vis the state. For centuries, prior to the establishment of the majlis - the church had been the 
sole representative. Mariz Tadros, "Vicissitudes in the entente between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the 
state in Egypt (1952-2007)," International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 2 (2009): 270. 
96 
 
state.195 Tadros argues that an entente was forged between the church and the government 
whereby the church was provided with concessions in return for its political allegiance.196 In 
Egypt, thus, a secular political regime supported and bolstered the powers of the orthodox 
and conservative Coptic clergy. 
The khul’ law of 2000 allows Copts – both males and females – to obtain divorce and 
remarry. The church, however, sees these rights as infringement to its sovereignty over its 
followers. Following public outcries among Copts in June 2010 who question the 
containment of Coptic papal authority by the Egyptian state197, the government announced 
that a working group would be established in order to work on a new marriage and divorce 
law for Egypt’s religious minorities. Kaiser points that controversy over Coptic family law 
“underscores the tension between collective and individual notions of religious freedom and 
offers an opportunity for the state to advance the civil liberties of all Egyptian citizens.”198 
The ongoing transformational period in Egypt contains thus the seeds of politicized 
considerations around group-based and individually-based citizenship that precede the 
February 2011 revolution. 
 
4.4 Political regimes and female citizenship in MENA: a typology 
Portrayed as a region where the ‘freedom deficit’199 for women is particularly high, MENA 
countries are those where “the gap between the rights of men and those of women is the 
                                                          
195 The entente was forged when the Egyptian regime removed the mandate over Coptic awqaf from the 
authority of the majlis to the waqf organization of the Coptic Church, and by decreeing new bylaws in 1957 
which stipulated that an elected patriarch must be at least 40 years of age and ordained as monk for at least 
fifteen years. With these state measures, the majlis was not only deprived from financial control, but also 
emptied from reformist pressures by the younger layers within the Coptic community. Ibid., 271-72.  
196 Ibid., 269. 
197 In May 2010, an Egyptian civil court (the Supreme Administrative Court) ruled in favor of Hani Wasfi, a Copt 
who had divorced and remarried against the rulings by Pope Shenouda who had refused to legitimize Wasfi’s 
divorce. Katherine Kaiser, "Coptic marriage law and the church-state divide in Egypt," The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs (2010). Retrieved at http://rfiaonline.org/extras/articles/678-coptic-marriage-law-and-the-
church-state-divide-in-egypt, accessed 19 January 2011. 
198 Ibid.  
199 The Arab Human Development Report 2005, "Towards the rise of women in the Arab World." Retrieved at 
http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2005e.pdf. The Global Gender Gap Report 2010, World 
Economic Forum, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2010.pdf, accessed 20 August 
2011. For case studies, , see Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010, Freedom House. 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=86, accessed 20 August 2011. 
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most visible and significant and where resistance against women’s equality has been most 
challenging.”200 
How do we as researchers deal with polities where female and male citizens have 
equal political rights of participation but where civil rights are unequally distributed? This 
situation is observable in polities in the MENA region where religious law is part of state law. 
What evolves is the partial inclusion of females as members of the polity in ways that I argue 
necessitate analytical approaches where both membership aspects as well as participatory 
aspects related to citizenship are included and addressed. 
In 2000, Joseph commented on the scarcity of comparative research in her 
introduction to Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East: “[a] generation of feminist 
theorists have been investigating Middle Eastern state structures [18 works listed]. Few 
studies […] have established a systematic basis for comparative analysis of the rules and 
practices of citizenship throughout the Middle East.”201 
Indeed, scholars have analysed female citizenship202; addressed advocacy of women’s 
rights as part of the human rights agenda within particularly Islamic thought203; engaged in 
textual studies204 and focused on social and legal disadvantages of women within family 
law.205 My attempt at comparing reform in family law in four states in chapter 5 builds 
heavily on the work of these researchers who have strengthened the possibility of 
comparing family law reform in contemporary Arab states. 
A focus on the politicization of the demos with reference to the partial membership 
of female citizens in the polity as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 generates an impetus in 
                                                          
200 Tomppert and Nazir, Women's rights in the Middle East and North Africa: citizenship and justice: 2. 
201 Joseph, "Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East," 29. 
202 See Deniz Kandiyoti, ed. Women, Islam, and the state (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Deniz Kandiyoti, ed. 
Gendering the Middle East: emerging perspectives (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Laurie A. 
Brand, Women, the state, and political liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African experiences  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998). 
203 See Welchman, Women's rights and Islamic family law: perspectives on reform; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 
"Internationalizing the conversation on women’s rights: Arab countries face the CEDAW committee," ed. 
Yvonne and Freyer Stowasser Yazbeck Haddad, Barbara (2004); Vogt, Larsen, and Moe, New directions in 
Islamic thought: exploring reform and Muslim tradition. 
204 See Moors, "Debating Islamic family Law: Legal texts and social practice."; ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad an-Naʿīm, 
Islamic family law in a changing world: a global resource book  (London: Zed Books, 2002); Welchman, Women 
and Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development and advocacy; Judith E. 
Tucker, Women, family and gender in Islamic law  (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2008). 
205 For two excellent comparative studies, see Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on trial: Islamic family law in Iran and 
Morocco; Mounira Charrad, States and women's rights: the making of postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Janine A. Clark and Amy E. Young, "Islamism and 
Family Law Reform in Morocco and Jordan," Mediterranean Politics 13, no. 3 (2008); Barbara Drieskens, ed. Les 
métamorphoses du marriage au Moyen-Orient (Beyrouth: Institut Francais du Proche-Orient, 2008).  
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presenting a typology of political regimes which takes heed of conditions that structure 
female citizenship in MENA. Table 2 below indicates variances pertaining to the distribution 
of civil rights in distinction to the distribution of political rights in Arab states as well as in 
three non-Arab states – Turkey, Israel and Iran.  The latter three states are included in order 
to juxtapose diverse patterns of membership in the state more clearly. 
The typology categorizes states according to type of political regime and whether the 
citizenship regime is based on predominantly group-based citizenship rights or individually-
based citizenship rights. ‘Female citizenship’ refers to the set of civil rights that regulate the 
legal capacity – and as such – the membership of a female citizen in the polity, and the set of 
political and social rights that enable a female to participate in the polity on an equal footing 
with male citizens. ‘Gendered citizenship’ reflects the legal incongruence between 
constitutional laws and gendered state laws that are found in four main legal spheres: i) 
family law – by far the most extensive set of laws regulating women’s civil rights in the polity 
– which principles guardianship of male citizens over female citizens; ii) nationality law 
where a female citizen is unable to pass citizenship to her children if married to a non-
national; iii) criminal law where femicide206 – the killing of a female by a male relative – is 
either pardoned or legitimized through milder prison sentences compared to homicide; and 
iv) customary law where non-official normative rules challenge state laws without being 
subject to penalization by state authorities (eg. patriarchal inheritance laws and marital 
violence). 
 
4.4.1 Female citizenship: group-based or individually based? 
With reference to principles of distribution of rights within the polity and type of citizenship 
regime (pointed at in part 2) I argue that pressures for reform in family law entail a contest 
between two fundamentally different notions of citizenship rights in the Middle East: first, 
group-based citizenship rights reflect notions of citizens as members of kinship structures 
organized along patriarchal lines, often privileging male citizens over females; and second, 
individually-based citizenship rights are grounded in a citizen’s direct membership in the 
state where she (or he) has autonomous rights guaranteed by state authorities regardless of 
religious or ethnic group affiliation. Individually-based citizenship is in line with governance 
                                                          
206 See Sara Hossain and Lynn Welchman, "Honour": crimes, paradigms and violence against women  (London: 
Zed Books, 2005). 
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according to rule of law criteria and embodies core elements in CEDAW which profess 
gender equality.207 
The distinction between individually-based and group-based citizenship rights builds 
further on comparable differentiation made by feminist researchers. Joseph, for instance, 
differentiates between ‘individual’ and ‘communal’ citizenship where the latter “includes 
constructs of citizens as members of subnational communities” and points that the 
“intersection of religion, state and patriarchy […] reinforces communalist views of citizenship 
that tend to diminish women’s roles and rights as citizens.”208 Also, Moghadam presents a 
two-fold typology on gendered outcomes of revolutions in fourteen states. She 
differentiates between a ’women’s emancipation model’ and a ‘woman-in-the-family 
model’. While the first model grants women individual freedoms, the latter embodies, 
according to her, “an ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism and the 
religious order”.209 
These researchers’ distinction between rights granted on an individual basis and 
rights derived from group membership overlaps and corresponds with notions of 
individually-based and group-based citizenship with reference to female citizenship as 
understood in table 2.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
207 On ‘rule of law’ and Islam, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic law as a core for political law: The withering of 
an Islamist illusion," in Shaping the current Islamic reformation, ed. B. A. Roberson (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
On ‘rule of law’ and gender, see Anna Loretoni, "The rule of law and gender difference," in The Rule of law: 
history, theory and criticism, ed. Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo, and Emilio Santoro (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007).  For 
CEDAW work and reports 1979 - 2007, see http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. Since 2008 CEDAW 
has been under the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, see 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/index.htm. For the lifting of CEDAW reservations in Arab states, 
see the website of the “Coalition Equality without Reservations” launched in 2006: 
http://cedaw.wordpress.com/, accessed 18 August 2009. 
208 Suad Joseph, "Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States," Middle East Report, no. 198 (1996): 51. 
209 Moghadam, "Gender and Revolutions," 143. 
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Table 2: Typology on female citizenship in the MENA region 1920-2010210  
 
 
Type of political regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizenship 
rights 
 
 
Table 2 renders year of codification of family law in brackets. Nearly all states have issued 
substantive amendments or new laws since first year of codification. Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain are not included; Saudi Arabia does not have a codified family law, and in Bahrain 
only Bahrainis who belong to the Sunni population have a codified family law.211 
Differentiating between individually-based and group-based citizenship rights serves 
three analytical purposes: First, rather than proposing that individually-based citizenship 
rights lead to less gendered citizenship, my purpose is to point that what is often referred to 
as ‘the woman question’ in Arab polities can thereby be theoretically handled as a classical 
demos issue pertaining to different degrees of affiliation to the polity which reflects less 
than full membership. Second, aspects related to change in gendered citizenship are fruitful 
                                                          
210 The text of references rendered in Roman numbers in table 2 is found at the very end of chapter 1, i.e. after 
the list of references on pages 149-150. 
211 See an-Naʿīm, Islamic family law in a changing world: a global resource book; Welchman, Women and 
Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development and advocacy: 15, 157-60. 
 Hereditary 
monarchy 
One-party dominated 
regime 
Semi-democratic 
 
Individually-
based 
 
Morocco 
(2004) 
 
Tunisia 
(1956) 
 
South Yemen i 
(1974-1990) 
 
Turkey  
(1926) 
 
 
Group-based 
 
Morocco  
(1957-2003) 
 
Jordan (1951) 
Kuwait (1984) 
Oman (1997)  
UAE (2005) 
Qatar (2006) 
 
 
Egypt ii  
(1920/1938) 
 
Syria (1953) 
 
Iraq (1959/  
Resolution 2003) iii  
 
Libya (1972) 
Algeria (1984) 
Sudan (1991)iv 
Yemen (1992) 
 
Iran (1967 /  
draft 2007) v 
 
 
Lebanon vi 
(1951/1962) 
 
Palestinian 
Territories 
(draft law 2005) vii 
 
  Israel viii 
(1992) 
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in evaluating the degree of legal reform that accrues to female citizenship. Along with other 
indicators, legal reforms regarding consent, minimum age of marriage, divorce, nationality, 
polygyny, guardianship, and violence against women can thereby be assessed as necessary, 
though not sufficient, steps toward expanded female citizenship in Arab states. 
Third, debates over reforms in family law that establish individually-based rights can be 
fruitfully seen as efforts and pressures at democratization whereby female citizenship is 
sought expanded. 
It is important to emphasize that the typology does not represent an understanding 
that women living in contemporary Morocco, Turkey or Tunisia where female citizens have 
individually-based civil rights are those who also enjoy the ‘best’ citizenship regime in MENA. 
De jure equal civil rights reflect by no way de facto well-being in terms of material or non-
material conditions. I argue nevertheless that unequal distribution of civil rights between 
male and female citizens structure gender-specific scopes of action in MENA  which are 
sustained and perpetuated through state power to the disadvantage of female citizens.212 To 
the degree that the typology reflects theoretical viewpoints as well as normative 
perspectives it is by emphasizing and pointing attention to three objectives: First, equal civil 
rights between members of the demos are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
practice of political rights. Second, equal civil rights for male and female citizens are 
fundamental ‘rule of law’ principles whereby the agendas of political parties and groups in 
MENA should be scrutinized against. Third, democratization involves a two-tiered process 
where citizenship encompasses not only extended forms of participation in parliamentary 
elections, voting patterns and party politics, but also in terms of expansive forms of 
membership whereby female citizens in MENA are included as full members of the demos. 
 
4.4.2 Position of female citizens in multireligious versus homogenous states 
Chapter 5 represents a discussion of the following observation: states that have group-based 
citizenship – such as Lebanon and Syria – do worse on women's rights than states that 
                                                          
212 The coining of ‘gender-specific scope of action’ builds on Swedish political sociologist Walter Korpi’s terms 
‘gendered inequality’ and ‘gendered limitations in scope of action’ – my translation of ‘kjønnet ulikhet’ and 
‘kjønnsbestemt mangel på handlingsrom’ – which Korpi in his comparative analysis of welfare regimes in 18 
OECD-states. See Walter Korpi, "Kjønn og klasse i ulike velferdsstater [Gender and class in different welfare 
states]," in Virker velferdsstaten? [Does the welfare state function?], ed. Bjørn Hvinden, et al. (Kristiansand: 
Høyskoleforl., 2001), 66, 71. See also Walter Korpi, Gender, class and patterns of inequalities in different types 
of welfare states, vol. no.224, Working paper series (Walferdange: LIS, 2000). 
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address and promote individual rights – such as Morocco and Egypt – because states that 
are ethnically and religiously divided are more likely to promote group rights to ensure 
representation of ethnic and religious groups. On the other hand, states that are more 
homogenous have, for different reasons, partially succeeded in “escaping” the need to 
represent religious and traditional groups or communities. For that reason, it is argued that 
pressures that strengthen individually-based rights, and thereby female citizenship, are more 
likely to appear in states where Islam is dominant religion and where controversy is publicly 
expressed.  
The conclusions drawn from the discussion in chapter 5 point that, to a certain 
extent, the homogeneous / hetereogeneous divide among states in the contemporary 
Middle East is as salient as the homogeneous / hetereogeneous divide envisaged by Rokkan 
with reference to western European states (discussed in part 7 of this chapter). With 
reference to challenges which newly established non-western states were confronted with, 
Rokkan suggested that independent states in the making “may learn more from the smaller 
countries than from the large [and] more from the multiculturally consociational polities 
than from the homogenous dynastic states”.213 
My discussions with reference to family law reform draw different conclusions. 
Evidently, homogeneous states such as Morocco and Egypt may learn more from the 
democratization process in fairly homogeneous societies in western Europe rather than the 
democratization process of what has been termed ‘consociational democracies’ in western 
European states. Multireligious societies in the Middle East have, likewise, something to 
learn from their multireligious western counterparts. States such as the Netherlands, Austria 
and Belgium manage, for instance, to combine equal civil rights between female and male 
citizens. Interestingly, the ensuing citizenship regime in these states portrays comparatively 
marked elements of group-based citizenship as reflected in the strong family-oriented 
welfare regimes professed by conservative oriented Christian democratic parties.214 
In the Middle East, the centralization of judicial authority and the expansion of 
female citizenship appear to go hand in hand. Strengthened civil rights for Arab female 
citizens in both homogenous and multireligious states are, moreover, contingent on 
                                                          
213 Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research on 
variations within Europe," in The Formation of national states in Western Europe 
ed. Charles Tilly, Gabriel Ardant, and Stein Rokkan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 600. 
214 Korpi, "Kjønn og klasse i ulike velferdsstater [Gender and class in different welfare states]," 69, 73. 
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weakened political alliance coalitions between conservative political parties and orthodox 
clerical authorities and groups. 
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5 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
 
“Feminism is much more than an ideology driving organized 
political movements. It is, above all, an epistemology. It is an 
attitude, a frame of mind that highlights the role of gender  
in understanding the organization of society.”215 
 
As a concept, citizenship is historically heavily linked with the development of western 
liberal democracies, and the bulk of what can be termed as ‘classical theories’ on citizenship 
is therefore primarily based on the socio-economic and political experiences of these 
polities.216 
 Looking at citizenship related issues in the Middle East, we can observe that the 
institution, practice and politics of citizenship challenge basic tenants and premises of 
classical theories on citizenship. In the Middle East, rather than being a hallmark of gradual 
inclusion and membership in the political community, citizenship has emerged as a legal 
marker of exclusion and stratified membership in the state. The proliferation of legal status 
categories that differentiate between citizens and non-citizens as well as between different 
categories of citizens has turned the institution of citizenship into a political instrument of 
control at the hands of ruling elites. Citizenship in the Middle East has featured 
predominantly exclusionary traits since the establishment of modern states in the region.217 
Can we – and if so, how – are we able to make use of the rich theoretical heritage 
primarily based on and embedded in the experiences of western democracies into a non-
western context? 
As observers and researchers we face two separate but related problems which have 
to do with science of philosophy considerations when we seek to make use of theories based 
and developed on western historical experiences. On the one hand, we are confronted with 
                                                          
215 Speaking truth to power, as she puts it. Miriam Cooke, Women claim Islam: creating Islamic feminism 
through literature  (New York: Routledge, 2001), ix-x. 
216 I must immediately clarify that ‘classical’ is here applied not in terms of history of philosophy, but in terms of 
primary references within the social sciences on citizenship. ‘Classics’ include thus the works of political 
sociologists and historians such as T.H. Marshall, Reinhard Bendix, Charles Tilly and Stein Rokkan who have 
contributed to studies on nation-building and state formation. For an insightful introduction to the concept of 
citizenship from a Western liberal perspective, see J. M. Barbalet, Citizenship: rights, struggle and class 
inequality  (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988). See Turner and Hamilton for a wide range of critical 
approaches to theoretical debates on citizenship, Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton, Citizenship: critical 
concepts  (London: Routledge, 1994).  For an anthology of old and new texts on citizenship, see Paul Barry 
Clarke, Citizenship  (London / Boulder Colorado: Pluto Press, 1994). 
217 On the exclusionary traits of citizenship in the Middle East, see particularly Butenschøn, "State power and 
citizenship in the Middle East: A theoretical introduction," 5-8. 
106 
 
a ‘translation’ problem which logically opens up a discussion on sociological and cultural 
relativism regarding distinct political and social entities with different historical courses. On 
the other hand, we may point out that certain observations reveal inherent shortcomings 
and inadequacies within classical theories on citizenship that do not clarify the puzzling 
empirical anomalies detected in the Middle East. These shortcomings include the systematic 
and perpetual exclusion of particular segments of the resident population from citizenship, 
the arbitrary use of naturalization and denaturalization policies in expanding and contracting 
the citizenry, and the partial inclusion of female citizens as full members of the polity. 
The latter kinds of concerns, i.e. the potential inherent shortcomings of classical 
theories of citizenship, have notably been raised within in the wake of three particular 
historical events in western states: i) the women’s movement in the late 1970s saw the 
onset of feminist theories where the ‘blind spots’ regarding gendered citizenship and the 
exclusion of female citizens from full membership in the polity were pointed at218; ii) non-
western migration to western states had by the 1980s enforced re-evaluation of what 
constitutes a ‘nation’ albeit ‘multicultural’ democratic polities with reference to the 
integration of new citizens of non-western background219; and iii) the establishment of new 
European states following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s revealed the 
                                                          
218 Feminist approaches – themselves emanating primarily in western liberal polities – highlighted the blind 
spots which classical theories were embedded in, and which did not take into consideration the full 
personhood of females. The contribution of feminist scholars provide significant critical viewpoints on the 
dynamics of gender relations within the family as an institution, and the diverse experiences men and women 
have had with regards to political inclusion as members and participants in the polity. The canonical 
philosophical work of modern feminist theories, first published in 1949, remains Simone de Beauvoir, The 
Second Sex  (New York: Knopf, 2010). Feminist theorists who comment on and criticize theoretical 
shortcomings within liberal contractual theories and the problems related to the private / public dichotomy 
include Carole Pateman, The disorder of women: democracy, feminism and political theory  (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1989); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family  (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Anne-
Hilde Nagel, "The development of citizenship in Norway: Marshall remodelled," in Women's politics and women 
in politics: in honour of Ida Blom, ed. Sølvi Sogner, Gro Hagemann, and Ida Blom (Oslo: Cappelen akademisk 
forl., 2000). On gendered citizenship in western welfare states, see Helga Maria Hernes, Welfare state and 
woman power: essays in state feminism  (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987); Helga Hernes, "Kvinners 
medborgerskap i den skandinaviske velferdsstaten," in Virker Velferdsstaten?, ed. Bjørn Hvinden Ann-Helen 
Bay, Charlotte Koren (Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget, 2001). On women’s rights within religious jurisdictions, 
see Shachar, Multicultural jurisdictions: cultural differences and women's rights. 
219 See the works of Hammar, Democracy and the nation state: aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of 
international migration; Gershon Shafir, The Citizenship debates: a reader  (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998); Brubaker, "Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America." 
On a defense for minority group rights within liberal democracies, see Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a 
liberal theory of minority rights. On immigration and the politics of inclusion in Norway, see Knut Kjeldstadli, 
Sammensatte samfunn: innvandring og inkludering  (Oslo: Pax, 2008). For an excellent anthology on central 
works on citizenship with reference to western liberal democracies since the mid-1980s where the scope is 
widened to include immigration, gender and multicultural issues, see Richard Bellamy and Antonino Palumbo, 
eds., Citizenship (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 
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exclusionary facets of citizenship as an institution, and the violent creation and 
establishment of the demos when territorial borders were redefined in each state.220 
Literature and research on citizenship has since the 1990s therefore reflected the 
academic absorption and analytical efforts at exploring and explaining these major political 
issues in western societies. All arising from western experiences and based on critical 
observations, these events challenged previously latent and theoretically unproblematized 
features within classical theories on citizenship. Kofman was among those who pointed at 
the inadequacy of (at the time) existing models of citizenship: 
it is not simply the disparity between the normative and the real [models and forms of citizenship] that 
lies at the heart of some problems, but that we also need to rethink the civil society and the state, the 
public and the private, and the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion that regulate membership of 
socio-cultural and political communities 221 
The same kind of problems that I encountered when trying to explain citizenship related 
issues in the Middle East through the perspective of classical theories were, in other words, 
shared by other researchers who tried to analyze changes related to citizenship in the 
western world.  
Earlier perspectives on citizenship which implicitly analyzed inclusive elements (such 
as studies of nation-building, the development of social and political rights, democratic 
political participation) were, following a redirection of focus and the development of new 
theoretical questions, enriched with new perspectives that problematized the exclusionary 
traits of citizenship not previously discussed within the classical citizenship literature: 
gender-specific issues, the violent and coercive aspects state formation, debates over 
supranationality, globalization and human rights, and problems of control following border 
closures. In short, the ‘anomalies’ observed in the Middle East found similar counterparts in 
contemporary European thought, politics and states. 
                                                          
220 The establishment of new states brought particularly the potential exclusionary traits of citizenship policies. 
These arose in the wake of the violent processes that evolved out of the formation of demos and polis 
configurations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. See André Liebich, Daniel Warner, and Jasna Dragović-Soso, Citizenship, East and West  (New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1995); Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig, and Wiebke Sievers, Citizenship policies in 
the new Europe  (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007). For a theoretical discussion of what 
constitutes the geographical outline of the term ‘people’ in light of nationalism as political project, see chapter 
3, “Democratic theory: government by the people”, Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and political theory  
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 16-26. 
221 Eleonore Kofman, "Citizenship for some but not for others: Spaces for citizenship in contemporary Europe," 
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Seen from a philosophy of science perspective, we may therefore partially conclude 
that particular historical events permitted the formation of new theories and enlarged the 
scope of analysis of classical theories on citizenship. Ontological questions related to the 
nature of ‘personhood’, ‘membership’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘the state’ were posed, along with 
epistemological questions as to how we as researchers come to know and contribute to our 
knowledge on particular fields of interest, what knowledge about this field of interest is 
possible, and what rules of inquiry we follow to probe into it.222 
 
5.1 The liberal / non-liberal divide 
The enlarged scope with regards to a widened range of analytical and theoretical 
perspectives since 1990 allows, I maintain, the use and applicability of terms, concepts and 
analytical approaches related to citizenship in western and non-western contexts. What I 
believe poses more serious analytical problems in terms of comparing citizenship in a 
western and non-western context, is the liberal / non-liberal divide reflected in western 
liberal polities on the one hand, and in non-liberal polities in general on the other hand.223  
By ‘liberal’ I imply the sustaining of rule of law standards where equality in legal 
status among individual citizens and principles such as freedom of association and 
expression are endorsed in the legal framework of the state. Moreover, the prevalence of 
liberal norms and ideals in society reflect that legal boundaries assure individual rights along 
with group rights without the latter violating the former.224 
In most states in the Middle East, religious law permeates state law in ways that 
render the polity basically non-secular, and by extension illiberal. In part 4 I dealt with 
problems related to the inclusion of religious law as state law and argued that what can be 
seen as the abdication of the state in family law renders citizens de facto members of 
religious groups. Structurally illiberal practices such as mandated membership in religious 
groups and the existence of legal pluralism at the state level limit and constrain rule of law 
                                                          
222 Berth Danermark, Explaining society: critical realism in the social sciences  (London: Routledge, 2002), 15-18. 
223 I use the terms ‘non-liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ interchangeably although there may well be analytical reasons for 
making fruitful distinctions between the two. 
224 See Barry, Culture and equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism: 7,129, 63; Brian Barry, Why social 
justice matters  (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 23. On the relationship between civil liberty  and rule of law, see 
chapter 7 in Day, Liberty and justice. For a popularized but to the point discussion on differences between 
liberalized autocracies and illiberal democracies, see Farid Zakariyya, "The rise of illiberal democracy," Foreign 
Affairs 76, no. 22 (November / December 1997). 
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standards in the polity. While the option of ‘exit’ is available for citizens in western liberal 
states who wish to opt out of his or her membership in a particular religious group, this 
option is non-existent for citizens in most states in the Middle East. 
Does the illiberal nature of polities in the Middle East, then, permit a theoretical and 
analytical application of concepts that are embedded in a liberal context when observing or 
imploring into state and society relations in the Middle East? 
Halliday discusses these problems and relates them to what he observes as some 
social scientists’ tendency to limit the application of universal concepts such as human rights 
and norms of justice in non-liberal and non-western settings.225 He criticizes particularly John 
Rawls’ proposition of ‘the law of peoples’ which, according to Halliday, implies “not 
international law as we now have it but those laws which all peoples have in common, that 
is, a set of principles shared across frontiers and cultures.”226 In making such a proposition, 
Halliday maintains that Rawls “demonstrates that liberalism respects non-liberal 
societies”.227 Halliday proposes another perspective: one that does not assume historical 
separateness between cultures, religions or communities, but takes as a point of departure 
the variety of sources from which states, nations and communities of today present as 
particular and indigenous. These include international ideas and concepts such as universal 
suffrage, national independence and territorial integrity which “[s]tates give national form 
and allege national histories for their political institutions when these are neither traditional 
nor indigenous institutions.”228 He emphasizes that the most difficult and divisive disputes 
are not between communities, but rather within them, and argues that discussions on the 
relationship between liberal and non-liberal societies cannot avoid the issue of a shared 
modern history in which both the non-liberal and the liberal world were “created as part of 
the modern state system and owe much to it.”229 
                                                          
225 Among those Halliday perceives as representing views and perspectives that deny universalist approaches to 
moral issues and rights are Alasdaire MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Amitai Etzioni and John Rawls. 
Fred Halliday, Nation and religion in the Middle East  (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 2000), 16. See chapter 1 entitled 
“Liberal Theory and the Middle East” in ibid. Halliday builds upon and enlarges this line of reasoning in chapter 
5 entitled “Human Rights and the Islamic Middle East” in Fred Halliday, Islam and the myth of confrontation: 
religion and politics in the Middle East  (London: Tauris, 2003). 
226 Halliday, Nation and religion in the Middle East: 20. For the original text of John Rawls’ article “The Law of 
Peoples” Halliday refers to Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, On human rights  (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 
59, 67. 
227 Halliday, Nation and religion in the Middle East: 21. 
228 Ibid., 26. 
229  ibid., 27-28. 
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The approach followed in this thesis builds on Halliday’s perspectives with regards to 
maintaining a universalist approach towards the study of political processes in both liberal 
and non-liberal polities. I problematize the notion of universalism further and comment on 
the schism between human rights and citizenship rights in part 8 of this chapter. At this 
stage, I make the note that a liberal / non-liberal divide exists with reference to basically 
liberal European states and illiberal polities in the Middle East. Moreover, one of the 
objectives I seek to problematize and discuss is precisely how and in which ways this divide 
sheds light on the politics of citizenship and the impact of the ensuing politicization of the 
demos in the Middle East on regime survival. 
 
5.2 Ontological and epistemological reflections 
Partly related to the liberal / non-liberal divide, but nonetheless separate, I find it important 
to clarify that the epistemological approach applied towards the study of membership and 
citizenship in the Middle East is based on certain assumptions of ontological relevance which 
permeate the fabrics of the thesis: This study is grounded in a belief that observable and 
non-observable objects of study such as membership, power, religion, justice, personhood, 
communities, rights, and human dignity exist in and for themselves, and ”by extension 
[constitute] observable events [that] exist in and for themselves.”230 A political scientist by 
training, with plausible insight in social anthropology and history, I seek to account for and 
understand why particular events happened, how they happened, and the likelihood of 
them happening again. As such, I accept that there are certain regularities in the world that 
we as researchers seek to describe and explain.  
Some of the observable regularities sought explored in this thesis evolve around the 
unequal distribution of membership in the state following constitutive acts such as 
enumeration processes and the formation of citizenship laws which lay the basis for 
establishing the demos of the state231; variances in state formation and democratization 
processes in three Arab states which are characterized as ‘plural societies’232; the 
                                                          
230 Todd Landman, Issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction  (London: Routledge, 2003), 16. 
231 Discussed in chapter 2 of the dissertation entitled “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the 
Lebanese?”. 
232 Discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation: “Tune in Religion, Turn on Pluralism, Drop Out Citizenship? 
Membership and Political Participation in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon”. 
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establishment, sustaining and political pressures for reforming gendered citizenship whereby 
female citizens are sought included as full members of the demos.233  
From this ontological cognition springs an epistemological approach that guides this 
thesis and takes as its point of departure the following: Despite observable differences in 
religious, cultural and historical experiences of contemporary western liberal and non-liberal 
states in the Middle East, I maintain that there are nevertheless common features that relate 
to legal structures, kinship as social organizational principle, modes of production and 
reproduction, as well as bureaucratic institutionalization which implicate choices and 
considerations that are political in nature. ‘Political’ in the sense that choices and 
considerations involve the exercise of power through human agency in relation with 
structures234, and in the sense that the exercise of power is visible at certain historical critical 
moments235. These choices, conditions and structures permit comparative analysis of social 
events and phenomena across time and space. As such, I distinguish between religion (eg. 
Islam, Christianity, Judaism) understood as faith and as a system of belief about a deity 
wherein moral and ethical meaning is derived on the one hand, and ‘religion’ as comprising 
social and political systems and as objects of study where little can be explained by 
reference to a unitary faith without taking into consideration the study of particular events 
and places.236 In this thesis, it is the latter understanding of ‘religion’ I adapt. 
I elaborate further on some of the methodological challenges related to the 
ontological and epistemological approaches outlined here in part 7. What follows below is a 
discussion of the impact of applying different epistemological approaches to the study of 
citizenship in the Middle East. 
                                                          
233 Discussed in chapter 4 entitled “Gender, Family Law and Citizenship in Syria” and in chapter 5 entitled 
“Female Citizenship in the Middle East: Family law reform in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon”. 
234 Steven Lukes, "Power and Structure," in New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, volume 1, ed. Kate Nash 
Alan Scott, Anna Marie Smith (Burlingron: Ashgate, (1977) 2010); Chantal Mouffe, The return of the political  
(London: Verso, 2005). 
235 Charles Tilly builds on the Gramscian notion of ‘moment’ and calls these spatial moments where the use of 
power is displayed as ‘choice points’, Charles Tilly, Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons  (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 14. Stein Rokkan recognizes such ‘moments’ as ‘historical junctures’. For 
an analysis of Rokkan’s understanding of ‘critical junctures’ within a western European context, see Stein 
Kuhnle et al., State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: the theory of Stein Rokkan based on 
his collected works  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 303-19. 
236 Halliday, Islam and the myth of confrontation: religion and politics in the Middle East: 2. 
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5.3 Two epistemological approaches: ‘culturalist’ or ‘structuralist’ studies 
Studies on membership and citizenship in the Middle East can be carried out by applying a 
‘culturalist’ or a ‘structuralist’ approach. What can be termed as a ‘structuralist’ 
epistemological approach applied in this thesis towards the study of citizenship and state in 
the Middle East differs from what can be termed as ‘culturalist’ approaches where social 
phenomena are sought explained by emphasizing traits pertaining to ascriptive identities 
such as religion or kinship.237  
The Arabist legal comparative scholar Gianluca Parolin exemplifies, as I argue below, 
a culturalist approach towards the study of citizenship in his Citizenship in the Arab World: 
Kin, Religion and Nation-State.238 I dwell on this particular study as part of my discussion on 
ontological and epistemological approaches to the study of citizenship for two reasons: First, 
Parolin proceeds to study citizenship in Arab states through the lens of membership. He 
argues, for instance, that “[a]pproaching citizenship through ‘membership’ seems a viable 
and promising option, especially in the Arab world, where ‘subject’ and ‘rights’ depend even 
more crucially upon it.”239 Second, in his study Parolin presents a set of analytical and 
theoretical concepts that – at first glance – are compatible with the ones I use. Parolin’s 
analysis on forms of membership and the ensuing formation of citizenship patterns in the 
Middle East proceeds, nevertheless, along another epistemological line of reasoning which 
emphasize disparate kinds of insights, and therefore conclusions, than the one I adapt.240 
 
5.3.1 Parolin’s study on membership and citizenship in MENA: a critique 
Parolin starts his analysis by pointing at Aristotle’s distinction between man, his relation to 
family (oikia) as a ‘natural’ form of membership, and man’s participation in the political 
community (polis). Looking at citizenship as an ellipsoid, he states that the individual and the 
                                                          
237 On features of ‘culturalist analysis’, see Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East politics: state formation and 
development  (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 16-19. See also Selvik and Stenslie, Stabilitetens pris: stat og 
politikk i Midtøsten [The price of stability: state and politics in the Middle East]: 24-25, 54-57. For the English 
version, see Selvik, Stenslie, and Meyrick, Stability and change in the modern Middle East: 15. 
238 Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state. Parolin’s book is the result of five years’ 
research sponsored by the Italian National Research Council and the EU as part of the prestigious International 
Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe (IMSCOE). ‘IMSCOE Network of excellence’ unites 500 
European institutes who specialize in studies of international migration. See the network’s website on 
www.imscoe.org. 
239 Ibid., 25. 
240 For a short version of this critique in Norwegian, see my review of Parolin’s book in Babylon, no. 2, 2011, p. 
104-105. 
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political community can be seen as basic coordinates of citizenship where concepts such as 
membership, rights, participation and status represent intersection points: “When the 
models of each focus change, the entire figure reshapes.”241 Parolin thus elegantly captures 
basic elements of the individual and a political community, and presents fruitful analytical 
categories that may, in methodological terms, be applied in different historical and regional 
settings. 
Nevertheless, instead of holding on to the basic coordinates of citizenship he initially 
presents (man and political community), and their points of intersection (membership, 
rights, status and participation), Parolin proceeds to examine membership in the Arab world 
through a historical account of membership in three arenas where ‘Islam’ is main focal point: 
membership in the kin group from  pre-Islamic time, membership in the religious community 
with the onset of Islam, and membership in the nation state with the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Islamic Caliphate. Nowhere is the term ‘Islam’ – so central to Parolin’s 
analysis – defined. He implicitly presents Islam as a religious belief system and basis for 
jurisprudence at the individual, group and political community level. 
The analysis and discussion offered fall short of the analytical model initially 
presented when Parolin, relatively early in the book, juxtaposes the historical experiences of 
the Latin and the Islamic worlds (his terms) as two inherently different experiences with 
regards to the development of citizenship. Indeed, the author maintains that “[e]xploring 
citizenship in the Arab world requires a disentanglement from all those ideas, images and 
suggestions that have settled into the concept in the course of European thought.”242 
According to him, the two worlds followed ‘different civilizational paths’. In the Latin world, 
“a major watershed in the history of citizenship [saw that] the individual came to the center 
of the stage, possessing natural rights prior to and irrespective of his affiliation in a political 
community. Thus membership in a political community became a way of ensuring such 
rights, not their basis.”243 Parolin specifies some of the intellectuals who participated in that 
paradigmatic transformation. In addition to the ‘philosophical father’ of the principle of 
sovereignty as theoretical innovation, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), these include Althusius 
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242 Ibid., 25. 
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(1563-1638), Hobbes (1588-1679), Grotius (1583-1645), Pufendorf (1632-1694) and Locke 
(1632-1704).  
Parolin does not provide the dates of birth and death of these thinkers. I here add 
them in order to make the following argument: The intellectual legacy of these thinkers is 
that they lived through, and were engaged in, addressing questions raised before, in the 
course of, and in the aftermath of the Lutheran Reformation initiated by Martin Luther (1483 
– 1546).244  What binds the collective efforts of the intellectuals referred to by Parolin with 
regards to “bringing the individual to the center of the stage” is, as I argue further below and 
in part 6 , indivisibly related to bringing the sovereign territorial state at the center of the 
stage of world politics. 
The philosophers Parolin points at provide us with a wealth of perspectives with 
regards to drawing boundaries between religious and political authority, and by extension 
the nature and limits of authority, autonomy and powers of king, Catholic church and 
reformist forces (within the incumbent Catholic church itself, as well as between and among 
proponents of Lutheran teachings). As historical event, the peace treaty reached in 
Westphalia in 1648 was a ‘moment’ of politico-legal reverberations that ended a long trail of 
civil wars in and between European political entities: The Treaty settled two questions 
related to manifestation and exercise of political authority: first, it established the 
territoriality of the state as  a basic boundary in which the principle of sovereignty was 
vested; second, it manifested the supremacy of political authority, i.e. the king’s, over 
clerical authority, i.e. religious power, in becoming the main (though not singular nor 
exclusive) arbitrator of state politics. While Parolin maintains that the philosophers he 
referred to “proposed different solutions on how to frame the power, but all agreed on the 
individual’s centrality and his ‘absolute’ natural rights”245, I argue that this process occurred 
in close connection with the demarcation of the territorial state itself as sovereign entity 
related to, but not dependent on, the sovereignty of the king.246 
                                                          
244 The year 1517 is usually referred to as a ‘moment’ during the lifetime of Luther since it marks the year in 
which he presented his theses against clerical abuses, particularly through the sale of indulgences, i.e. allegedly 
sacred salvation remedies and edifices that had by the 15th century been institutionalized and legitimized by 
the Roman Catholic Church. 
245 Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state: 22. 
246 The two processes are so intimately connected to the degree that I leave it to philosophers of history and 
philosophers of religion to agree or disagree on which process is the cause or effect of the other. What I seek to 
emphasize is that the individualization of the self and the ‘territorialization’ of the state as two interconnected 
processes. 
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My argument here is to emphasize the importance of establishing and embedding a 
basic immaterial component – that of Bodin’s concept on sovereignty – and a material 
component – that of the principle of territoriality, i.e. the demarcation of land and the 
establishment of state structures (and by extension variances in church-state relations) in 
European states, as profoundly significant defining moments inside and outside the ‘Latin 
world’. At the time, the establishment of the territorial state as organizing principle was, in 
other words, a paradigmatic shift and occurred in parallel with, and inseparable from, the 
demarcation of the self along individualistic lines.247 
Turning back to our discussion on the Arab Islamic world, Parolin maintains that a 
new order did not manifest itself there because – he explains – internal and external 
challenges to Abbaside rule (appr. 750 – 1258) were settled through an understanding of 
how the foundations of political authority were to be sorted out, particularly influenced 
through the “masterpiece of literature on Islamic political authority (wilayah) – al-Ahkam al-
sultaniyya (The Ordinances of Government) – […] written by al-Mawardi (d. 1058 AD)”248: 
Once fixed, the rules of Islamic wilayah remained uncontested, whereas the development of the 
Western notion of sovereignty and of the underlying concepts of citizenship had a much more intricate 
story. (…) The Arab-Islamic world did not suffer the kind of destruction brought about by the European 
Wars of Religion, and was thus not compelled to look to sources of legitimacy other than the religious 
one, which is the pivot of wilayah. (…) Even after the caliphate disappeared, Islam inflexibly 
maintained the ideal of the caliphal wilayah and did not develop any alternative theory; indeed, every 
once in a while the prospect of reinstating the caliphate is raised once again.249  
In his brief account of Islamic political history, Parolin does not identify when the Islamic 
caliphate starts and ends in historical time, and has therefore no need to specify when its 
rules regarding the organization and distribution of political authority were ‘fixed’. 
Apparently, an authoritative historian and philosopher delineated the rules of ‘Islamic 
political authority’ during the 11th century, and these rules and norms guided rulers and 
ruled in the Islamic Arab world through 900 years and brought some kind of order which 
ended by the breakdown of the Caliphate through the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
                                                          
247 For an interesting philosophical discussion around the concept of citizenship and individualism with 
references to Ibn Khaldoun and the Middle East, see Jean Leca, "Individualism and citizenship," in Citizenship: 
critical concepts (vol. 1), ed. Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 151-54. 
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around 1920.250  ‘Islam’ is implicitly applied as a central parameter through which change, or 
more notably ‘non-change’, with regards to rights and status is measured from pre-Islamic 
time until date.  
It is, for instance, “[c]lassical Islamic law [which] finally fixed the forms of 
membership in the Islamic community”251, and then, “[c]enturies after the formation of the 
Islamic community (…), a new form of membership (nationality or jinsiyya) in a new form of 
political organization (the nation-state or al-dawla al-wataniyya) took shape in the Arab 
world.”252 ‘Islam’ as faith, as canonical body of law, or as represented and interpreted by 
different political adversaries over the centuries is addressed as ‘a given’. 
Halfway in his analysis Parolin shifts focus from discussing the status and rights of 
inhabitants of the Arab world seen as individuals with relation to kin and religious 
membership, to a thorough focus on discussing the ‘nationality of detached territories’253, 
that is of contemporary states, after which he concentrates on a presentation of each of the 
independent state’s nationality legislation. Interestingly, with the presentation of each 
state’s legislation (18 in all), we easily get the impression that diversity, rather than unity, 
characterizes the fairly different nationality laws of Arab states.254 Now, given the presumed 
common traits that characterize Islamic law and the Islamic Arab world in general, 
differences in nationality legislation trigger questions such as: why are national legislations 
on citizenship so different? Parolin comes with the following explanation:  
Responses to the actual content of nationality regulations, conversely, follow the rules of model 
circulation in comparative law. Some regulations matching Arab mentality have been fully 
implemented and some were rejected by the legal environment, while other local rules even prevailed 
on foreign model.255 
 
The legislation of citizenship laws reflects a remarkable use of ‘foreign models’, as Parolin 
sees it, regarding citizenship legislation along with considerations that have to do with a 
                                                          
250 For historical accounts on the development of political and clerical authority under the Umayyads (appr. 630 
– 1030), the Abbasids (appr. 750 – 1258), and during Ottoman Empire (appr. 1417-1918), see Vikør, Between 
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particular ‘Arab mentality’, which – by extension – lie at the heart of the arbitrariness and 
exclusionary practices with regards to the distribution of membership in the state, 
naturalization and denaturalization policies. With respect to the Gulf states, for instance, he 
points at Kuwait where the stateless bidun population has been deprived from citizenship 
since 1959, Qatar where the Ghufran tribe were denaturalized for lack of loyalty to the Emir 
in 2005, and Bahrain where large segments of the Sunnite Dawasir tribe who migrated to 
Saudi-Arabia in the 1920s were collectively naturalized in 2002.256 Within Parolin’s approach, 
these inclusionary and exclusionary acts reveal that  
[k]in affiliation is a resilient and vital feature of Arab society, in spite of all endeavours of the religious 
communities, and later the nation-states, to do away with it. (…) Limitations of certain kin groups’ 
rights are usually carried out by communal denial or deprivation of nationality (jinsiyah), even 
disregarding national legislation.257 
In Parolin’s citizenship matrix the element of power and its evident practice by rulers in 
distributing or withdrawing citizenship certificates is non-existent. Parolin sees exclusionary 
practices, communal deprivation and the naturalization and inclusion of groups of citizens 
through the lens of kin affiliation. The primacy of membership in kin groups is related to, and 
implicitly explains, according to him, the resilience of kinship as an organizational principle in 
the Middle East. Parolin gives kinship – a central social organizational principle in Arab 
societies – explanatory force and turns it thereby into a ‘culturalist’ trait by neglecting to 
probe into the power by rulers who distribute or withhold citizenship certificates as means 
of coercion in order to strengthen their survival strategies as rulers.258 
Seen through a structuralist epistemological approach, the powers of rulers in 
constituting and defining demos constellations would be emphasized in shedding light on 
the resilience of kinship organization for two reasons: first, the use of coercive power at the 
hands of state authorities who obviously include some inhabitants and exclude others on the 
basis of kinship and religious affiliation; second, the authoritative nature of the distributive 
process itself. Here the disclosure of citizenship status indicates how kinship and religious 
affiliation is used by those holding state power as active ingredients in extending and 
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solidifying their hold over the state. As such, applying a structuralist approach impels 
identifying and problematizing constitutive features of citizenship such as the formation and 
application of principles for membership in a social group (religious, ethnic, tribal).  
Through a structuralist epistemological approach I look particularly at state power in 
forming and sustaining various modes of membership policies in sub-state units, particularly 
religious groups, and discuss the implication of state policies on the distribution of power in 
the polity along gendered lines.259  
What Parolin achieves, in what I have described as a ‘culturalist’ approach, is an 
informative presentation and historical description of citizenship patterns where he builds 
his explanation on what he seeks to explain. He contrasts different civilisational paths in the 
Latin and the Arab Islamic world with ‘membership’ and ‘citizenship’ as terminological points 
of departure, without providing empirical controls to the generalizations he assumes with 
regards to each of the civilizational paths followed. In Parolin’s analysis, modes of 
membership in the kin group and in the religious community are seen as pertaining to the 
Islamic world in ways that differ in essence from religious and kinship structures found in 
‘the Latin world’. In his study, historical events and political processes in the Muslim world 
are characterized as fairly unchanging and stagnant. If we are to follow Parolin’s 
epistemological approach towards understanding citizenship paradigms in contemporary 
states in the Middle East, the continued salience of Islamic umma is characteristic of 
contemporary societies and states. He is surprised that inhabitants or citizens in the region 
opt for the formation of national entities:  
Remarkably, some local ‘Islams’ have supported the formation of national communities (al-ummah al-
wataniyyah) by projecting onto them what Islam declared as constitutive of the Islamic community (al-
ummah al-islamiyyah), and have presented the centralization of power of the nation-state as fully 
compliant with the classical Islamic doctrine of the wilyah. Such a stance is now questioned on many 
sides. On the one hand, radical Islamists believe that the nation-state openly challenges the unity of 
the Islamic ummah, and on the other hand, ethnic and religious minorities condemn an Islam that 
denies their traditional peculiarities. Supranational Islamic movements still need to overcome serious 
obstacles in order to take root, but processes of political and administrative decentralisation, 
conversely, are quickly developing and may even breathe some new life into the kin organization.260 
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In this paragraph, Parolin implies that there exists a sovereign authoritative body which is, or 
represents, ‘Islam proper’.  He is, moreover, somehow startled that some of these ‘local 
Islams’ assert territorial notions of belonging to national states which, according to him, are 
issues which “Islam declared as constitutive of the Islamic community”. What this 
(monolithic) community presumable is or who represents it, is not clarified. ‘Religion’ – 
implicitly ‘Islam’ – in the Arab world is portrayed as having an acting capacity, that is an 
agency, not connected with individuals or groups.261   
In short, Parolin falls epistemologically in the trap of essentializing the Middle East. 
He sees kinship and religion as explanatory variables rather than variables which themselves 
are subjects of study. What is lost in his analysis is a contextualization of kinship, ethnic and 
religious affiliation in relation to the power dynamics at play between and among social 
groups and rulers who include or exclude members as citizens of the state according to 
political objectives centered around maintaining the political power of rulers. In Parolin’s 
study, kin formation grounded in pre-Islamic times are seen as key elements in maintaining – 
thereby understanding and implicitly explaining – social order as reflected in contemporary 
states; religion – confined and limited to Islam – is treated as virtually unchanging and 
stagnant until introduced and confronted by western norms and ideas.  
The result is a historical and linguistic descriptive account with little analytical vigor 
that extends our knowledge on the formation of citizenship in the Middle East because the 
presentation implicitly and systematically builds its assumptions on the differences rather 
than similarities between the experiences of the Latin and Arab worlds. These similarities 
evolve around, I would emphasize, spheres of influence, power, coercion and manipulation 
that fuse events and considerations we find in both worlds. Such similarities have to do with 
conflicts between individuals, groups and institutions vested in religious and/or political 
authority; adversaries that hold ideological opinions regarding different topics, at times in 
alignment and mutual interests, at other times in conflict or violent upheavals. Other 
similarities at the macro level include the dissemination of capitalist modes of ownership, 
production and reproduction since the 15th century, the establishment and diffusion of 
                                                          
261 ‘European Wars of Religion’ during the 16th and 17th century were, in contrast, carried out by adversaries –
kings, princes, representatives of the Catholic church, priests and clerical authorities of different confessional 
shades, along with members of the nobled classes. 
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territoriality as an organizing principle in world politics, and the struggle of females in 
obtaining ownership over their own personhood since the 19th century. 
With reference to the Middle East, the conflicts that rise out of the continuing 
struggle between and among representatives of religious and political authority is an 
ongoing and salient struggle. As such, I would argue that the sum of violent and non-violent 
struggles and clashes witnessed in different states in contemporary states in the Middle East 
today are part of events that resemble and correspond with, those that occurred during 
European state-making following the Reformation. These struggles are, in other words, 
currently taking place and can fruitfully be seen as part of a violent creation of political order 
in the region.262 Cohen et al. indicate, for instance, that 
Many of the new states of today are engaged in struggles whose logic is similar to that of the 
European period of primitive central power accumulation. [Many conflicts] evidence antagonisms 
between central state-makers and subnational collectivities. The theoretical language of “cleavages” – 
ethnic, religious, tribal – tends to obscure their intimate connections with competitive political 
conflicts for control over the power resources of the respective territories and populations. Increasing 
central state claims for resources – for material means of state-making and domination – intrude and 
compete with pre-existing structures of rights and obligations which tie those resources to subnational 
collectivities and or “polities”. Conflict, resistance and violence are as they were in Europe, often the 
result.263 
 
Seen through a state formation perspective, contemporary strife in the Middle East center 
around the organization and institutionalization of Islam as state religion or the use of Islam 
as means to provide authoritative canonical understandings on how to organize social and 
political life. These struggles reflect comparatively similar forms of conflicts of interest 
between and among those who seek to assert political authority in alliance with or in 
opposition to those who seek to assert power based on religious authority as witnessed in 
earlier periods of European state formation. The results are both non-violent as well as 
violent forms of upheavals within and among states. Not yet a hundred years old, the 
institutionalization of the territorial state system in the Middle East is, indeed, still in the 
making. 
Having laid out what distinguishes ‘culturalist’ and ‘structuralist’ epistemological 
approaches and the implications these have when seeking knowledge on a particular subject 
                                                          
262 Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical nature of state making: The violent 
creation of order," The American Political Science Review 75(1981). 
263 Ibid., 902. 
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of study – such as citizenship in the Middle East, I turn attention to situating my research 
within the theoretical body of studies on citizenship. 
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6 The theoretical framework: State formation and democratization 
 
“What if everything we have said about Western Europe is valid,  
but irrelevant to the contemporary world?”264 
 
Theoretical studies on the Middle East where citizenship is applied as conceptual or 
theoretical framework are scarce. Little has been published since 2000 after the two-volume 
publication of Citizenship and the state in the Middle East: Approaches and applications 
edited by Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian, and Gender and Citizenship 
in the Middle East edited by Suad Joseph.265 To the extent that the contributions in these 
two books remain influential, it is by drawing attention to the theoretical complexities and 
analytical fruitfulness of applying the concept of citizenship as a level of analysis in a non-
western and non-liberal context. The articles that constitute this thesis are attempts at 
extending some of the theoretical perspectives introduced in these books. 
Evidently, considerable research on citizenship related issues in the Middle East is 
carried out, without researchers introducing the concept of citizenship as a level of analysis. 
Works on political representation and participation266; political regimes267; the state268; 
Islamism as political force269; labor immigration270; Islam, justice and human rights271, and 
                                                          
264 Charles Tilly, "Western state-making and theories of political transformation," in The Formation of national 
states in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly, Gabriel Ardant, and Stein Rokkan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 601. 
265 Suad Joseph, ed. Gender and citizenship in the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000); 
Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis, and Manuel S. Hassassian, eds., Citizenship and the state in the Middle East: 
approaches and applications (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000). 
266 Saloua Zerhouni and Ellen Lust-Okar, Political participation in the Middle East  (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2008); Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
regimes and resistance  (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Samir Makdisi, "Lebanon: the constrained democracy 
and its national impact." 
267 Michael C. Hudson, Arab politics: the search for legitimacy  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Owen, 
State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East; Selvik, Stenslie, and Meyrick, Stability and 
change in the modern Middle East. 
268 Giacomo Luciani, The Arab state  (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990); Ayubi, Over-stating 
the Arab state: politics and society in the Middle East; Bromley, Rethinking Middle East politics: state formation 
and development; Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and state formation in the Middle East. 
269 Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world  (London: Routledge, 1993); Sami 
Zubaida, Islam, the people and the state: political ideas and movements in the Middle East  (London: Tauris, 
1993); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islam and politics in the contemporary world  (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Utvik, 
Islamismen; Zubaida, Law and power in the Islamic world. 
270 Longva, Walls built on sand: migration, exclusion and society in Kuwait; Kapiszewski, Nationals and 
expatriates: population and labour dilemmas for the Gulf Cooperation Council states; F. Eelens, T. Schampers, 
and J. D. Speckmann, Labour migration to the Middle East: from Sri Lanka to the Gulf  (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1992). 
271 See Tore Lindholm and Kari Vogt, Islamic law reform and human rights: challenges and rejoinders, ed. Rights 
Seminar on Human and Law the Modern Application of Islamic, Proceedings of the Seminar on Human Rights 
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the position of women within Islamic law272, provide ample examples of studies that discuss 
the politics of citizenship without referring to ‘citizenship’ as a central analytical concept. 
Indeed, Kymlicka and Norman’s warning of the potential hazard of limitless possible fields of 
application with reference to a ‘monolithic theory of citizenship’ is valid: most questions and 
problems regarding the distribution of power and the organization of political authority 
concern relations among and between rulers and ruled, and by extension citizenship.273  
Why, then, insist on using citizenship as a level of analysis? Where does the 
theoretical impact area of this thesis fall into?  
I place my research on the politics of citizenship in the Middle East within an 
overarching theoretical and analytical framework related to theories of state formation, 
nation-building and democratization as mapped out by the Norwegian political sociologist 
Stein Rokkan (1921-1979)274 and German American political sociologist Reinhard Bendix 
(1916-1991)275. The works of these scholars contributed significantly to my alertness in 
conceiving political development through an eye on historical processes without which 
scholars on the Middle East stand chanceless in exploring into and understanding 
contemporary politics. The legacy of these scholars permeate my thinking around the 
politics of citizenship and the politicization of the demos in the Middle East, and lies as a 
foundation to what eventually developed into an interdisciplinary exercise; the imprint of 
academic fields such as history, law and social anthropology are – hopefully – discernible in 
the various articles. My insistence on holding to citizenship as a level of analysis springs thus 
from an interest in making an effort to apply some of the approaches provided by Rokkan 
and Bendix to the Middle East, and from viewing the works of these scholars as both 
applicable and relevant to our contemporary world. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the Modern Application of Islamic Law, Oslo 14 -15 February 1992 (Copenhagen ; Oslo: Nordic Human 
Rights Publications, 1993); Vogt, Larsen, and Moe, New directions in Islamic thought: exploring reform and 
Muslim tradition; ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad an-Naʿīm, Islam and human rights: selected essays of Abdullahi An-Na'im, 
ed. Mashood A. Baderin (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); an-Naʿīm, Muslims and global justice. 
272 Welchman, Women's rights and Islamic family law: perspectives on reform; Welchman, Women and Muslim 
family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development and advocacy. More references on 
the position of women in the Middle East is provided in part 7. 
273 Norman, "Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe," 284. 
274 Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research on variations 
within Europe."; Stein Rokkan and Bernt Hagtvet, Stat, nasjon, klasse: essays i politisk sosiologi  (Oslo: 
Universitetsforl., 1987); Kuhnle et al., State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: the theory 
of Stein Rokkan based on his collected works. 
275 Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship: studies of our changing social order  (Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1977). 
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6.1 Rokkan and Bendix on state formation and democratization: an outline 
In their joint work entitled “The extension of citizenship to the lower classes”276, Bendix and 
Rokkan elaborated upon the threefold typology and historical development of citizenship 
rights as presented by British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893-1981) and 
blended these in their studies on the democratization of Western European states: the 
development of civil rights during the 18th century included individual protection of arbitrary 
rule by state authorities, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, 
equality before the law, and the right to justice; political rights during the 19th century 
encompassed the right to vote and to run for political office; and social rights during the 20th 
century which included social welfare services and benefits according to an (undefined) 
standard of living common in society. The authors accorded four public institutions that 
correspond to the three types of rights: courts for safeguarding civil rights; representative 
bodies in public decision-making and legislation for the exercise of political rights; schools for 
basic education; and social service institutions to provide minimum of protection against 
poverty and underpin social rights. 
Rokkan linked the development of these rights and their bearing in public institutions 
to variances in state formation and nation-building in the political development of western 
European states. While state formation was seen as a process which involved the 
establishment of political order through the use of force by means of extracting resources 
within a particular territorial entity, nation-building was perceived as reflecting the set of 
pressures for and couterpressures against standardizing cultural, religious and linguistic 
distinctions within that territory.  
Figure 2 and table 3 indicate how he visualized a four-phased time dimension which 
spans around a centre-periphery axis that reflects processes of state formation and nation-
building: i) the dimension of force initiated the state building process through a penetration 
phase characterized by extractive and military capacities of rulers; ii) the dimension of 
culture reflected a standardization phase characterized by processes of nation-building 
which “brings larger sectors of the masses into the [political] system” by generating 
                                                          
276 This chapter is found in ibid., 89-93.  For T.H. Marshall’s  original text on “The development of citizenship to 
the end of the nineteenth century”, see Marshall, Class, citizenship, and social development: essays: 78-91. 
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“widespread feelings of identity”277; iii) the dimension of law highlighted the strength of 
center-imposed legal traditions as well as opposition towards legal centralization; and iv) the 
dimension of economy reflected the degree of integration or separation of primary economy 
with / from city networks, as well as the degree of openness versus closedness of the 
territorial economy.278 
 
Figure 2 
Four types of citizenship plotted in Rokkan’s model on state formation and nation-building279 
 
 
 
In the original figure, Rokkan identified two forms of citizenship: ‘political citizenship’ and 
‘social citizenship’. He linked the establishment of ‘political citizenship’ to the dimension of 
law which was characterized by ‘the equalization of rights of participation’, and ‘social 
                                                          
277 Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research on variations 
within Europe," 572. 
278  ibid., 563-72. 
279 I have plotted in the four forms of citizenship to the original model. For Rokkan’s original figure entitled 
“The Time Dimension: A Scheme of Four Phases”, see ibid., 571. For an edited and updated presentation of 
Rokkan’s original figure, see Kuhnle et al., State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: the 
theory of Stein Rokkan based on his collected works: 132. For the Norwegian translation, see Rokkan and 
Hagtvet, Stat, nasjon, klasse: essays i politisk sosiologi: 355. 
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citizenship’ with the dimension of economy whereby the redistribution of resources and 
benefits occurred.280  
To Rokkan’s original conceptual map I add two forms of citizenship – ‘legal 
citizenship’ which refers to a process through which individuals are classified as members of 
the state, and ‘civil citizenship’ that reflects the equalization of civil rights under state law in 
distinction to political rights of participation.281 With reference to contemporary states in the 
Middle East, external and internal pressures that seek to equalize civil rights among citizens 
or maintain existing differences constitute politicized arenas of conflict and violent upheaval 
that are intimately related to the organization of state power and the distribution of rights 
within the polity.  
I argue that the two additional types of citizenship clarify significant features 
pertaining to the entanglement of law, religion and state power in contemporary states in 
the Middle East. These reflect various points of engagement that highlight the relationship 
between political regime and mosque/church-state relations as reflected in the 
institutionalization of the judicial system. Various patterns pertaining to institutionalization 
and management of religion in different states impact on the distribution of rights and 
obligations among the citizenry in ways that shed light on the organization and distribution 
of power in different states. 
  
                                                          
280 Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research on variations 
within Europe," 566-67.  
281 The equalization of civil rights encompasses theoretically male and female citizens as well as members of 
different confessional groups although I focus primarily on the former in this thesis. 
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Table 3: A simplification of Rokkan’s table on state formation and nation-building 282 
 
FORCE CULTURE LAW ECONOMY 
strength of 
extractive agencies 
 
extent of 
opposition to such 
agencies 
strength of 
standardizing 
agencies 
  
strength of 
counteragencies 
strength of centre-
imposed versus 
local/regional legal 
traditions 
Integration / 
separation of primary 
economy with / from 
city network 
 
internal versus 
external resources 
of military agencies  
 
 
distinctiveness vs 
sharedness of 
religious and / or 
linguistic standards 
 
distinctiveness vs 
sharedness of 
territorial legal 
system 
 
 
openness versus 
closedness of 
territorial economy 
 
penetration 
state-building 
 
constitution of the 
citizenry 
 
standardization 
nation-building 
 
equalization of civil 
rights 
 
equalization of 
rights of 
participation 
 
 
redistribution of 
resources / benefits 
 
Legal citizenship 
 
Civil citizenship 
 
Political citizenship 
 
Social citizenship 
 
 
By specifying and including ‘legal citizenship’ and ‘civil citizenship’ as two analytical forms of 
citizenship that differ from political and social citizenship, I seek to emphasize some central 
points of political dispute that surround the politics of citizenship and the politicization of 
the demos in contemporary states in the Middle East. While conflicts pertaining to ‘legal 
citizenship’ are related to the inclusion of non-citizens as members of state, conflicts 
pertaining to ‘civil citizenship’ are related to the equalization of civil rights under the 
auspices of the state as sovereign authority. 
In the following I point at some of the challenges embedded in Rokkan’s conceptual 
map with reference to particularly the politics of citizenship in the Middle East as 
framework.  It is important to emphasize that I do not view characteristics pertaining to 
citizenship in the Middle East as deviations from a particular ‘standard’ European model 
regarding state formation and the development of citizenship. The main reason for applying 
Rokkan’s ‘way of seeing’ is that I find the conceptual maps and theoretical perspectives 
                                                          
282 For Rokkan’s original table, see Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible 
paradigm for research on variations within Europe," 567. I have removed parts of the original table and marked 
my additions in italics. In the original table Rokkan builds further on Talcott Parson’s paradigm of functional 
differentiation, see Kuhnle et al., State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: the theory of 
Stein Rokkan based on his collected works: 125. For the Norwegian translation, see Rokkan and Hagtvet, Stat, 
nasjon, klasse: essays i politisk sosiologi: 351. 
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fruitful methodological guidelines in an attempt at applying citizenship as a level of analysis 
as reflected in various junctures related to state-building and state formation in MENA.283  
I discuss methodological considerations regarding the use of Rokkan’s conceptual 
maps and variables in section 7 (entitled ‘Methodological considerations’) and concentrate 
here on the theoretical challenges related to distinguishing the four types of citizenship 
pointed at above. 
 
6.2 Forms of citizenship in the Middle East within a Rokkanian framework 
Neither Bendix nor Rokkan dealt with the Middle East in particular.284 Nor did they discuss 
gender issues specifically, although they did deliberate about the extension of political rights 
to women by noting that the term “the lower classes” is used in a classificatory sense: 
the extension of citizenship occurred with reference to broadly and abstractly defined groups such as 
all adults over 21, or women or adults having specified property holdings, fulfilling certain residence 
requirements, etc. Such groups encompass many people other than those who have few possessions, 
low income, little prestige, and who because of these disabilities are understood to “belong” to the 
lower classes. The reference here is to the larger, classificatory group of all those (including the “lower 
classes”) who were excluded from any direct and indirect participation in the political decision-making 
process of the community.285  
The gendered dimension of excluding women from political participation is, in other words, 
addressed theoretically although not discussed empirically.286 
Other more challenging and analytically intriguing problems are related to the 
implicit inclusion of the impact of the Reformation in state formation theories as embedded 
in Rokkan’s conceptual models. I concentrate here on three interlinked challenges with 
reference to the Middle East: an embedded post-Westphalian political order; an under-
theorization of the ‘force’ dimension related to state formation; and an overall emphasis on 
                                                          
283 For an interesting presentation and a constructive critique of Rokkan’s conceptual maps and his ‘ways of 
seeing’, as Tilly coins it, see Tilly, Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons: 131-39. For a recent 
analysis of the democratic deficit within the European Union in light of Rokkan’s conceptual map, see Øyvind 
Østerud, Fredrik Engelstad, and Robert E. Goodin, Power and democracy: critical interventions  (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004), 176-78. 
284 Both authors included the Islamic Empire as part their historical analysis. Bendix, for instance, investigated 
variances of political authority in the Islamic empire Bendix, Kings or people: power and the mandate to rule: 
35-49.  
285 Footnote 29 in Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship: studies of our changing social order: 90. 
286 Nagel points at some of the weaknesses in Marshall’s model but sees its fruitfulness in her analysis of the 
development of female citizenship in Norway. See  Nagel, "The development of citizenship in Norway: Marshall 
remodelled." 
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the ‘culture’ dimension related to nation-building. Each of these three points is dealt with 
below.287 
First, an embedded post-Westphalian political order permeates the original model on 
state formation which thus premises the political outcome of the Reformation on European 
state formation based on territoriality as organizing principle and the monarch’s gradual 
sovereignty over extra-territorial clerical / papal authority. It should be noted that Rokkan 
introduced ‘outcome of the Reformation’ as an additional variable in later works where he 
observed and commented on differences pertaining to states where the Catholic Church, for 
instance, “proved able to slow down processes of democratization and mass 
mobilization”.288 However, in general, Rokkan was more occupied with variances in the 
outcome of the Reformation as reflected in the formation of counterforces (such as the 
upsurge of pious and linguistic vernacular movements). To a lesser degree was he occupied 
with historical processes that led to the Reformation.289 Also, political views pertaining to 
the secularization290 of society was an element in Rokkan’s and Lipset’s study on electoral 
support to parties who adopted ideological positions towards secularization of society.291 In 
other words, Rokkan was primarily concerned with the European nation state and its 
democratization as reflected in patterns and differences in the developmental paths 
                                                          
287 It should be noted that Rokkan stated explicitly six ‘givens’ with reference to his analysis on the history of 
center formation and periphery incorporation, among these he points at the “heritage of the Roman Empire, 
the supremacy of the Emperor, the systematization of legal rules, [and] the idea of citizenship” as only one of 
these ‘givens’. Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research 
on variations within Europe," 575. In other words, Rokkan seeks to analyze fairly huge historical processes. 
What I have attempted to do with reference to the Middle East is to concretize and explicitly point at some of 
the ‘givens’ which Rokkan makes, and try to perceive these in terms of contemporary politics in the Middle 
East. 
288 Kuhnle et al., State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: the theory of Stein Rokkan based 
on his collected works: 27.  
289 Rokkan pointed thus that the “great upheavals of the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ war left Western 
European states divided in three parts”: a protestant North, a belt of religiously mixed territories (includes 
Ireland, the Low countries, the Rhineland, large sections of France until 1658 and the Swiss cantons); the 
Counter-Reformation countries in the east and the south (Habsburg territories, Spain, the Italian territories, 
France after 1685). Ibid., 304. 
290 ‘Secularization’ refers here to societal processes that free institutions from clerical and church power, while 
‘secularism’ – as other ‘isms’ is connoted to political programs that seek to enhance the process of 
secularization. Oddbjørn Leirvik, "Religionsdialog, sekularitet og eit felles forpliktande språk [Religion dialogue, 
secularity and a common binding language]," in Sekularisme - med norske briller [Secularism - with Norwegian 
glasses], ed. Oddbjørn Leirvik, Sindre Bangstad, and Ingvill Thorson Plesner (Oslo: Unipub, 2012), 8-9. 
291 Rokkan and Lipset saw secularization as including “the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and 
mobilizing nation-state of the historically-established corporate privileges of the Church”, as cited by Jada who 
discusses the religious structure of party support towards issues pertaining to secularization. See Kenneth 
Janda, "Regional and religious support of political parties and effects on their issue positions," in Religion and 
politics, ed. John T. S. Madeley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 386. 
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pursued, rather than processes of secularization which was implicitly taken as part of his 
‘grander thesis’ pertaining to democratization as a normative outfall witnessed in the case of 
Western European states, notwithstanding the nationalist-socialist and fascist periods in 
Germany and South Europe. 
Second, an under-theorization of the ‘force’ dimension related to state formation. 
The development of the state apparatus and modern bureaucracy in the Middle East, 
particularly after 1920, offered authoritarian rulers with formidable instruments and means 
to extract resources and to use coercive power to control and shape the demos in ways that 
sustain their rule. Flora points, for instance, that Rokkan was “primarily interested in the 
nation and democracy and hardly interested in state formation in a stricter sense”.292 
Therefore, “[s]tate-building, the formation of military states and, later, of welfare states, 
though central to [Rokkan’s] theory, concerned him much less in his historical-comparative 
studies.”293 
Thirdly, a logical result of the two previous points: an overall emphasis on the 
‘culture’ dimension related to nation-building. At center here is Rokkan’s linking of aspects 
and structures related to religion as mainly belonging to the ‘culture’ dimension. In the 
Middle East, the domain of ‘religion’ includes both the culture dimension, but spans also 
over the ‘law’ dimension because religious law permeates the legal and judicial structures of 
the state. 
The non-secularization of the state’s legal and judicial systems in most states in the 
Middle East in the arena of family law requires therefore that the standardization of the 
legal structure be related to the dimension of ‘law’ rather than the culture dimension as 
envisaged by Rokkan. The persistence and proliferation of the phenomenon of legal 
pluralism294, i.e. the existence of several parallel and not always overlapping legal and 
judicial norms and rules in the region reflects, to use Rokkan’s terminology, variances in the 
strength of centralizing agencies towards standardizing the legal and judicial structures of 
the state and the power of counteragencies towards such pressures. I discuss some of these 
differences in chapter 5. There I point at variances in the institutionalization of the judicial 
                                                          
292 Peter Flora, "Introduction and interpretation," in State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in 
Europe: the theory of Stein Rokkan : based on his collected works, ed. Stein Kuhnle, et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 86. 
293 Ibid., 4. 
294 Berger, Zwaini, and Dupret, Legal pluralism in the Arab world. 
132 
 
systems in unitary courts as found in Egypt and Morocco where Islam dominates as religion, 
as compared with states with dual courts as found in Syria and Lebanon where the 
autonomy of religious groups in multireligious states is judicially institutionalized. 
I address some of these three challenges as part of my discussion below on state 
formation in the Middle East and the four forms of citizenship – legal citizenship, civil 
citizenship, political citizenship and social citizenship. 
 
6.2.1 Legal citizenship and penetration: emphasizing the force dimension  
Rokkan does not refer explicitly to the structural dimension of citizenship, i.e. the 
distribution of membership in the state. Building on his model, however, the constitution of 
the citizenry falls logically under the force dimension that characterizes the penetration 
phase of state formation. The reason being that the constitution of the citizenry is a political 
act that expresses the sovereignty of the state over those it defines as its subjects, rather 
than a process of equalization of rights that falls under the dimension of law. 
An example which reflects the intertwinement of the dimension of ‘law’ and ‘force’ 
as portrayed by Bendix and Rokkan is when they state that “a core element of nation-
building is the codification of rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens”.295 
In contemporary states of the Middle East, what appears as politicizing elements with 
regards to constituting the demos is the very classification process of adults as citizens. This 
process is evidently related to the ‘force’ dimension pertaining to the penetrating process 
whereby the demos is constituted, and not with the ‘law’ dimension pertaining to the 
process of participation in the polity.  
In the Middle East, the constitution of the citizenry, that is the distribution of legal 
status (citizens, non-citizens, aliens, stateless), occurred with the establishment of the state 
and as a result of efforts at categorizing the population in ways that fit the nationalist ideals 
and professed state-idea of competing ethnic, religious and / or tribal groups. Once war and 
violent strife settled the territorial borders of the state, enumeration processes, censuses 
and the formation of citizenship laws were formed and applied in ways that created the 
demographic realities envisaged by groups who gained power over the state apparatus. It is 
                                                          
295 Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship: studies of our changing social order: 90, my emphasis. 
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these sets of questions I discuss with reference to particularly Lebanon as case study in 
chapter 2. 
 
6.2.2 Civil citizenship and standardization: reassessing the culture dimension 
Inasmuch as Rokkan dealt with the concept of rights, these were primarily seen in terms of 
political rights. His main focus was thus on aspects of citizenship seen as a desirable activity 
where the “equalization of rights of participation” was particularly emphasized.  
The biased focus on political rights which Rokkan displayed in the chapter published 
as part of The Formation of national states in Western Europe in 1975 was later enriched and 
refined with a more sensitive discussion on the significance of legal equality in civil rights in 
the chapter written jointly with Bendix and published in 1977. In their discussion entitled 
“The extension of citizenship to the lower classes”, both authors addressed issues regarding 
the equalization of civil rights and emphasized that “rights of citizenship emerge with the 
establishment of equal rights under the law” adding further that: 
Legal equality advances at the expense of legal protection of inherited privileges. Each man now 
possesses the right to act as an individual unit; however, the law only defines his legal capacity, but is 
silent on his ability to use it. In addition, civil rights are extended to illegitimate children, foreigners 
and Jews; the principle of legal equality helps eliminate hereditary servitude, equalize the status of 
husband and wife, circumscribe the extent of parental power, facilitate divorce, and legalize civil 
marriage. Accordingly, the extension of civil rights benefits the inarticulate sections of the population, 
giving a positive libertarian meaning to the legal recognition of individuality.296 
 
Aspects pertaining to – in a Middle East context – matters related to family law, and an 
emphasis on individually-based civil rights, are here clearly emphasized. 
My unqualified guess regarding a more refined focus on the legal aspects related to 
civil status in Bendix’s book – and by extension civil rights – is the legacy which Bendix bears 
to Max Weber who, it should be reminded, started his academic work in the fields of law and 
legal history. The sensitive eye to political aspects at the individual level can also be seen as 
related to Bendix’s and Rokkan’s different ‘ways of seeing’. According to Tilly, the work of 
Bendix bears mark of ‘individualizing comparisons’ while Rokkan’s work is characterized by 
‘universalizing’ and ‘encompassing’ comparative analysis.297 
                                                          
296 Ibid., 92-93, my emphasis. 
297 Tilly, Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons: 81, 84. On Max Weber and studies in law, see 
Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: an intellectual portrait  (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 1.  
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The significance of civil citizenship, i.e. the establishing of civil rights in a polity, 
reminds us that the non-secularization of the state’s legal and judicial system in the Middle 
East impacts not only on the institutional level of the state (legal and court systems), but also 
at the individual level where the distribution of civil rights among and between citizens occur 
along communal religious lines as part of the legacy of religious freedom for minority groups 
in multireligious states, and along gendered lines. 
 
6.2.3 Political citizenship and participation: framing the law dimension  
Rokkan is unclear on what the ‘law’ dimension encompasses in his original grid.298 The 
dimension of law evolves around the strength of center-imposed versus local legal traditions 
that are characterized by the distinctiveness or sharedness of territorial legal system. The 
law dimension included furthermore ‘organizations for adjudication’ and ‘internal 
representation’, which I figure are courts and representative political organization such as 
parliaments. The ‘law’ dimension becomes all the more complex in as far as Rokkan turns to 
the individual level and links the equalization of rights of participation and the establishment 
of ‘political citizenship’ to the ‘law’ dimension. 
The lack of focus on the ‘law’ dimension with reference to state formation in The 
Formation of national states in Western Europe was commented upon by Tilly who admitted 
that a chief omission which researchers who contributed to the book “came to regret was 
the judicial system. Because courts, judges, and judicial proceedings antedate national states 
and appear in so many unstately guises, it is easy to forget how large a part certain kinds of 
courts played in the day-to-day construction of Western states. […] the volume as a whole 
treats the judicial system much less adequately than we would have liked.”.299 
While a theorist on state formation regrets the omission of the judicial system as an 
area of analysis in probing into western European state formation, researchers on the 
politicization of religious law in contemporary states in the Middle East have since the turn 
of the millennia been increasingly sensitive to the establishment of centralized power and 
the institutionalization of a territorially based legal system. Legal scholar on Islamic law, Lynn 
Welchman, cites her colleague Leon Buskens who points that the “study of  the process of 
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within Europe," 566-67. 
299 Tilly, "Western state-making and theories of political transformation," 6. 
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state formation, in which a central government claims the monopoly on the imposition of 
uniform and generally valid legal norms, offers a key to understanding the constantly 
changing relationships” between state, religion and society in the Middle East.300 
The Norwegian historian and scholar on Islamic law Knut S. Vikør discusses likewise 
the proximity of the law and force dimensions in his analysis of the development of Islamic 
law during the Ottoman Empire. Pointing at the historical conflicts regarding which 
authoritative body can codify religious law, he emphasizes that “[t]he monopoly of force 
which centralizing agents are eager to obtain is usually conferred upon the ruler by a system 
of law. Control over the legal system is therefore one of the definitions of political power, 
making the legal system an executive branch of the state.”301 
Seen through Rokkan’s conceptual map on state formation, the persistence of legal 
pluralism within the state’s corpus of laws in the Middle East exhibits the power of 
counterforces against the centralization of the state’s legal system. The influence which 
religious authorities exert on sustaining conservative readings and interpretations of 
religious text varies, however, with the limits and opportunities which those holding political 
power are able to set. The contemporary Arab state has thus ‘abdicated’, so to say, in 
centralizing its legal system. The state’s abdication in the legal sphere follows from what 
Vikør sees as a ‘containment strategy’ where the state creates protected spheres in which 
religious groups and communities have partial autonomy in regulating the group’s ‘internal 
affairs’, most often in the arenas of education and family law.302 
In his studies on the development of Norwegian pious movements, Rokkan sees their 
rise as a consequence of the efforts by centralized government and urban elites into creating 
standardized religious institutions under the auspices of urbanized elites. I see interesting 
parallels, and better analytical glasses, in analyzing the rise of radical religious groups (such 
as ultra-conservative and Salafist303 groups, some who do not refrain from the use of 
                                                          
300 Lynn Welchman, "Islamic law: Stuck with the state?," in Religion, law and tradition: comparative studies in 
religious law, ed. Andrew Huxley (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 61. 
301 Knut S. Vikør, "The shari'a and the nation state: Who can codify the divine law?," in The Middle East in a 
Globalized World, ed. Bjørn Olav Utvik and Knut S. Vikør, Nordic research on the Middle East (Bergen: Nordic 
Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 2000), 223. For a comprehensive historical analysis, see  Vikør, Between 
God and the Sultan: a history of Islamic law. 
302 Vikør, "The shari'a and the nation state: Who can codify the divine law?," 234. 
303 Often portrayed as religious revivalists, Salafists – i.e. those who call for orthodox and textually-based 
interpretations of Islamic doctrines without abstaining from the use of force – can and should, I argue, be 
analytically distinguished from other groups of ‘religious revivalists’ who oppose the use of force as means to 
obtain political objectives (such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after 1995, for instance). In cases where 
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violence) in contemporary states in the Middle East along these analytical terms rather than 
viewing them as ‘cultural representations’ that give rise to clashes of civilizations.304  
Rokkan’s center-periphery approach towards counterforces in Norway maintained 
that three particular movements – one anchored in religious pietistic movements 
(lekmannsbevegelsen), another in an anti-alcohol movement (avholdssaken) and the third 
based on linguistic vernaculars (målstriden) – characterized the democratization process of 
political development in Norway.305 There is thus nothing particularly ‘Islamic’ about the 
political force or the role which ‘religion’ in general, or pious religious movements in 
particular, have played – and continuously play – as societal transformational agents.306 
Despite the unclear delineations between the law and culture dimensions, Rokkan 
viewed that the phase of participation “brings subject masses into active participation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Muslim puritans oppose state authority, as the case is with the strand of Islamists referred to as ‘jihadists’, 
these are ipso facto not only ‘puritans’ but also political dissidents because they oppose state authority 
altogether, and some profess the use of violence in challenging the principles on which the current world 
political order is based upon, i.e. the territorial sovereignty of individual states. 
304 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of civilizations?," Foreign Affairs 72(Summer 1992). See the discussion on 
various authoritarian responses to religious pluralism and the rise of religious radicalism at the international 
level in Turner, Religion and modern society: citizenship, secularisation and the state: 184-93, 271-84. See 
particularly chapter 14 entitled “The globalization of piety” in ibid. For an excellent Rokkanian study on 
countercultural forces and the rise of the Norwegian right-wing party Fremskrittspartiet which became 
Norway’s biggest party in the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections, see Tor Bjørklund, "Fremskrittspartiets 
suksess og kulturell standarisering," Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, no. 2 (2007). Bjørklund argues that the 
standardization of the three countercultural movements in Norway has occurred at the regional level in 
contemporary politics, but that we can still find pockets of counterforces in contemporary religious movements 
among ethnic Norwegian in Western Norway, among immigrants and citizens of immigrant background, as well 
as among followers of new-age worldviews. Ibid., 157. 
305 See chapter 8 («Sentrum og periferi, økonomi og kultur: Modeller og data i kliometrisk sosiologi») in Rokkan 
and Hagtvet, Stat, nasjon, klasse: essays i politisk sosiologi: 229. See also the Norwegian historian Jens Arup 
Seip’s critique of Rokkan’s center - periphery analysis of Norwegian politics, «Modellenes tyranni: Analyse av 
Stein Rokkan’s anvvendelse av en sentrum-periferi modell på norsk historie», chapter 12 in Jens Arup Seip, 
Problemer og metode i historieforskningen: [artikler, innlegg, foredrag 1940-1977]  (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983). For 
the original articles by both scholars, see "Periferi og sentrum i historien: Utdrag av foredrag ved Nordisk 
fagkonferanse for historisk metodelære på Røros 16. - 20. juni 1974", (paper presented at the Nordisk 
fagkonferanse for historisk metodelære på Røros 16. - 20. juni 1974, Røros, 1974). Seip and other Norwegian 
historians point at the establishment of the Konventikkelplakaten in 1741 while Norway was under Danish rule 
as an important element which laid the bases for the democratization of Norwegian politics. ‘Konventikler’ 
were religious meetings led by laymen which were arranged without obtaining the authority of the local priest 
(sognepresten). The ordinance prohibited thus religious gatherings without the authoritative permission by 
state authorities, i.e. Norwegian bureaucratic officials (embettsmenn) who ruled by proxy of the Danish king. 
Internal opposition against the ordinance created an upsurge in national counterforces of religious puritans 
and political dissidents in both rural and urban areas which are referred to as ‘lavkirkelige bevegelser’ (low-
church movements) in contrast to ‘høykirkelige bevegelser’ (high-church movements, i.e. religious groups and 
movements legitimized by state officials). The ordinance was abolished in 1842 and spurred the establishment 
of mass religious groups and movements, including radical revivalists, moderates and conservatives, which 
served as significant roots to the democratization of Norwegian domestic politics. 
306 See, for instance, Bjørn Olav Utvik, Islamist economics in Egypt: the pious road to development  (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Lara Deeb, An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon  
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
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workings of the territorial political system”.307 As such, the politicization of matters related 
to family law and demands for reform in Arab states since the 1990s can be seen as 
encompassing a political participatory process whereby conflicts of interest span along a 
continuum between pressures to equalize civil rights between citizens and pressures to 
sustain and strengthen conservative interpretations of religious law as state law. From a 
citizenship regime perspective, this struggle centers around pressures for reform that seek 
to establish an individually-based citizenship regime and counterforces against change that 
seek to bolster and sustain group-based citizenship. 
 
6.2.4 Social citizenship and redistribution: the economy dimension 
Aspects pertaining to social citizenship, i.e. the distribution of resources and benefits as 
envisaged by Rokkan, are focused upon in terms of the impact of economic globalization in 
terms of presenting powerful pressures for change. Economic factors enter the analysis on 
the politics of citizenship in chapters 4 and 5 through a focus on female citizenship and the 
impact of economic forces of change towards political liberalization with reference to 
gendered state laws. In these chapters, I point that economic globalization paved the way 
for the introduction of human rights standards, including the strengthening of women’s 
rights through the framework of the Women’s Convention, CEDAW.308 Also, with the 
increase in female labour, employed women and labour unions began to highlight economic, 
social and legal issues and present demands in order to improve their living conditions.309 
Pressures for change in family law are presented as part of these demands.  
Debates over family law and pressures to change existing gendered laws in Arab 
states are multifaceted. On the one hand, the primacy of kinship-based social and political 
systems accentuates the importance of family laws due to the profound social and economic 
                                                          
307 Rokkan, "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building: A possible paradigm for research on variations 
within Europe," 572, emphasis in original. 
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impact of these laws on the quality of life of all family members, including females who are 
predominantly outside the waged labour market. On the other hand, they should be 
understood as fundamental individual and group struggles for welfare, since in the absence 
of expansive welfare states, family remains the essential guarantor of individual welfare in 
Arab states. Karshenas and Moghadam point, for instance, that “family law is social policy” 
in their analysis of the impact of economic globalization on variances in the development of 
economic citizenship in MENA.310 Moghadam observes, moreover, that it is “employed 
women who have been the ones to recognize gender injustices and to mobilize for women’s 
participation and rights” by entering into coalitions with trade unions and human rights 
organizations to obtain social and economic rights.311 
Researchers on women and economic participation emphasize that economic 
liberalization led to an increase in female labour participation. Karshenas and Moghadam 
point that the increase in labour participation in MENA has been the highest in the world 
between 1960 and 2000, and indicate that MENA women’s share of this increase is strikingly 
high at 4,7 per cent, while it is 2,6 per cent in Latin America and 1,1 in South East Asia.312 The 
authors argue that although Arab women’s labour participation is the lowest in the world, 
the overall increase in female labour participation reflect two central moments: first, more 
people were outside the waged labour market in MENA compared with other regions in the 
world as reflected in considerably higher shares of unemployment. Second, poverty has 
been feminized: partly because the salaries of unskilled labour in the private sector has been 
reduced to an extent that women to a higher degree choose the lowest paid jobs, and partly 
because more unemployed men are not able to fulfil their role as breadwinners for their 
families.313 
Writing already in 1991, i.e. before the forces of economic globalization were visible 
a decade later, Kandiyoti theorized on the breakdown of ‘the patriarchal contract’ in times of 
crisis which is bolstered on traditional gender roles of male providers and female caretakers. 
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During economic transformational processes women may find themselves caught between 
their active support for maintaining and sustaining conservative gender roles, and a 
“genuine personal tragedy, since they have paid the heavy price of an earlier patriarchal 
bargain, but are not able to cash in on its promised benefits.”314 
Economic crisis can thus be seen as significant incentives for pressures made by 
women’s associations to demand changes in conditions that limit and contain women’s 
economic position. 315 The economic and financial impetus of reforms in family law on 
individually-based rights for females and women’s social citizenship is, in other words, 
significant. 
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7 Methodological considerations 
 
“Our final question: How do politicians know on which issues to generate demands? 
An answer to this question requires a careful definition of political astuteness,  
a topic we dare not entertain! At this point politics becomes art, not science.  
Or at any rate it becomes psychology, not political science.”316 
 
Having stated the theoretical framework of the thesis, I have implicitly presented certain 
perceptions and understandings of social and political processes in contemporary states in 
the Middle East.  
In this section I comment on some of the advantages and disadvantages in perceiving 
political processes within a Rokkanian analytical framework. I also point at the sets of 
instruments used to operationalize the politics of citizenship, and then reflect over implicit 
assumptions and weaknesses in my methodological approach. After all, our methods 
“dictate the problems we study rather than vice versa.”317 
 
7.1 Making Rokkan’s conceptual maps relevant: strengths and weaknesses 
One of the disadvantages of applying a Rokkanian approach to the politics of citizenship and 
state formation from a methodological point of view is that the conceptual maps serve 
simultaneously as methodological compasses. Indeed, at times it is difficult to distinguish 
between theoretical perceptions and methodological outlines when one indulges into 
Rokkan’s developmental phases, dimensions, paradigms and conceptual maps on state 
formation and nation-building. What I presented as a fruitful theoretical approach in part 6 
embodies thus at the same time some constraints. 
Among the problems related to the relevance and applicability of Rokkan’s state 
formation and nation-building theories in a non-western context is that the phases which 
Rokkan delineated as separate occurred simultaneously in the majority of Arab states. In 
some states, such as the GCC states, they did not occur at all. The accumulation of conflicts 
in states established after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire are furthermore entangled 
in ways that complicate political analysis and reduce the validity and applicability of the 
conceptual models in a non-European context. Indeed, Tilly commented plainly that 
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“European state-building experiences will not repeat themselves in new states. The 
connections of the new states to the rest of the world have changed too much.”318  
 Another evaluation of Rokkan’s conceptual models is their lack of emphasis on 
aspects of change. In a critical but constructive review, Tilly states that Rokkan’s conceptual 
maps “lack dynamism” because they tend to “reduce the known facts of international power 
to effects of similar positions within an abstract grid”319. Which external variables give rise to 
the transformation of social and political processes that eventually manifest themselves in 
cleavages at the national level in contemporary states? What are the kinds of pressures for 
change that in due course form the patterns of internal divisions within states? Such 
questions remain less articulated in Rokkan’s analytical approach and render his conceptual 
maps static. 
 A third critique is that Rokkan takes ‘very large’ and comprehensive political 
processes as givens. I have already pointed at the weaknesses that follow from analyzing the 
impact of the process of secularization on democratization processes as envisaged by 
Rokkan. With reference to my own analysis of the politics of citizenship, one factor that is 
dealt with as a given is the impact of warfare on population movements and demographic 
changes within and between states in the Middle East. In the thesis I do not address warfare 
as a catalyzer of change, although warfare – including civil war – and violent civil strife 
impact on the formation and amendments made to citizenship, naturalization and 
denaturalization policies. Immigration, emigration and massive demographic movements 
internally as well as across territorial boarders following war or nationalist political agendas, 
impinge clearly on political calculations which are part and parcel of the establishment and 
regulation of the polity’s demographic constitution. Inasmuch as war is pointed at (the 1948 
war following the establishment of the state of Israel, civil war in Jordan in 1970 and in 
Lebanon in 1975, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990), it is the impact of these wars and 
violent upheavals on the politics of citizenship that is in focus. Demographic changes are, in 
other words, assumed. My analysis focuses thus on the instruments and political objectives 
involved in the political calculations regarding who the demos of the state is or ought to be. 
External pressures led to three different forms of state formation in Jordan, Kuwait 
and Lebanon. Such pressures include colonial rule as exercised by the French Mandate 
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power in Lebanon, and British colonial rule in Transjordan and Kuwait. Colonial power was, 
indeed, decisive for the establishment of particularly these three polities as territorial 
entities. Moreover, the social and economic legacy of colonial rule held sway over 
consequent political development in each state: a predominantly francophone Lebanese 
state with close ties to France until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975; an oil-rentier 
Kuwaiti economy linked internationally with the interests of British and eventually American 
petroleum companies as well as American geopolitical interests in the Gulf region; and a 
Jordanian state based on the tribal allegiance of Transjordanians to a pro-western monarch 
whose rule was enhanced by conforming to British great power interests, and later to 
American superpower interests. 
Other kinds of external pressures in the contemporary Middle East include 
international pressures for embedding human rights norms such as strengthened women’s 
rights at the national level. The critique regarding the potency of external factors and their 
impact on internal change is addressed in chapters 4 and 5. There I discuss the impetus of 
transnational pressures for change following economic globalization in strengthening female 
citizenship after 1990. Although no references are made to Rokkan’s conceptual maps in 
these two chapters, pressures for establishing equal civil rights between male and female 
citizens are analytically seen through a state formation perspective. The process of 
secularization and the centralization of the judicial and legal systems in which reform in 
family law is a central political battlefield are, in other words, seen as conflicts embedded in 
processes of state making and nation-building as theorized in Rokkan’s and Bendix’s works. 
The table which renders factors that impact on change in family law in four states (appendix 
1 in chapter 5) reflects thus a ‘way of seeing’ where the inclusion of female citizens as part of 
the demos in Arab states is at center. As such, the approach in chapters 4 and 5 is 
permeated by a perspective in which variables such as ‘strength of religious authority’, 
‘agents of reform’ and ‘resilience to reform’ with regards to family law are linked to Rokkan’s 
conceptual terminology pertaining to ‘forces of change’ and ‘counterforces against change’. 
The discussions regarding expanded female citizenship in chapters 4 and 5 evolve 
around the inclusion of female citizens as full members of the polity in Arab states. In terms 
of state formation, I argue that the expansion of civil rights for female citizens reflects a 
process of including Arab female citizens, i.e. ‘the masses’, as full members of the polity in 
contemporary states in the Middle East. ‘The masses’ is a terminology used by Rokkan and 
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Bendix in their analysis of the inclusion of disenfranchised workers, also termed as ‘lower 
classes’, in the political participation process which impacted on the democratization of the 
political order in western European states.320 Bendix and Rokkan applied the term to 
describe those who protested against their second-class citizenship, mainly the industrialized 
proletariat in western European states, and their demand to “the right of participation on 
terms of equality in the political community of the nation-state.”.321 
Rokkan is aware of the limits of his conceptual maps and emphasized their potential 
applicability: 
The European sequence cannot be repeated in the newest nations; the new nation-builders have to 
start out from fundamentally different conditions, they face an entirely different world. But they can 
learn to develop new combinations of policies from a detailed analysis of the many facets of the 
European experiences of state-building and national consolidation. They may learn more from the 
smaller countries than from the large, more from the multiculturally consociational polities than from 
the homogeneous dynastic states, more from the European latecomers than from the old established 
nations: what is important is that these experiences be sifted and evaluated, not just case by case, but 
within an effort of cross-regional systematization.322 
What is, then, analytically possible is to sift and evaluate contemporary experiences in light 
of older paradigms, and make attempts at systematizing and categorizing knowledge in new 
ways. Rather than providing theoretical roadmaps of political development, the distinctions, 
dividing lines and variances Rokkan points at with reference to state formation and 
citizenship can be discerned and examined in non-western contexts. Not necessarily in the 
sequential manner as they were initially laid out, but in the identification and categorization 
of significant variables and principles of variation that can be applied in studies of particular 
states and in comparative analysis. I maintain thus that Rokkan’s dimensions, concepts and 
models remain relevant and the analytical architectural legacy is applicable as 
methodological means to describe and conceive political processes such as state formation, 
democratization and secularization in a Middle Eastern context. 
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7.2 On comparison 
Comparison lies as a thick thread throughout the thesis. As pointed at in the previous 
section, comparison is embedded in the theoretical framework as a “conceptual map” also 
when analyzing single case studies.  
By introducing and applying Rokkan’s conceptual maps on state formation and 
nation-building, I seek to follow what Bromley suggests as a comparative endeavor when 
attempting to compare political processes with the Middle East as reference. In order to 
avoid the pitfalls of implicitly building elements into our discussions which themselves are in 
need of explanation, he suggests that “we must apply a common theoretical framework, 
using an empirically open methodology, to different societies.”323 
Dogan and Pelassy point that “comparison is the engine of knowledge” because the 
comprehension of a single case is linked to the understanding of many cases.324 Ragin 
indicates more explicitly that qualitative comparative studies aim in general at being 
historically interpretive and causal analytic in their approach.325 This study seeks to conform 
to these two objectives. It is historically interpretative in the sense that it seeks to account 
for and understand the historical foundations and outcomes of the politics of citizenship 
applied in Arab states in the course of the modern – and still ongoing – state formation 
process. The study is causal-analytic in the sense that it seeks to analyze the significance of 
the patterns of historical outcomes of the politics of citizenship on the organization of 
political order in Arab states. 
 The uniqueness of the qualitative comparative studies is the attention they allow to 
analyzing complexity – both the heterogeneity and particularity – of each case. Ragin 
identifies two dominant ways that enable us to simplify complex social relations: the case-
oriented strategy where similarities and differences among a limited number of cases are 
analyzed, and the variable-oriented strategy where general features of social structure are 
conceived as variables, and the distribution among and between these variables is 
studied.326 Both strategies are, according to him, complementary either through a 
combination of major elements of the case-oriented and variable-oriented comparative 
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methods (combined strategy), or through a synthetic integration of features of both 
methods (synthetic strategy).327 A combined strategy is sought in this study, with emphasis 
on a case-oriented approach. The survival of the regime is sought understood by identifying 
and analyzing features pertaining to the politics of citizenship that characterize the particular 
state / states under study in each article, and the ensuing citizenship regime that sustains 
rulers’ hold on power. 
 
7.3 Operationalizing the politics of citizenship 
Ragin calls the analytical research process a “dialogue between the investor’s theory and the 
data”, and indicates that this dialogue is shaped by the techniques of data analysis used by 
the investigator.328 What then are the means used in organizing the dialogue between 
theory and data in the articles that constitute the thesis? How do I best discern and apply 
fruitful indicators when I attempt to define and analyze aspects of membership and 
participation in the state in the Middle East? Which problems are connected with the 
variables I have selected and the data I have used? 
The empirical material which the thesis builds upon is relatively compound given the 
necessity of underpinning each of the published articles with a theoretical and 
methodological basis. A common pool of empirical material and methodological approaches 
have, however, been used to discern and implore into the components of the politics of 
citizenship.  
In analyzing the relationship between aspects pertaining to citizenship seen as 
membership in the state on the one hand, and aspects pertaining to participation in the 
state on the other, I have operationalized the politics of citizenship by approaching its 
dynamics through i) demographic figures and population censuses; ii) citizenship legislation; 
iii) family laws and court appeals; iv) fieldworks and interviews; v); analysis of public 
discourses pertaining to citizenship legislation and legislation on family law. I comment 
shortly on each below: 
 
                                                          
327 Ibid., 69. 
328 Ibid., xi. 
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7.3.1 Demographic figures and population censuses 
The demographic structure and the constitution of the ratio of citizens to non-citizens in 
each state provide an avenue to probe into fluctuations regarding those included and those 
excluded from the citizenry, and to some extent – collective naturalization and de-
naturalization such as in the case of individuals who hold 1948 Palestine refugee status, 
tribal groups, Christian minority groups (such as Copts and Armenians) and Kurds. Official 
statistical demographic data issued by the Ministry of Planning or Central Bureaus of 
Statistics on the composition of the population at the aggregate level is, with the exception 
of Lebanon, fairly easily available through the internet. However, figures that are available 
are subject to alterations (changing population categories and total numbers, or entering 
new population categories) at the time of gathering, or over time through citizenship 
decrees and policies regulating admission and residence permits. These changes in 
demographic re-assessments are political in nature, and the rationale behind cannot be 
grasped only by taking crude numbers at face value. 
 Kapiszewski’s comments on the gathering of demographic and statistical data in the 
Gulf states are relevant to other states in the Middle East:  
the value of information collected and analysed by inexperienced personnel is sometimes 
questionable. […] official figures often leave out the large numbers of illegal workers living in the GCC 
and do not deal successfully with the problem of who should be counted as national and who should 
not. […] The figures published by different official sources, ministries included, often vary considerably 
as no unified accounting methodology is used. Furthermore, the available population figures often 
refer to different periods of time, making any comparative analysis more difficult.329  
Notwithstanding the problems related to demographic data in general, data on the ethnic 
and / or religious composition of the population is not publicly available and researchers 
have to rely on estimates.330 It should be emphasized that this is not an anomaly for the 
Middle East. Collecting data on the religious and ethnic composition of the citizenry in 
Norway is prohibited. Compared to the Middle East, data on membership in religious 
                                                          
329 Kapiszewski, Nationals and expatriates: population and labour dilemmas for the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states: 27. 
330 Modern population enumeration processes do not have to be carried out by means of ‘counting every 
head’. Statistical sampling can be applied and may result in reliable demographic figures pertaining to the 
composition of the resident population provided that ruling authorities – through the Ministry of Planning – 
support the sampling process with basic data on governorates, households and the geographical distribution of 
inhabitants. Such an authorization has been granted, for instance, in surveys on the Palestinian refugee 
populations in the West Bank and Gaze, Jordan and Lebanon to Fafo, previously known as The Norwegian 
Institute for Applied Social Sciences, currently The Institute for Applied International Studies. For studies on 
living conditions in the Middle East since 1993, see www.fafo.no. 
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organizations and associations that represent ethnic, religious and national groups, is 
however public. The difference between Norway, for instance, and states in the Middle East, 
is that data on the religious and ethnic composition on the population in Arab states is 
registered in public records, particularly through the state mandated official documentation 
and registration of each citizen’s patrilineal religious status.331 This information is, however, 
not publicly available. 
Syria, for instance, stopped releasing data on the religious and ethnic composition of 
its population in 1956. Likewise, Jordanian statistics do not disclose the proportional 
numbers of Jordanians with Palestinian background compared to Jordanians with 
Transjordanian background, although the breakdown and composition of Palestinian 
refugees (both 1948 Palestine refugees who are Jordanian citizens and 1967 Palestinian 
refugees labeled ‘displaced persons’) are available.332 No data has been accessible for the 
Lebanese citizenry since the last population census was carried out in 1932, a point which is 
elaborated upon in chapter 2. Kuwait has, comparably, the most easily accessible and 
composite data.333 However, as the case of the Bidun population clearly illustrates, they 
were included as part of the citizenry prior to 1985 although they never acquired legal 
citizenship. The Bidun were stripped of their citizen-privileges after 1985, and eventually 
labeled as ‘illegal residents and rendered de facto stateless in the aftermath of the liberation 
of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in 1991.334 
In short, demographic statistics on religious, ethnic or tribal groups in four of the six 
states dealt with in this thesis – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait – are perceived as 
internal security issues by ruling regimes and are treated as such.  
                                                          
331 ‘Patrilineal’, i.e. in the case of mixed confessional marriages, for instance, the confessional faith of the father 
determines the confessional status of the child in the Arab Middle East. Lebanon is the only Arab state where 
the state allows by law, and thereby legitimizes, a citizen’s conversion to one of the 18 confessional groups. 
Patrilineal descent is, nevertheless practiced, until the child reaches 18 years and can freely choose 
confessional membership. 
332 For official population statistics in Jordan, see The Department of Statistics, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: 
http://www.dos.gov.jo, accessed 20 December 2011. For estimations on the Palestinian refugee and non-
refugee population in Jordan, see Marie W. Arneberg, Living conditions among Palestinian refugees and 
displaced in Jordan, vol. 237, FAFO-rapport (Oslo: Fafo, 1997), 14-16. 
333 For Kuwaiti official demographic data, see The Central Statistical Office (CSO) under The Ministry of Planning 
http://www.cso.gov.kw/. For the last population census in 2005, see 
http://mopweb4.mop.gov.kw/statistics/CPD/Pop.Census2005(Preliminary%20Results)/2.pdf, accessed 20 
December 2011. 
334 See table 7.1. entitled “The population of Kuwait as rendered in official statistics before and after the Crisis: 
1990 versus 1992-figures” in Maktabi, "The Gulf crisis (1990-1991) and the Kuwaiti regime: Legitimacy and 
stability in a rentier state," 98. See also Shiblak, "Arabia's Bidoon." 
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What evolve over time in these plural and multireligious societies are various forms 
of the “numbers game” whereby power holders adopt policies in order to control and shape 
different forms of minority and majority constellations.335 The political nature of the 
constellation of demographic data lies at the heart of what I term as the ‘politicization of the 
demos’. Given the nature of this stated problem, what then is available official statistical 
demographic data on the size and composition of the population cannot be taken as reliable 
information. Changes are made over time with regards to who is counted and under which 
category. Such changes have occurred, and still do, following the introduction of new 
categories of ‘residents’ or ‘foreigners’ after censuses336; the introduction of new population 
categories337; the issuing of citizenship decrees which either grant or strip individuals and 
groups of citizenship according to the political interest of decision-makers at a given 
historical time338; and difficulties pertaining to renewing resident permits or issuing new 
citizenship documents339. 
It is by reading the political rationale behind crude demographic data and the 
changes that occur when bureaucratic policies are applied in administrating the population 
and thereby gaining control over it, that we as researchers may get a glimpse of patterns of 
inclusionary and exclusionary stratification, where demographic configurations evolve into 
instruments of control at the hands of rulers. 
 
                                                          
335 On the ‘numbers game’, see Jr. Theodore P. Wright, "The ethnic numbers game in India: Hindu-Muslim 
conflicts over conversion, family planning , migration, and the census," in Culture, ethnicity, and identity: 
current issues in research, ed. William C. McCready (New York: Academic Press, 1983), 405-07. 
336 As was the case with Syrian Kurds living in the North-Eastern parts of Syria who were not counted as 
‘residents’, but registered as ‘foreigners’ during the 1962 census. For more, see the Human Rights Watch 
Report The Silenced Kurds, issued in October 1996. 
337 As was the case following the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1951 and the naturalization of 1948 
Palestine refugees as Jordanian citizens. 
338 As was the case with the communal deprivation of citizenship to al-Ghufran tribe in Qatar in March 2005 for 
lack of loyalty to the Emir, and the mass naturalization of Sunni tribes and expatriate workers in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia before local elections. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state: 116-17.  
In June 1994 decree 5247 granted Lebanese citizenship to an unknown number of residents in Lebanon which 
included a conglomerate of stateless persons, long-term residents and children of Lebanese mothers, but 
excluded Palestinians is also an example. 
339 See the 60-page report by Human Rights Watch entitled “Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanian 
Deprived of their Nationality” issued on 1 February 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/01/jordan-stop-
withdrawing-nationality-palestinian-origin-citizens, accessed 28 October 2011. 
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7.3.2 Citizenship legislation 
Official records – such as the text of laws, decrees340 and official statements – constitute 
sources to what can be labeled as documents on citizenship legislation in the state which are 
essential in understanding the politics of citizenship. In general, works on citizenship 
legislation are written almost exclusively by law scholars who do not discuss political, social 
and historical factors that influence and affect the formulation and development of 
citizenship regulations. Questions that address membership aspects in the state are thus 
mostly Arabic publications with a predominantly legal textual approach to citizenship 
legislation, i.e. jinsiyya-related issues. Citizenship is approached in terms of laws and 
regulations pertaining to naturalization and the regaining of citizenship.341  
Though rare to come by, some of these legal books on citizenship legislation render 
case law studies as examples in the appendix or in the course of discussion of a particular 
theme related to the acquisition of citizenship or naturalization. Case law studies render 
claims by individuals and disputes over citizenship and the court’s decisions on behalf of the 
state on whether to grant or oppose demands for citizenship. These examples proved to be 
valuable pieces of information in getting a picture of the types of claims and the decisions 
made – or not made, when requests were, for example, shelved into bureaucratic oblivion – 
as was the case for many claimants for Lebanese citizenship after 1967. These studies were 
essential in shedding light over how and why litigants win or lose their case because they 
reflect representations of inclusionary and exclusionary forces related to the distribution of 
membership in the state. 
  
7.3.3 Family laws and court appeals 
Family laws represent legal texts of another nature than citizenship legislation because 
different confessional groups have formed their own family law as is the case with regards to 
                                                          
340 Decrees are official documents that have the power of law which are issued by elite members of ruling 
authorities such as the monarch, the President, or a Minister. Decrees are usually issued to bypass 
parliamentary processes or voting procedures and are thus expressions of authoritative direct rule. 
341 The list of mainly legal scholars who have produced books on citizenship legislation in different Arab states 
is exhaustive. Here are some examples: Hasan al-Haddawi, al-jinsiyya wa markaz al-ajanib fil-qanun al-kuwaiti  
(n.a.: n.a., 1973); Hasan al-Haddawi, "al-jinsiyya wa ahkamiha fil-qanun al-urduni,"  (Amman: dar majdalawi, 
1993); Jaber Jad Abdelrahman, majmu'at qawanin al-jinsiyya fid-duwal al-'arabiyya  (Cairo: ma'had al-buhuth 
wad-dirasat al-'arabiyya, 1970); Rashid Hamad al-Enezi, al-jinsiyya al-kuwaitiyya  (Kuwait City: Kuwait 
University, 1995); Hasan 'Alawiyya, al-jinsiyya al-lubnaniyya wa turuq isti'datiha  (n.a.n.d.); Sami Abdallah, al-
jinsiyya al-lubnaniyya  (Darayya: maktabat wa matabi' al-shouf al-haditha, 1986). 
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the numerous confessional denominations in Syria and Lebanon. There does not, in other 
words, exist official publications on family law, and a researcher has to get hold of 
compilations of legal regulations and laws issued by publishers who specialize on legal 
literature (such as manshurat al-halabi al-huquqiyya in Lebanon and mu’assasat an-nuri  in 
Syria), or the headquarters of religious organizations and larger churches or mosques in 
capital cities which often have a library and book sales.  
In Lebanon and Syria, family law is officially taught under the auspices of law faculties 
at public universities such as the Lebanese University in Beirut and the University of 
Damascus in Syria, or private universities such as the Université St. Joseph in Beirut where 
the principle language of teaching is French. Books on family law that are used in law courses 
are usually written by current or previous professors in charge of the courses. For a social 
scientist not trained in law, these books proved to be essential in ‘decoding’ the legal 
language in which religious family laws is rendered. With additional help of professors in law 
who teach family law, and practicing lawyers who raise family law cases on behalf of 
litigants, I was able to get an insight into the complex labyrinth of processing cases 
pertaining to family law by citizens who belong to different confessional groups in Lebanon 
and in Syria. 
In general, academic specialization in legal matters pertaining to family law in Arab 
states is not a prioritized legal arena in higher education, nor is it in law firms where in depth 
studies in other legal arenas – such as finance or business – are financially considerably more 
rewarding for students. This situation is comparable to western states, too, with the 
important difference that research and studies in private law pertaining to personal status 
and women’s law (‘kvinnerett’ in Norwegian) is minimal in Arab states. Most academic 
research or high quality reports on personal status issues in the Middle East have since the 
turn of the millennia been done or are sponsored by ‘outsiders’, i.e. visiting scholars and 
researchers who are commissioned either by western NGOs or academic institutions. NGOs 
also commission local authoritative researchers to contribute with reports and analysis on 
women’s position in society.342 It is this observation which convinced me on the importance 
                                                          
342 See for instance, Tomppert and Nazir, Women's rights in the Middle East and North Africa: citizenship and 
justice. Of the states under study, Morocco emerges by far the state where external support has strengthened 
domestic and transnational pressures for change since the early 1990s. In Syria and Lebanon, the EU, Canada 
and Norway have been major financial contributors since the late 1990s in support of women’s and human 
rights’ groups through national cultural and economic organizations (such as the Goethe Institute, Friedrich 
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of probing into the significance of transnational forces for change in family law as discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
7.3.4 Fieldwork and interviews 
As a native Arabic speaker and reader I do not encounter problems related to language. As 
an Arab educated in a western academic institution and living permanently in Norway I am, 
however, not vaccinated against the scholarly biases I carry when analyzing social and 
political structures in the Middle East. While some truth lies in Dogan and Pelassy’s 
statement that “[expatriation has always been perceived as a key to more objective 
judgement”343, I am aware that the analytical glasses I put on to look at the region have been 
formulated in a western academic context. At the same time, I would add that my root-
affiliation also makes me less scared of comparing among Arab states and across continents. 
For, as pointed out in part 5, despite evident differences in the constitution of political order 
in predominantly authoritarian and illiberal states in the Middle East compared to western 
liberal states, I find it challenging to highlight the fruitfulness of applying the same analytical 
concepts when analyzing political processes in both settings. Particularly relevant from a 
social anthropologist point of reference is that some anthropologists remind us that the 
similarities in the distribution and stratification of political power, socio-economic processes 
such as urbanization, and the development of states, are more evident among human 
societies than the differences between them.344 
I rely mainly on secondary literature for my analysis on Morocco and Egypt in chapter 
5 where I compare reform in family law in four states. For Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait and 
Jordan, I have been able to obtain primary data of different kinds. In Lebanon and Syria, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Ebert Stiftung and Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung). In Lebanon, for instance, regional campaigns entitled “My 
nationality Campaign” advocate the case of gendered nationality law and is fronted by CRTD-A 
(www.crtda.org.lb), kafa (www.kafa.org.lb) and nasawiyya (www.nasawiya.org). External financial support is 
not only western: in all six states, Islamic institutions registered in the Gulf are major financial supporters of 
welfare and educational related institutions and programmes, including women’s associations. Egypt 
represents a ‘special’ case, however, in that external financial sponsorship of local NGOs was made illegal by 
law since the mid-1990s. See Neil Hicks, "Transnational human rights networks and human rights in Egypt," in 
Human Rights in the Arab World, ed. Anthony Tirado and Hamzawy Chase, Amr (Philadelfia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 82-83; Nadje Al-Ali, Secularism, gender and the state in the Middle East: the 
Egyptian women's movement  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
343 Dogan and Pelassy, How to compare nations: strategies in comparative politics: 6. 
344 Georges Balandier, Political anthropology  (London: Allen Lane, 1970). See particularly chapter 4 “Social 
stratification and power” and “chapter 5 “Religion and power”. See also Roger M. Keesing, Cultural 
anthropology: a contemporary perspective  (Fort Worth, Tex.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 49-62. 
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obtained copies of court appeals, pertaining both to persons who raise cases against the 
state (in Lebanon), and persons who raise cases in personal status matters in Syria and 
Lebanon. These cases were provided for by lawyers who anonymized the names of litigants. 
In order to get an idea of how litigants present their cases in a religious court, I 
conducted two fieldworks at the Shi’a Court of First Instance (al-mahkama al-bida’yya) and 
the Shi’a High Court (al-mahkama al-‘ulya) in Beirut in December 2007 and in December 
2008 (three weeks each year) where I interviewed judges and lawyers at both courts. Shi’a 
family law tribunals are open to the public in contrast to family law cases in Syria where both 
civil and religious courts are closed to the public. In December 2009 I attended six sessions 
where three religious judges and a civil judge who represents the Lebanese state listened to 
the cases of litigants as presented through their lawyers and where the religious judges gave 
rulings. During that period I read all 65 cases handled by the Shi’a High Court in Lebanon for 
the year 2007 to get an idea of the type of cases raised and the decisions made by a religious 
court.345 
During my fieldworks I interviewed state officials, civil lawyers and judges, religious 
clerics who represent different confessional groups (in Lebanon and Syria), judges in 
religious courts, women’s groups, human rights groups, representatives in labor unions in 
Syria, representatives of pressure groups who lobbied for the citizenship decree in Lebanon 
prior to and after the citizenship decree was issued in 1994,  as well as members of the 
Phalangist political party (al-kata’ib) and representatives of the Maronite League in Lebanon 
(ar-rabitat al-maruniyya) who opposed the decree.346 These interviews were unstructured 
and focused mainly on the subject of expertise which the persons interviewed represented.  
In Jordan I had the opportunity to partake in training sessions held by the Ministry of 
                                                          
345 After using approximately two weeks in order to obtain an official permission to get access and read the files 
on family law at the Shi’a High Court in Beirut, the clerk was puzzled: “Do you want to read last year’s protocol? 
All the others [visiting researchers] want to read the old protocols [dating from the 1930s]. They are more 
valuable. Are you sure you want to read the new ones?”. I mention this because it illustrates how little 
contemporary research is done on family law in Lebanon. Nisrine Mansour’s Ph.D. thesis entitled “Governing 
the personal: Family law and women’s subjectivity and agency in post-conflict Lebanon” (London School of 
Economic and Political Science, 2011) provides valuable insight into family law in contemporary Lebanese 
politics. 
346 “Who are the Lebanese? Some political aspects of citizenship legislation in Lebanon” is the title of an 
unpublished paper on the Decree 5247 of 30 June 1994 (popularly referred to as the ‘Citizenship Decree of 
1994’) in Lebanon which I presented at the conference “Redefinition of national identity and citizenship in the 
age of culturalist politics in Germany, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey” held at Bogazici University, 17-19 June 1999. 
The analysis of the 1994 nationality Decree is not included in the thesis, but serves as a historical event which 
highlights the politicization of membership policies in contemporary Lebanon. 
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Planning where enumerators were being trained in order to carry out the 1994 census. In 
retrospect, such insights into how households and individuals are categorized and counted 
have proved fruitful in widening the scope of understanding how state apparatuses ‘think’ in 
politico-bureaucratic terms.347 
My choice of interviewees in matters related to family law is to a certain extent 
biased. I have mainly focused on representatives and organizations, including religious 
associations, who convey conservative and liberal interpretations of religious text, and not 
those who represent ultra-conservative and fundamentalist interpretations of religious text. 
I have thus not approached individuals and associations that represent extra-official religious 
bodies nor civil societies with neo-conservative leanings such as Islamist revivalist groups 
and Salafist associations.348 While this choice may be seen as a weakness in my analysis on 
particularly counterpressures against reform in family law, I had to draw a limit with regards 
to meeting and interviewing persons and associations that voice arguments against 
strengthening women’s civil rights within family law by referring to a particular religious 
faith. Such arguments are plentiful in the press and on the internet.349  
In other words, I have approached and extracted knowledge from what I labeled as 
‘concerned conservative catalyzers’ (CCC). This is the term I applied for my own personal 
usage when I interviewed individuals or groups who were concerned representatives within 
their confessional communities. They not only acknowledged gender injustices within family 
law regulations, for instance, but – more importantly – the social injustice and psychological 
as well as financial disarray of those affected, mainly children. Indeed, CCCs, though at times 
marginalized and ostracized, are present as members of their confessional groups and voice 
their demands for change.350 These representatives should not be viewed as demanding 
                                                          
347 James C. Scott, Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); James C. Scott, "The Production of Legal Identities Proper to States: The 
Case of the Permanent Family Surname." 
348 It is important to note that I interviewed state officials and leaders of religious associations who represent 
and portray conservative as well as ultra-conservative views pertaining to gender differences in state agencies 
such as the Ministry of Religious Endowments (awqaf), the Faculty of Shari’a at the University of Damascus, the 
Shi’a High Court in Lebanon, the Maronite League in Lebanon, as well as the Greek Orthodox religious court in 
Damascus. 
349 For references on Islamic websites, confer with Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Global mufti: 
the phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī  (London: Hurst, 2009). Relevant articles in Norwegian, "Medier i 
Midtøsten: Regimets stemme eller folkets røst?," Babylon, no. 1 (2011). 
350 This is the case, for instance within the Druze community in Syria as well as in Lebanon. Internal schism was 
particularly noticeable within the Shi’a clerical leadership in Lebanon where Lebanese religious scholar and 
judge Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935 - 2010) had public authority in issuing divorce, to the annoyance of 
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radical changes. They are often deeply religious individuals who do not conceive themselves 
as revolutionaries. Many of the CCCs have – seen from a Norwegian perspective – fairly 
traditional and conservative views regarding gender differences; they perceive women 
ideally as mothers and homemakers, and males as breadwinners. What these 
representatives demand is ‘change from within’, i.e. reforms that strengthen the position of 
women through new interpretations of religious text and by pointing at canonical law 
references and text that emphasize justice, fairness and righteousness, be it within Christian 
church laws of the different confessional denominations, Islamic shari’a laws and 
jurisprudence, or Druze family laws.351 
 
7.3.5 Analyzing discourses on citizenship law and family law 
Reading legal text has been a torturing ordeal. Whether the legal texts concerned citizenship 
legislation or family law, I perceived entering the field of law as much more challenging than 
entering the field of economics and petroleum finance which I had known equally little 
about before imploring into Kuwait’s rentier economy in my Cand. polit. thesis. 
One fruitful avenue in overcoming some of the problems I encountered in reading 
the political grammar of inclusion and exclusion in the state through legal texts such as 
citizenship legislation, and the gendered citizenship which permeates family law, has been to 
approach legal text through discourse analysis. Through a course in qualitative methodology 
I was introduced to Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis which provided useful 
insights in perceiving power struggles through textual analysis. A ‘discourse’, according to 
Fairclough is “analysis of how texts work within a sociocultural practice”352. Fairclough 
introduces a three-dimensional analytical framework for analyzing a particular discourse: 
First, ‘textual analysis’ of spoken or written texts; second, ‘discourse practice’ which refers to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the religious judges at the Beirut Shi’a Court of First Instance as subtly articulated to me during my fieldworks 
at the Court. Lara Deeb comments on this schism, see Deeb, An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in 
Shi'i Lebanon: 54-55, 60, 71,78. Witness also the popularity of Greek Catholic (Melchite) priest Gregoire Haddad 
who maintained his faith although he was banished as priest from his church in Lebanon after calling for the 
political development towards the establishment of a secular polity in Lebanon. See Gregoire Haddad, al-
'ilmaniyya al-shamila [Comprehensive secularism]  (Beirut: mukhtarat, 1978 / 2005). 
351 I elaborate more on the different political and ideological views of individuals and groups who participated 
in the public debate on family law reform in Syria in 2009 in Maktabi, "Female Citizenship in Syria: Framing the 
2009 controversy over the draft laws on personal status." For an interesting article on three divergent 
standpoints on female advocacy groups and women’s political agency in Iran and Sudan, see Tønnessen, "Nye 
utfordringer til islamsk feminisme: Kvinneaktivismens mange ansikter i Sudan og Iran [New challenges to 
Islamic feminism: The multiple faces of women's activism in Sudan and Iran]." 
352 Norman Fairclough, Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language  (Harlow: Longman, 1995), 7. 
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analysis of processes of text production, distribution and consumption; third, ‘sociocultural 
practice’ that reflects analysis of the sociocultural setting in which a discourse is formed, and 
which it influences.353 According to Fairclough, these are “three complementary ways of 
reading a complex social event.”354 
I must immediately infer that I have not chosen particular texts where I have applied 
textual discourse analysis method as Fairclough sketched out. His insights have however 
served as useful tools and a guide to analyzing discourses on citizenship by ordering texts 
and questions at different levels of analysis. For instance, Fairclough argues that what is 
absent from a text is as significant as what is rendered explicitly in a text: “Analysis of 
implicit content can provide valuable insight into what is taken as given, as common sense. It 
also gives a way into ideological analysis of texts, for ideologies are generally implicit 
assumptions.”355 
In chapter 2 I present a re-reading of a one-page document which renders the results 
of 1932-census in Lebanon. The political re-reading of the enumeration process grew out of 
sheer curiousness related to the dates rendered, the enlisted categories of residents and 
emigrants, along with the careful counting of individual members of the different religious 
groups. This particular document eventually led me to the analysis of the political ideas 
baked into the census document and the enumeration process which reflect the methods 
used in order to materialize particular objectives regarding the distribution of power in the 
Lebanese state, and the means used – among these the politics of citizenship and the 
politicization of the demos – to maintain and bolster the survival of the regime until the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1975. 
The discussion on family law debates in Syria in chapter 4 represents an example of a 
multi-leveled discourse: a textual level where religious law appears as codified legal text in 
the form of state law; a discourse practice whereby codified law is institutionalized in ways 
that regulate the distribution of civil and economic rights in society; and yet another level 
where the sociocultural practice of these authoritative laws impact on the establishment and 
sustaining of group-based citizenship rights on the one hand, and gendered differences in 
society on the other. 
                                                          
353 Ibid., 2-3. 
354 Ibid., 133. 
355 Ibid., 6. 
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Building on Fairclough’s insights I differentiated between three types of official, i.e. 
state and governmental documents, and text that reflect the opinions of state officials: i) 
rule bounded texts; ii) authority related texts; and iii) court appeals. 
 
7.3.5.1 Rule-bounded texts 
Citizenship laws, regulations and decrees are examples of rule-bounded text. Legal texts 
have an imperative vocabulary and are among the most reliable sources of text because of 
their very nature as publicly known and recorded binding rules intimately linked to the 
exercise of sovereignty of the state. Jordan’s citizenship legislation serves here as an 
example of rule-bounded text:  
In 1928, Transjordan – as present-day Jordan was then called – issued its first 
Nationality law which stated that “All Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Transjordan on 
the sixth day of August shall be deemed to have acquired Transjordanian nationality”. 
Following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Palestinian residents of the West Bank 
were naturalized as Jordanian citizens through Law 56/1949. Following Jordan’s formal 
annexation of the West Bank of the River Jordan in 1950 a new citizenship law was passed in 
1954 which specified that four categories of persons shall be regarded as Jordanian citizens: 
i) those who obtained citizenship according to the Law of 1928; ii) Non-Jews who had 
Palestinian citizenship prior to 15 May 1948 and resided in Jordan between 20 December 
1949 and 16 February 1954; iii) Those born to Jordanian fathers; iv) Foundlings born of 
unknown parents. Jordan’s citizenship law was once again amended following Jordan’s 
disengagement from the West Bank where article 2 of the disengagement statement reads 
“[e]very person residing in the West Bank before 31 July 1988 is considered a Palestinian, 
not a Jordanian citizen.” The article renders the population of the West Bank de facto 
stateless since there does not exist a ‘State of Palestine’.356  
Jordan’s citizenship legislation reflects political decisions made as to who constitutes 
a Jordanian citizen at a particular point in time. The amendments made over time show how 
territorial expansion and contraction is accompanied by political decisions as to who is 
included and who is excluded from the Jordanian citizenry. The decisions are recorded as 
rule-bounded texts which serve as legislation that form and regulate the citizenry. 
                                                          
356 See al-Haddawi, "al-jinsiyya wa ahkamiha fil-qanun al-urduni," 211, 16-17; Davis, Citizenship and the state: a 
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Another example that can be pointed at is references to terms which correspond 
with ‘guardianship’ or ‘custody’, wali in Arabic in state laws and regulations pertaining to 
family law (in Morocco, Egypt and Syria), and in the uncodified religious law of the Sunni and 
Muslim confessional groups in Lebanon. It is not explicitly stated in these texts that female 
citizens are systematically under the custody of male citizens. What is, nevertheless, 
revealed by reading “between the lines” is that the principle of male guardianship over 
females permeates clauses, sentences and references that regulate not only questions 
pertaining to marriage and divorce where reference to a male guardian is explicit and 
frequent. The principle of guardianship is implicitly ‘baked into’ inheritance law, criminal law, 
and nationality laws where males are valorized and empowered with legal authority not to 
conveyed to females. 
  
7.3.5.2 Authority-related texts 
Authority-related texts are authoritative in the sense that they represent centers of power. 
They differ from rule-bounded texts in that they reflect the opinions of persons in position of 
power and involve various degrees of interpretation. Authority-related texts implicitly 
underline what the current policy should be by emphasizing how it is. Official documents 
such as governmental announcements in gazettes or in newspapers represent one type of 
authority-related texts that substantiate current policies. Another type of authority-related 
texts is rendered in interviews or comments by ministers and public officials through the 
media on matters concerning family law or citizenship legislation where persons in authority 
declare viewpoints and justify them.  
A comment made by Kuwait’s president of parliament in 1997, Ahmad as-Sa’doun, 
illustrates how he refutes the need for amendments in the citizenship law that grants 
Kuwaiti citizenship to the offspring of Kuwaiti women married to non-national male Biduns 
whose children, born and raised in Kuwait, are categorized as ‘non-national’, while the 
offspring of Kuwaiti men married to non-national women gain Kuwaiti citizenship: 
The 1959 citizenship law is to a great extent refined and balanced, it takes care of most humane and 
legal aspects. However, the numerous amendments that have been introduced after its issuing, and 
the failure of the executive power in applying some of its articles have resulted in its abuse.357 
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In his answer, as-Sa’doun shies away from a clear standpoint, implying that the reform in not 
necessary because amendments have already been made and further amendments 
complicate the situation even further. 
 
7.3.5.3 Court appeals 
Court appeals are authority-related texts that put citizenship laws as well as family law 
tenets to the test. As Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the American 
Constitution, noted: “Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true 
meaning and operation.”358 
Both citizenship legislation and family law legislation are powerless without civil as 
well as religious courts that provide premises for their functioning and without judges who 
interpret laws in different ways. 
For instance, exclusionary practice is baked into citizenship legislation with regards to  
‘proof of residence’ in Kuwaiti territories in 1920, or ‘proof of residence’ in 1924 in Lebanese 
territories in the case of litigants who are the offspring of residents in these territories at the 
time, but who were not listed in enumeration lists. Litigants who raise cases where ‘proof’ is 
either non-existent or no longer possible to oblige, is a recurring theme in cases which are 
continuously presented in court in Lebanon and Kuwait. 
Analyzing the explicitly stated and material components of the politics of citizenship 
demanded more than mere reading of legal texts, imploring into demographic statistics or 
studying petitions where non-citizen litigants raise cases to obtain legal citizenship, or 
female citizens who raise cases for divorce, custody over children or economic maintenance 
through court. It is rather, the multiplicity and complexity of relations that evolve out of 
conferring with legal texts, demographic data, institutional settings, economic indicators and 
ideological orientations that together shed light on the power dynamics at hand with 
reference to the politics of citizenship.  
Ayubi touches upon the unveiling of complex social relations where power is at play 
by indicating that  
[s]overeignty of the state, the form of law or the units of domination, are the ‘terminal forms’ that 
power takes on. What matters more are the discreet power relations of ceaseless struggles and 
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confrontations or of transformations and reverses, as well as the relations of mutual reinforcement or 
disjunction among the relations. The various social hegemonies, the formulations of law, and the state 
apparatus, come in the final instance to be the institutional crystallizations of these more complex 
relations.359 
 
Through the discussions rendered in the four articles that constitute the thesis, I have 
attempted to portray and analyze some of these complexities. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
“at certain periods of social transformation, what was structural 
 ceases to be so and becomes subject to human agency”360 
 
 
The relationship between the politics of citizenship and regime survival is complex and defies 
easy summary across the broad range of issues pertaining to membership in the polity and 
the state as discussed in the four articles. More empirical-oriented and comparative studies 
and theoretical elaborations are needed in order to synthesize the impact of inclusionary 
and exclusionary practice with reference to the relationship between structures of 
membership and processes of participation. Nevertheless, a provisional summary and 
reflections over some of what I perceive as key findings is possible. 
The discussion in the four chapters that follow are attempts at applying citizenship as 
a level of analysis with reference to the following questions delineated at the beginning of 
this introduction: i) How does the politics of citizenship reflect the organization and 
distribution of power in the polity and impinge on the survival of the regime?;  ii) Where do 
we find political arenas of contestation through which inclusionary and exclusionary forms of 
citizenship are established, sustained and redefined? iii) In which ways do external and 
internal pressures for change impact on the politics of citizenship in different states in the 
Middle East? 
The empirical material which my analysis is based upon was gathered before the 
revolts and upheavals in the Arab world made their toll in 2011. Massive political 
mobilization challenged the authoritarian governance strategies of regimes in two of the 
states discussed in this thesis: the thirty-year rule of the Mubarak regime in Egypt was 
overthrown, while the fourty-year rule of the Assad regime in Syria is – at the time of writing 
– struggling to survive. Can the politics of citizenship, as defined and discussed in this thesis 
shed light on the background and impact of the forces of change that led to the political 
upheavals evidenced the past year?  
I believe the fruitfulness of a citizenship approach lies in revealing variances 
pertaining to governance strategies of rulers where political considerations related to 
membership and participation policies represent the analytical axis. To a lesser degree can a 
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citizenship approach explain regime survival. In this conclusive part I reflect on the 
relevance, as well as weaknesses, embedded in holding to citizenship as a level of analysis 
when discerning and shedding light on contemporary politics in the Middle East. 
 
8.1 The politics of citizenship:  the organization and distribution of power 
Seen from the perspective of state formation in six states in the Middle East – Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait and Egypt – I point at three provisional conclusions regarding 
the politics of citizenship in the Middle East:  
First, the constitution of the citizenry is of paramount importance for ensuing 
patterns of participation in the polity. Particularly in divided societies, the distribution of 
legal citizenship is a significant mechanism applied by rulers to ensure regime survival. The 
distribution of legal citizenship conditions the terms upon which political participation rests. 
In three states divided along ethnic, religious and tribal lines – Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait – 
institutionalized participatory projects have, indeed, seen light at different points in time 
since independence. Participation is, however, limited in scope, and has structurally 
contained agendas that reproduce and sustain power distribution based on oligarchic rather 
than democratic forms of participation. In these states inclusionary and exclusionary 
practices pertaining to membership in the state reflect more than mere regulation of 
immigration, naturalization and residence policies. These policies permeate the structure 
and distribution of power within the polities. The politics of citizenship in the Middle East 
portrays a range of patterns whereby forms of membership in the territorial state and / or 
the polity on the one hand, and forms of participation in the polity on the other hand, are 
intimately linked. 
In Kuwait, it is the haves against the have nots in terms of those holding Kuwaiti 
citizenship certificates. Legal citizenship guarantees directly (through the dispersion of social 
welfare goods) and indirectly (through the economically lucrative kafala system) the non-
taxation based welfare of a minority citizenry based on the contracted and indentured 
servitude of a majority of non-citizens. The stateless Biduns represents a politically bounded 
limbo population that was at a time included in the citizenry and which represent a 
demographically significant problem of inclusion in the polity. Kuwait shares some common 
features with Lebanon, although the parameters and structures that define and regulate the 
163 
 
politics of citizenship differ. In both states, the organization and distribution of power reflect 
overt exclusionary traits, which are part and parcel of the democratic participatory projects 
portrayed at different historical periods.  
In Lebanon, the political leadership of the four main confessional groups – the Sunnis, 
the Shia, the Druze and the Maronites – are internally divided in politico-religious subgroup 
alliances. These are in continuous power-brokering at the national and international levels. 
Power-sharing sustains the political stalemate established by former PM Hariri after the civil 
war ended in 1990.  State structures that organize and institutionalize membership in 
confessional groups may well be seen and analyzed as illiberal and non-democratic 
measures that sustain and solidify oligarchical rather than democratic forms of governance. 
The Lebanese political order rests upon group-based citizenship which is intimately related 
to the tenets on which the Lebanese political order is organized. Political representation is 
based on the illiberal practice of state mandated membership in religious groups. Political 
elite groups support and legitimize state policies that grant clerical authorities judicial 
autonomy as institutionalized through separate court systems which regulate family law 
issues. Maintaining group-based citizenship is therefore equal to supporting and 
perpetuating the current distribution of political power along confessional lines in ways that 
recurrently and continuously depoliticize conflicts of interest such as efforts at centralizing 
the state’s judicial system, conflict based on class interest and pressures to equalize the 
distribution of civil rights among citizens of different confessional groups and between male 
and female citizens.  
In Jordan, citizens of Transjordanian background are perceived as the monarchy’s 
‘ethnic soldiers’361 – its legitimate supporters and what Butenschøn terms as ‘titular group of 
which the state is the embodiment’.362 The reconfiguration of the Jordanian citizenry 
following Jordan’s disengagement of the West Bank in 1988 (fakk al-irtibat) initiated an era 
of political participation, which has nevertheless been manipulated in order to substantiate 
the power of citizens with Transjordanian background. Electoral participation in 1989, 1993, 
1997 and 2003 reflects, as Lust-Okar argues, how the delineation of electoral districts has 
“clearly shifted political weight away from Jordanians of Palestinian origins towards those of 
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institutions through authoritarian elections: Insights from Jordan," Middle East Law and Governance 1, no. 1 
(2009). 
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Transjordanian origin. […] By gerrymandering, the government pushed seats and 
opportunities to access state resources toward traditional bases of support for the 
regime.”363 
Indeed, a higher degree of participation is observable in these three states, but 
various degrees of participatory projects presuppose exclusionary practices that hardly fall 
under the label ‘democratic’. Scrutinized against political as well as bureaucratic deficiencies 
related to the enumeration of the population, structures of involuntary association at the 
group level, and the systematically gendered distribution of civil rights among female and 
male citizens, the politics of citizenship is characterized not only by its exclusionary traits, 
but also by its exclusiveness. 
A second provisional conclusion is that the expansion of the demos in terms of 
including female citizens as full members of the state has notably occurred in the Maghreb, 
and to a lesser extent in the Mashreq. Tunisia was the first Arab state that standardized the 
distribution of civil citizenship within family law in 1956, the first to grant a woman the right 
to confer her nationality to her children if married to a non-national and the first Arab state 
to withdraw all its reservations to CEDAW in 2011.364 In terms of expanded female 
citizenship, notwithstanding the exception of South Yemen between 1974 - 1990, Morocco is 
the other state that embarked on a paradigmatic shift towards individually-based citizenship 
in 2004. Partial changes gave Egyptian women of all confessional denominations an 
independent, though financially conditional, right to divorce in 2000 – a fundamental civil 
right over a female human’s agency over her body which is no less politically important than 
the franchise which Egyptian women got in 1956. 
In terms of perceiving state formation from a citizenship approach it can be argued 
that conflicts pertaining to legal citizenship and the equalization of civil rights between male 
and female citizens have been addressed in these three North African states and partially 
solved by weakening the ties of group-based citizenship to the benefit of individually-based 
citizenship rights. An individually-based citizenship regime in Morocco is most probably not a 
sufficient measure to ensure the monarch’s autocratic rule. As argued in chapter 5, the most 
important factor that distinguishes the governance strategy of the Egyptian and Moroccan 
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regime during the 1990s is the entry of an Islamic political party (PJD) in 1997 in Morocco as 
legitimate participant in parliamentary elections. The PJD was also the first Islamist party 
ever to be represented as a political association in parliament in an Arab state – a critical 
factor which gives additional sustenance to securing a more inclusive basis for the monarch’s 
autocratic rule. Once pressures to change the family law reached parliament, what was 
previously perceived as a unanimous Islamist opposition was split into one branch that did 
not oppose monarchical rule and one that did. The monarch had thus co-opted reluctant but 
willing Islamists in redefining the tenets of gendered citizenship. More importantly, after 
1993 the monarch in Morocco refrained to resort to violent means of persecution against 
Islamists as did the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia.365 
This last point leads to the third provisional conclusion pertaining to the politics of 
citizenship in the six states under study and which has to a certain degree been 
undercommunicated and therefore not given sufficient attention in my discussions 
pertaining to the relationship between membership and participation in the Middle East: the 
variations pertaining to the use of force by the ruling regime in supporting and sustaining its 
preferred citizenship regime. Ian Lustick points out that the variable ‘control’ represents an 
underdeveloped concept in studies of deeply divided societies, as well as in other non-
consociational but stable and deeply divided societies. He argues: 
There are likely to be many different kinds of control systems; they may involve different mixes of 
coercive and noncoercive techniques; emerge under particular socio-cultural, ideological, economic or 
political conditions; have different implications for the political and social evolution of their societies; 
and be more or less attractive as prescriptive models.366 
In the Middle East, ‘control’ as an analytical variable represents –  along the lines that Lustick 
draws – an essential component that sheds light on the distribution of legal and civil 
citizenship, and by extension, the organization of power in the polity along more or less 
authoritarian lines. Non-coercive techniques of control are institutionalized through 
citizenship laws and family laws. Even in states with variant degrees of political 
representation, participation has a strong oligarchic rather than democratic flavor to it. 
Following my critique of consociational forms of power-sharing, I would argue that 
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consociational political arrangements cannot be understood as ‘non-discriminatory’367 in so 
far as group-based political accommodation in a Middle Eastern context evidently 
discriminates on the basis of gender as well as on the basis of freedom of dissociation in 
religious groups. 
Of the six states under study, the Syrian regime has most notably applied the highest 
degrees of violent means of force in order to ensure its rule. Systematic detentions of 
political dissidents, imprisonment and torture have been widely used measures of 
persecution in ways that find little parallel in the other five Arab states under study.368 
Marginalized long-term stateless residents of mainly Kurdish background and their 
descendants who lacked Syrian citizenship following their deliberate non-registration in the 
1962 census proved to be central opponents against the Syrian regime in the upheavals that 
started in March 2011. 369 Evidently, Syrian authorities applied a policy of exclusion in their 
efforts at centralizing authority in periphery areas and as means to control potential threats 
which, in combination with failed societal pressures for reform, have resulted in the 
prolonged destabilization of internal security.370 Seen through the perspective of the 
expansion of female citizenship in Syria, the Syrian regime perpetuated its Janus-faced 
politics of citizenship articulated through a political agenda that lends ideological lip service 
to universalist secularist ideals, but which staunchly supported and sustained particularistic 
clerical interpretations of civil citizenship as means to ensure the reluctant support of Sunni 
majority groups in maintaining authoritarian rule of the Alawite minority regime. In 
retrospect, it is possible to perceive the political liberalization pertaining to pressures that 
sought to widen female citizenship in Syria between 2003 and 2006 as discussed in chapter 4 
as a short lived exercise. Demands for strengthened individually-based citizenship were 
finally and firmly aborted by 2009 to the benefit of group-based civil and economic 
citizenship in accordance with the interests of conservative clerical groups.371 
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8.2 Arenas of contestation 
The arenas of contestation over principles of inclusion and exclusion pertaining to 
membership in the state and membership in the polity are numerous. What constitutes an 
arena, and the forces that consequently politicize it, are in themselves contingent on the 
institutional characteristics of each state and the specific historical settings that surround it. 
Seen from the perspective of state formation I focused on arenas of contestations related to 
two main focal points: the distribution of legal citizenship on the one hand, and the 
distribution and equalization of civil citizenship between male and female citizens on the 
other hand. A third additional point emerged out of my discussions on pressures to expand 
female citizenship; the forces of economic globalization have in some states impacted 
positively on pressures pertaining to the equalization of civil rights. 
 
8.2.1 Legal citizenship 
With reference to the distribution of legal citizenship, enumeration processes and the 
categorization and institutionalization of each citizen’s ‘primordial’ membership in identity 
groups are latent arenas of contestation. This is particularly evident in divided states where 
state-mandated registration of group-identities is required, and where inhabitants 
particularly on the peripheral boundaries (Kurds in Syria, the qayd ad-dars population in 
Lebanon and the Bidun in Kuwait) have been systematically denied nationality in their place 
of residence and remain stateless.  
Questions pertaining to the distribution of legal citizenship remain under the 
discretion of state authority and in the hands of the government. Rulers issue new 
regulations or change existing citizenship legislations through decree. The expansion of the 
citizenry through political deliberations on reform in citizenship legislation in divided states 
remains a marker of state authorities. Rulers in states in the Middle East reserve the right to 
define who is and who is not eligible to membership in the state according to political 
priorities that concur with their survival strategies. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Justice and the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs (the awqaf) on the other hand. While the former 
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In Lebanon, for instance, the two civil court decisions which overruled the verdict by 
a Sunni religious court in 2006 were not challenged and opened thereby room for 
precedence-setting rulings that strengthened the civil rights of mothers and minor in family 
law issues. However, the Lebanese state could not lose a nationality law case where a 
Lebanese woman gained the right to confer citizenship to her children through court in 
2009. Through debatable legal and judicial steps the ruling was withdrawn a year later, 
safeguarding the sovereignty of the state in presiding over nationality cases. 
 
8.2.2 Civil citizenship 
In the six states discussed in the thesis the government and parliament have since 1990 
constituted institutional arenas of contest whereby demands regarding the distribution civil 
citizenship with reference to the equalization of rights between male and female citizens are 
discussed. Even in fairly authoritarian states such as Syria and – to a lesser degree Egypt – 
public deliberations on issues pertaining to strengthened female civil rights indicate that the 
use of decrees issued by rulers in order to address gender inequality subsided. Human rights 
norms regarding gender equality made their toll in all MENA states. Institutional conditions 
impacted however differently on whether female civil rights were expanded, and to what 
degrees. 
The institutionalization of courts, for instance, and variances in the organization of 
clerical autonomy in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon indicate that the centralization of 
the court system represents an important arena of struggle. Particularly in Lebanon and 
Syria, both majority and minority confessional groups resist institutional change which 
potentially decreases their relative strength as autonomous confessional groups. 
Maintaining the judicial prerogatives of clerics is therefore a means to ensure autonomy in 
regulating internal affairs for religious groups.  
In Morocco and Egypt where institutional centralization in matters related to 
personal status has occurred, textual re-interpretation of particularly Islamic religious 
doctrines and shari’a jurisprudential tenants have been a vibrant exercise among particularly 
feminist Islamist thinkers. Pressures since the late 1990s indicate that what was perceived as 
‘sacred text’ was subject to political deliberations and discussions in the public sphere 
Debates that evolved following the re-reading of religious text created contested field of 
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dissent and consent regarding the basic principles on which the state’s family law shall be 
based: a citizenship regime characterized predominantly by aspects and regulations that 
emphasize group-based membership in the polity; or a citizenship regime which enhance 
and strengthen the distribution of rights and obligations in the polity on an individual basis?  
One particular arena within family law, that of a woman’s independent right to 
divorce without raising case in court, appears to be of particular importance. The 
independent and judicial right to divorce, though severely hampered by the condition of 
financial buy-out on the part of women in Egypt, appears to have been an important 
threshold. Female citizens in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt strengthened their civil rights 
within nationality law and criminal law after gaining an independent right to divorce. 
 
8.2.3 Social citizenship and economic globalization 
Although I have not focused particularly on how economic globalization has affected female 
labor participation in the MENA region, I point at the importance of the impact of economic 
globalization on female labor participation and the ensuing pressures for reforms that 
strengthen female citizenship. Despite Arab women’s comparatively low labor participation 
rates, the percentage of employed women rose considerably between 1960 and 2000.  As 
such, the labor market represents a significant arena of struggle whereby women’s groups 
and labor unions have pressured for strengthened civil rights. With economic liberalization, 
employed women and labour unions have highlighted economic, social and legal issues and 
presented demands in order to improve their living conditions. In all four states, the result is 
a pattern of alliances in which unions, governmental and non-governmental groups have 
cooperated in order to improve what are regarded as legal aspects of social injustice. 
 Economic liberalization and globalization have since the late 1980s been based on 
neo-liberal principles of free trade, increased export-oriented economic activities coupled 
reductions in public expenditure and abolishment of state-subsidized goods and services.372 
What characterizes economic liberalization in the Middle East compared to other regions in 
the world is that economic liberalization has been state-centred and characterized by 
adaptation and what Selvik and Stenslie term as ‘reformism’ in ways which have maintained 
existing economic, social and political structures. The authors argue that through reformism, 
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rulers promised economic and political reforms, and sought adaptation strategies as means 
to adjust their policies towards new global environment by abiding to new norms. According 
to them, Arab regimes  
used the reform idea as a replacement for its weakened ideology. Because Arab nationalism and 
socialism failed to legitimise them, the regimes hope to construct a new ideological legitimacy. What is 
essential in this context is not whether the specific economic and political measures succeed but to 
give the impression that the state has a mission.373 
 
With reference to reforms in family law, I maintain that this perspective explains only to a 
certain extent political regime’s interest in supporting reform. For, how do we account for 
which reforms are introduced, neglected or opposed, particularly with reference to women-
friendly reforms that are both challenged and disputed in all states? 
Brand presents here a more fruitful approach. She relates reforms with political 
regimes’ insecurity regarding their strength. Brand points out that reforms occur as results of 
considerations regarding potential partners where the principle objective is to strengthen 
the regime’s governance strategy and its grip on power.374 In other words, through reforms 
the regime opts to strengthen its grip on power without necessarily increasing its legitimacy. 
The women-friendly reforms in North African states after 2000 appear to be part of such 
political strategies. More overt opposition against reforms in Syria and Lebanon than in 
Morocco and Egypt is, as I argue in chapter 5, related to institutional aspects pertaining to 
the organization of the judicial system and policies that establish group membership in 
multireligious states in distinction to states where Islam is dominant religion. 
Among the challenges created by economic and political globalization are increased 
transnational pressures which fused international human rights norms and standards at the 
domestic level. As such, economic globalization represents a powerful transitional force 
which impelled rulers in Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Syria to sign CEDAW, albeit with 
reservations, in 1981, 1993, 1997 and 2003 respectively. Reservations to CEDAW gave 
leaders the benefits of economic liberalization without obliging them to engage in 
comprehensive reforms. Nevertheless, transnational pressures for change evolved. These 
were characterized by a socialization process between and among domestic and 
international actors whereby national authorities are pressured to change their behaviour 
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and abide to rule of law principles, even though they do not necessarily believe in their 
validity.375 
The political framework that evolves around pressures for and counterpressures 
against the fusing of international human rights norms pertaining to gender equality on the 
one hand (in this thesis understood as ‘civil citizenship’), and the right to a nationality on the 
other (in this thesis discussed as ‘legal citizenship’), represents a ‘meta-arena’ so to speak, 
which – according to some researchers –, has the potential to transform the paradigm in 
which a rights-oriented discourse operates and manifests itself in the Middle East. This 
theme is discussed further in the next section. 
 
8.3 Citizenship and rights: Transnational pressures for change after 1990 
Østerud refers to the processes and forces of globalization as the ‘global shift’ which since 
the 1990s signal the internationalization of problems, societies and decisions where “[r]ights 
and law assume an increasingly supranational character, and the borderline between 
domestic and foreign policy is gradually eroding”. This general description is not contested, 
he argues, but “the degree of transformation, the implications, and the forces behind 
certainly are.”376 
In the Middle East, the post 1990 ‘global shift’ has in the past decade been 
particularly visible with regards to questioning and problematizing exclusionary practices 
pertaining to citizenship with reference to three main legal-demographic categories of 
persons and their appurtenant rights as based in human rights norms and rules: the 
equalization and strengthening of female civil rights; a sharpened focus on the perpetual 
deprivation of citizenship in the region that create different forms of statelessness; and the 
legal plight and workers’ economic as well as protection rights against maltreatment and 
exploitation of the non-citizen workforce, particularly but not exclusively in the Gulf states. 
Within the framework of the thesis, international conventions, emanating primarily 
at the international level can be understood as transnational means through which legal 
citizenship is sought established and consolidated. With reference to gender equality, 
CEDAW adopted by the UN in 1979 represents the most important and comprehensive set of 
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human rights that endorse women’s rights within a human rights agenda. With reference to 
statelessness, the most important rules regarding statelessness and the right to a nationality 
in international law are: article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UHDR) 
which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right 
to change nationality”; the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; and 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which asserts that nationality should 
be granted by “operation of law to a person born in the State’s territory” and to anyone who 
would otherwise be stateless.377  
Two main questions arise out of the juxtaposition of a focus on international 
conventions pertaining to human rights on the one hand, and a citizenship centered focus on 
the other: first, do these two sets of rights mutually reinforce each other in expanding forms 
of citizenship in the Middle East?; and second, if so – how do citizenship rights and human 
rights concur with each other and under what conditions? 
 
8.3.1 Human rights versus citizenship rights: Two alternative traditions? 
Gershon Shafir juxtaposes human rights and citizenship rights and sees them as two sets of 
rights. He argues that they represent ‘two alternative rights traditions’: one which anchors 
rights in membership in a political community through the institution of citizenship, and 
another which disconnects rights from membership and universalizes them through the 
human rights regime. Whereas citizenship is contingent on the state, human rights are 
inherent rights in humans qua individuals irrespective of state membership.378 
Peter Spiro agrees with Shafir on the difference in rationale that underpins the two 
traditions. Spiro spurs further on the argument by stressing the need to extend rights to 
those excluded from citizenship through the potential development of an international 
human rights regime. He points out that citizenship is increasingly being framed as a right in 
itself, and that as a result of the increased salience of human rights at the domestic state 
level “there may be some baselines to which states will have to adhere. Unlike past 
constraints on citizenship practice, those baselines will constrain a state’s core capacity to 
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define its citizenry.”379 For, he explains, “[a]s international norms have aggressively invaded 
virtually every sinew of domestic governance, nationality law has remained largely immune 
to any acknowledged constraint from beyond.”380 He concludes his argument by stating that  
nationality law is the fallen last bastion in the citadel of sovereignty […] indeed, states will retain 
important discretionary powers into the future. But no function of governance will be shielded from 
national law as a categorical matter, membership decisions included.381 
Spiro’s and Shafir’s observations are relevant to my discussions on the politics of citizenship 
and the ensuing inclusion and exclusion of individuals from membership in the polity and in 
the state for two main reasons. First, with reference to gender and the equalization of rights, 
the juxtaposition of citizenship and human rights as two different rights traditions enforces 
reflections on whether family law reforms in MENA are to be understood as expanded 
citizenship rights, or – by contrast – that these reforms are to be understood as processes 
that embed international norms of human rights with regards to gender equality in national 
legislation? Second, Spiro’s and Shafir’s arguments regarding citizenship laws as ‘the last 
bastion of state sovereignty’ contribute to sharpening the distinction I make with reference 
to differentiating between questions pertaining to membership in the state as analytically 
and substantially distinct from questions related to membership in the polity. While the first 
addresses the rights of non-citizens and stateless, the second addresses the rights of female 
citizens. 
 With reference to the first point: My observations support a perspective which sees 
strengthened civil rights for female citizens as expressions of primarily – but not exclusively – 
expanded citizenship at the domestic level. A significant evidence is that strengthened civil 
rights occurred though parliamentary reforms. This understanding does not reduce the 
importance of human rights as driving force for change emanating at the international level, 
but it does accentuate the significance of unraveling the dynamics of political alliance 
formation at the domestic level. 
With reference to the second point: Based on my observations and reflections over 
the two sets of rights – citizenship and human rights – , and the two categories of persons; 
those who lack full membership in the polity (Arab female citizen), and those who lack 
membership in the state (non-citizens and stateless), I argue that there is a politicized 
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dimension whereby Arab polities are more eagerly addressing widened female citizenship 
than addressing the plight of stateless residents. Widened female citizenship in family law 
can be seen in light of a sharper political conviction among rulers that maintaining, 
bolstering and enforcing nationality laws are prerogative decisions that shall be made by the 
state, particularly in divided societies. I elaborate further on these partial conclusions below. 
 
8.3.2 State formation between human rights and citizenship 
Seen from the perspective of state formation – the overarching theoretical and analytical 
framework within which my analysis of the politics of citizenship falls into – I would suggest 
that there are three features related to transnational pressures of change emanating from a 
human rights perspective:  
First, there is an observable gendered dimension to pressures pertaining to the 
expansion of particularly female citizenship in all MENA states. States have, to different 
degrees, been more responsive towards equalizing civil rights between male and female 
citizens and focusing on issues related to gendered inequalities and violence, than to 
pressures that address questions related to statelessness or non-citizens. The distribution 
and withdrawal of legal citizenship is – and will most probably continue to be – practiced as 
control instrument under the discretion of state authority. 
Second, there is a marked regional Mashreq-Maghreb divide where females in North 
African states have succeeded in extracting more rights than female citizens in Mashreq 
states. This is to a large degree related to the centralization of the judicial system in 
Maghreb states which strengthened the powers of decision-makers, independent of political 
regime, to introduce reforms in family law. Reforms that extend or contract female 
citizenship are, nevertheless, prone for withdrawal also through parliamentary reform 
following ‘free and fair elections’. This is not particular to states in the Middle East, nor to 
Islam as religion. Reversals and withdrawals of female civil rights are the result of contracted 
forms of democratization processes. In both democratic and non-democratic polities, 
expansion and contraction of female citizenship are subject to continuous governance 
strategies that aim at winning executive power with the support of conservative nationalist 
and orthodox clerical forces. In European states, the support of conservative forces within 
Catholic churches has invariably led to powerful patriarchal contracts which bolster group-
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based citizenship. Competitive democratic elections in Ireland since independence in 1922, 
Poland in 1993 and Nicaragua in 2006 rendered abortion illegal, hampered the reproductive 
health of female citizens and resulted in the contraction of female citizenship. Illiberal 
outcomes are thus obtained through democratic means. 
Third, ruling regimes are more able to disregard pressures to strengthen the political 
plight of statelessness and non-citizens by emphasizing and safeguarding their sovereign 
authority in defining who is admitted as members. The principle of sovereignty is, after all, 
rooted in exercising authority over geographical borders and over persons who reside within 
them. Ruling regimes in divided states are, moreover, able to sustain authoritarian, 
oligarchic and non-democratic forms of governance that ensures their survival with the tacit 
as well as vocal acquiescence of the citizenry.  
In the Levantine Mashreq states as well as in the Gulf states where most states are 
divided, regimes are less responsive towards issues pertaining to statelessness so that their 
nationality policies become more in agreement with international human rights norms on 
nationality. Female citizens in divided states have obtained meager results in the form of 
tangible reforms that ensure strengthened civil rights. Nevertheless, ruling regimes in 
divided states are more eager to give nominal and potential support to pressures that 
strengthen female civil and social rights through education, health programs, and small-scale 
private enterprises, than to put questions that address the non-citizen population higher on 
the political agenda.  
I shall substantiate the last argument further because it resonates with how and in 
which ways the politicization of the demos in the Middle East serves different purposes 
which strengthen regime survival in particularly divided societies. 
The debates on family law reflect, as argued in chapters 4 and 5, a sharpened public 
as well as internally divisive arena at the domestic level in different states. Reinterpretation 
of sacred text and a widened sphere of actors perceived as legitimate participators in that 
endeavor have resulted in the politicization of issues by defining these as conflicts of interest 
pertaining to divorce, custody over children, poverty alleviation, waged labor and working 
conditions, rather than defining these primarily in terms of conflicts pertaining to ‘religion’ in 
a narrower sense, i.e. doctrinal understandings on gender differences and the sustaining of 
conservative and orthodox definitions of religious text. The result is an implicit, though 
notably not overtly accentuated secularization process of contested issues: clerical authority 
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is to a lesser degree seen as authoritative and sovereign in defining family law tenets that 
regulate gender relations in the form of the state’s family law.382  
Kiddie notes that “[i]n the Middle East, the dominant form of secularization – that 
initiated by the states – was not at all liberal and was rarely democratic.”383 I believe that 
Kiddie’s observation is both valid and fruitful in shedding light on reform processes. What we 
are currently seeing in the Middle East in the field of family law reform is that forces of 
change and counterforces against change lead to a more or less violent democratization 
process by way of pressures to redefine the contractual relationship between rulers and 
ruled and – by extension – citizens’ civil rights through the institution of citizenship. The 
pattern of variation pertaining to the different outcomes of this process is unclear: further 
outcomes may most probably show a wider variety of responses and challenges pertaining 
to the organization and distribution of civil rights, with significant economic consequences 
pertaining to inheritance and authority over the disposition of conjugal material and 
immaterial assets, most importantly male sovereignty over children. 
In divided states, the distribution of legal citizenship as well as civil citizenship is 
intimately related to sustaining group-based citizenship. Group-based citizenship 
accentuates tribal traits in Kuwait, confessional traits in Lebanon and Syria, and tribo-
nationalist traits in Jordan. In these states, gendered issues pertaining to unequal 
distribution of civil rights between males and females are easily politicized because they 
serve as means that sustain the salience of kinship, confessional and / or nationalist ties. 
Gender differences are, seen from a family law perspective, based on the principle of 
structuring group boundaries through the use of state power. 
With reference to the discussion presented in chapter 5 I would anticipate that the 
reform trajectory pertaining to wider female citizenship – within family law as well as 
citizenship law –  to occur at a much slower and conflicting pace in the Mashreq, i.e. the 
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Levantine and Gulf states. A hypothesis I am working on is that the impact of rentierism, that 
is the comparatively high proportion of externally generated financial capital in for example 
the Lebanese, Jordanian and Gulf economies coupled with strong laissez-faire economic 
state sanctioned policies are powerful forces against pressures for further reforms in family 
law and expanded female citizenship. The same powers impact, I believe, even more 
forcefully on preserving strict distinctions between citizens and non-citizens in the state.384 
In 1996, Carole Pateman argued in favor of substantiating human rights rather than 
citizenship: 
The major problem with citizenship has been and remains, its exclusionary character, both within 
states in the case of women, and many other peoples and categories of inhabitants, and 
internationally, because citizenship has been tied to inclusion in particular states. Human rights are 
crucial because, in principle, at least, they give standing to individuals irrespective of their citizenship 
or lack of citizenship, and so help open the way for democratization and membership to become less 
state-centered.385 
 
Pateman shares, in other words, the same view as Shafir and Spiro in emphasizing the 
relevance of human rights as vehicles for change and the shortcomings of citizenship rights 
as impediments for reforms which lead to more expanded forms of democratization in the 
polity.  
I believe that the insights of these authors resonate well with reference to 
consolidated territorial states where legal citizenship and civil citizenship are 
institutionalized to different degrees. However, in the Middle East and in other states where 
legal citizenship is contested, state formation is still in the making. I would therefore argue 
that a state-centered and realist perspective is imperative if and when we seek to uncover 
and analyze forces and pressures for change that aim to expand human dignity and rights, 
whether these are pressured for by means of embedding human rights standards in 
domestic politics, or by means of pressures for widened or expanded forms of citizenship. By 
a ‘realist and state-centered perspective’ I mean one which is sensitive to the variety of 
patterns pertaining to pressures for reform at the domestic level. What is required – in 
terms of statemanship or in terms of advocacy – is a sensitiveness towards analytical 
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perspectives pertaining to opposition towards reform, and how and in which ways domestic 
resistance dovetails with or is in opposition to significant counterpressure groups. 
Counterpressure groups are found both within and outside the state apparatus, and these 
are able to form alliance patterns that are sustained and reproduced in collaboration with 
powerful international actors. 
Alliance patterns between international security interests, such as the US 
administration and the EU, and domestic conservative and orthodox politico-economic 
interests are only recently being profiled and criticized more boldly.386 Critics point at the 
double agendas presented – one which emphasizes women’s emancipation and ‘freedom’ 
on the one hand, and the merits of strengthening and widening capitalist forms of 
entrepreneurial and commercial interests as well as ‘religious freedom’ on the other. Such 
agendas have both strengthened and bolstered conservative and orthodox political alliances 
in other parts of the world in formerly Eastern Europe (such as Poland after 1993) and in 
Latin America (such as Nicaragua after 2006).  These alliances bolster existing patterns of 
unequal power distribution among female and male citizens in ways that is in accordance 
with politically and economically salient societal groups who support the survival of existing 
political regimes. 
The proliferation of women’s rights as part of the human rights agenda have 
evidently proved to be significant contributors for supporting domestic pressures for reform, 
as argued in chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless, reforms need to find resonance in each state in 
ways that harmonize with the political agendas of supporters and – perhaps more intriguing 
and challenging, but no less important – opponents at the national level. The single most 
significant supporter for reforms that strengthen female civil rights is, as concluded in 
chapter 5, a political regime that advocates expanded female citizenship.  
States – and by extension state power – remain enforcers of rights and, thereby, 
guarantors of rights, whether these are defined as citizenship rights or human rights. 
International institutions still lack the authority and sovereign mandate to dictate a state in 
the Middle East to guarantee citizen rights that resonate with strengthening and expanding 
legal citizenship and civil citizenship. 
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8.4 Female citizens as ‘the masses’:  gendering the democratic deficit  
In their introductory to Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the deficit, published in the 
same year as the Arab uprisings made their toll, Elbadawi and Makdisi point out that “[w]ith 
the exception of Lebanon and early isolated engagements that did not last long, Arab 
political regimes since independence have generally been characterized by varying forms of 
authoritarian rule”.387 They reiterate their verdict by stating that: 
[w]ith or without greater gender equality, […], the Arab countries (with the exception of Lebanon) 
remain autocratic and the question of explaining the persistent Arab democracy deficit remains to be 
addressed. […] There is plenty of evidence that the political and civic rights record in Arab countries 
has been marred by serious violations, attested by various reports of Arab and human rights 
organizations. All this lends evidence to the empirical support that, excepting one case (Lebanon), 
various shades of autocracy have prevailed in these countries since independence.388 
The case of Lebanon is discussed in three of four articles in this thesis. In none of the articles 
does the impact of the politics of citizenship, as defined here, lend support to the uniform 
understanding that Lebanon represents an exception – a ‘special case’ – of a democratic safe 
haven amidst an autocratic and authoritarian region. At best, Lebanon provides a 
prescription of how a cartel of power-holders can maintain stability under implicit overt 
structures of control which discriminate on the basis of gender as well as with reference to 
the freedom of belief. At worst, Lebanon is an extreme case where illiberal membership 
structures condition an oligarchic and patriarchal power-sharing formula that ensures 
stability through means that should not be conflated with ‘democracy’. 
If and when we as researchers seek to address ‘democracy deficits’ in MENA, we 
have to keep an eye on the arenas and battlefields through which state power is applied by 
governing elite groups to define and regulate the demos of the state. We need to 
continuously ask questions such as: who constitutes the citizenry of this particular state?; 
who constitute full members of the polity?; under which terms of membership 
constellations are those included and those excluded from the polity able or permitted to 
exercise potential civil or political rights, albeit prevented from participation if they lack legal 
and / or civil citizenship? 
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If Lebanon is still apprehended as a ‘model’ against which other states in the region 
shall measure their degree of democratic rule against, then I hold the opinion that 
researchers need to introduce a more complex and comprehensive set of indicators. These 
may reflect and highlight the politicization of the demos not only in Lebanon, but also in 
other states in the Middle East in order to highlight the particularly inclusionary and / or 
exclusionary conditions on which political participation rests upon. Through such an 
enlarged scope of analysis where membership aspects are juxtaposed against participation 
aspects we can discern important features that shed light on the constitution of the political 
order and the distribution of power in the polity which sustains and secures regime survival. 
Writing in 1963, Max Rheinstein commented on the challenges facing new states in 
Africa: 
Status of women and land tenure are but two topics of customary law with respect to which changes 
will have to be made. […] But in many respects the customary rules of succession will have to be 
adapted to the conditions of modern society, including rules that, like those of Islam, constitute parts 
of sacred traditions. Reforms recently in such strictly Islamic countries as Morocco, Tunisia, or Egypt, 
indicate that the shari’a is not incapable of adaption to change.389 
 
In my table pertaining to female citizenship, Morocco and Tunisia, and to a certain extent 
Egypt, currently represent the only three Arab states where female civil rights are 
individually based. One final conclusion to draw is that democratization can be seen as a 
dependent rather than an independent variable: the expansion of the demos by including 
female citizens as full members of the polity is a necessary though not a sufficient condition 
for the democratization of the polities in the Middle East. A focus on ‘democratization’ as an 
independent variable, operationalized by selecting variables such as electoral procedures, 
party structures or power-sharing formulas, does not necessarily lead to better governance 
in terms of more equitable distribution of power in a polity. 
The status of women is a political cursor that reflects the comprehensive 
democratization of society. Female civil rights in the Middle East are not only ‘women’s 
issues’. The use of state power in institutionalizing and distributing civil rights among and 
between citizens in society reflects central issues of consent and dissent pertaining to how 
and in which ways power is organized and allocated within the polity. Seen from a state 
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formation perspective, Arab female citizens are, indeed ‘the masses’ in present-day Arab 
polities. 
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i Under the rule of the revolutionary government in South Yemen (1967-1990) women obtained an 
independent and equal civil status with men in marriage and divorce through Law of the Family (Law no. 1, 
1974). The law was abolished upon the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 and the introduction of 
Law no. 20 regarding Personal Status in 1992. See Welchman, Women and Muslim family laws in Arab states: a 
comparative overview of textual development and advocacy: 160. 
ii Regulations for the personal status of Muslims were formed in 1920 and a family law for Copts was formed in 
1938. In 1955, dual judicial courts were abolished and the family law of Copts is promulgated by in secular 
courts. where civil judges apply – to a certain extent – Coptic family law. Shari’a based jurisdiction is, however, 
often applied either due to negligence, ignorance or repression by predominantly Muslim judges who can point 
at the ‘shari’a stipulation in the Constitution 
iii In 2003 Iraq’s at the time Governing Council passed Resolution 137 which aimed at abrogating the existing 
unified code of 1959. Welchman, Women and Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of 
textual development and advocacy: 25. This Resolution is, at the time of writing, still ‘at play’. Al-Ali and Pratt 
point that “[s]ince family law is not the preserve of central government and the wording of the constitution is 
substantially loose, this devolves authority to the regions to specify family law. […] the current constitution 
enables a system in which women are not necessarily divided by sect that allows different regions of Iraq to 
implement different family laws.” Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Christine Pratt, "The United States, the Iraqi women's 
diaspora and women's 'empowerment' in Iraq," in Women and war in the Middle East: transnational 
perspectives, ed. Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Christine Pratt (London: Zed Books, 2009), 89. The authors point 
further that “[t]his realizes the worst fears of many women’s rights activists in that it opens the way for a 
Lebanese-type system, in which family law is governed according to respective membership of a religious sect.” 
Ibid., 88. See also "Women and the Law in Iraq," (December 2010), 
iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf. 
iv Sudan’s 1991 family law codified in 1991 prevails in Northern Sudan after the establishment of the state of 
South Sudan in 2011. See Tønnessen, "Nye utfordringer til islamsk feminisme: Kvinneaktivismens mange 
ansikter i Sudan og Iran [New challenges to Islamic feminism: The multiple faces of women's activism in Sudan 
and Iran]."  
v Iran’s Family Protection Law of 1967 was suspended with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and replaced with a 
conglomerate of transitional Islamized laws and fatwas that are deemed ‘Islamic’ by the Judicial Supreme 
Council. See an-Naʿīm, Islamic family law in a changing world: a global resource book: 108. According to 
Marianne Bøe, recent changes include art. 946 regarding rights of inheritance to widows changed in 2009. 
Deliberations concerning a draft law presented in 2007 are controversial and not likely to be promulgated in 
the near future (personal communication, 5 December 2011, forthcoming Ph.D. University of Bergen). 
vi Each of the 18 officially acknowledged religious denominations in Lebanon has independent jurisdiction in 
family law. A common institutional judicial framework for Christian denominations was established 1951 and a 
similar setup was established for Muslim denominations in 1962. Az-Zein, qawanin wa qararat al-ahwal as-
shakhsiyya lil-tawa'if al-masihiyya fi lubnan [Laws and regulations on personal status for Christian confessional 
groups in Lebanon]; Aref Zeid Az-Zein, ed. qawanin wa nusus wa ahkam al-ahwal ash-shakhsiyya wa tanthim 
al-tawa'if al-islmaiyya fi lubnan [Laws and texts and rulings on personal status and the organization of Muslim 
confessional groups in Lebanon] (manshurat al-halabi al-huquqiyya, 2003). 
vii A draft text on Palestinian code for personal status was presented in 2005 which is viewed by women’s 
activists as limiting the civil rights of women and presenting a conservative profile which does not reflect the 
achievements and contributions of Palestinian women in the continuing national struggle for an independent 
Palestine. The draft law explicitly requires a guardians’ consent in matters related to marriage which the “Chief 
Islamic Justice has explained as primarily protective of women” and includes a provision for judicial khul’ 
“giving the judge a substantive role in assessing the need for such a divorce.” See Welchman, Women and 
Muslim family laws in Arab states: a comparative overview of textual development and advocacy: 74, 119. 
viii Israel is defined as a semi-democracy due to ethnocratic dimensions in the legal system where Law of 
Nationality and Law of Return establish group-based civil rights exclusively for the state’s Jewish citizens. See 
Anis F. Kassim, "The Palestinians: From hyphenated to integrated citizenship," in Citizenship and the state in the 
Middle East: approaches and applications, ed. Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis, and Manuel S. Hassassian 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 210, 33.  In 1992 the Basic Law of Human Dignity and 
Freedom was legislated. Swirski points that this law “came short of removing the main legal obstacle to the 
attainment of gender equality in Israel – the jurisdiction of religious courts in personal status matters” Barbara 
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Swirski, "The citizenship of Jewish and Palestinian Arab women in Israel," in Gender and citizenship in the 
Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 320. On the institution of the 
‘get’ and female civil rights in the Jewish family law in Israel, see Blecher-Prigat, "The interplay between tort 
law and religious family law: The Israeli Case". 
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